The thesis focuses on the study of the capability approach in the economist Amartya K. Sen and its relationship to justice at the global level. First we focus on the concept of global justice against international and transnational justice. Here we analyse the potential capacity (capability) as the key to global justice. From the criticism of other authors like Pogge, Nussbaum, Ricoeur, Cortina, Conill and Crocker we appreciate the potential and limits of Sen’s approach for global justice. The methodology used is the critical hermeneutics. Based on the study of the works of Amartya K. Sen we seek to unravel the key concepts of its economic and ethical proposal in view of the development of a theory of global justice. Chapter 1 is a general introduction to the conducted research in the thesis and the relevance of the addressed topics. Chapter 2 is dedicated to the state of the justice and analyses the proposals of international, transnational and global justice by authors such as John Rawls, Onora O'Neill, Thomas Pogge or David Miller level. Each of them defends a different conception of justice, which refers to assistance to third or liability to foreign countries to own suffering quotas poverty or inequality that hinder the development and recognition of the dignity of persons. The justification for each other is based on the importance of maintaining national independence, promote human rights, fulfil obligations that link us to the rest of humanity or achieving minimum international level to prevent exploitation or domination of those most vulnerable by those who have power. Thus we approach the most common justice-related responses to the question about what should be the international response to the problems of development and poverty suffered by a significant percentage of the world population. In chapter 3 we try to clarify fundamental aspects of the capability approach, going to linking the concept of capacity with notions of positive and negative liberty, or real freedom or as non-domination of republicanism. So we try to know the meaning of the concept of capacity and the importance it has for the understanding of justice from the perspective of Amartya Sen. This leads us to appreciate the dimensions of well-being and agency. We consider the evolution of these concepts and their development priorities have had on the work of Sen and how this affects the way of understanding freedom and Justice. For this task we have had to resort to the critical considerations of authors like David Crocker or Adela Cortina, qualifying or even correct aspects of the understanding of these concepts by Sen, especially as regards the meaning of the agency and its implications for individual autonomy. The study on agency allows us to delve into consideration the collective capabilities, as a way to expand the agency beyond the individual and including communities or groups as agents. This reflection has led us to consider that there are other agents of justice outside the state able to assume the role of agents in the sense that Sen specified. Also from the agency have critically considered the phenomena of adaptive preferences, resulting ultimately in failure of autonomy that deserves to be treated as cases of injustice. To conclude this chapter we discuss the contributions and criticisms Martha Nussbaum and Gerald Cohen made the concept of capacity Amartya Sen, reflecting on its scope and responding to the nuances that suggest for the approach from the relevance they may have to the proposed justice overall we defend. In Chapter 4 we try to put on two fundamental reflections about the idea of justice in Sen, namely, the concepts of equality and freedom. We try to locate the role occupied by each of them for a theory of global justice, clarifying the proposed opening distance Sen and Rawls. We propose as an end of distributive justice equality of basic skills and this led us to justify the capacity as optimal variable for the evaluation and metrics of justice. However, regarding capability approach we try to think beyond the debate on the informational basis of justice, and we consider the possibility of a combined information basis of human needs and their connections with the Sen’s capability approach. In chapter 5 we address the criticism that Thomas Pogge launches to capability approach trying to show their deficiency as a normative criterion to defend a theory of justice. In this regard the proposal of Pogge based on resources, particularly in the version of primary goods by Rawls tries to establish itself as superior to the capability approach, both in the treatment of inequality and for poverty eradication. Then we respond to criticism of Pogge and nuanced some issues on which draws attention trying to clarify or correct those points that deserve capability approach to be considered in a theory of global justice. In chapter 6 we focus on the limits and scope of the capability approach by Amartya Sen to a theory of global justice. We can say that this chapter considers at first the positive contributions of the capability approach and on the other side of deficits’s foundations of the approach from the criticism that several authors have done, pointing to aspects that deserve to be rethought or extended. In this sense we try at first to focus on intercultural advantages of capability approach and appreciate cultural freedom and intercultural dialogue as positive for a theory of global justice. This leads us to consider the possibility of building an intercultural human identity beyond national borders, which can be key to a proposal of global justice. On the other hand, we address the question of the requirement of impartiality that any theory of justice from the idea of equity claims, and raises Sen as open impartiality, against the closed impartiality of Rawls. We consider whether this opening is an advantage for a theory of global justice and in what direction. The capability approach reclaims the importance of public debates and government discussion ant this fact leads us to consider the value of deliberative democracy for a theory of global justice. The lack of specificity of deliberative democratic proposal by Sen forces us to consider other interpretations like David Crocker from the capability approach, which is built from an ethics of global development. Finally we value the contribution of human rights as global ethical imperatives to defend a proposal of global justice from the perspective of capability. Regarding the deficits foundation of the approach we deal with the criticisms and corrections that authors like Alkire, Ricoeur, Deneulin or Cortina point highlighting the need to complement the approach that has a solid normative basis. After assessing these deficits of Sen’s capability approach we consider the possibility of maintaining a theory of global justice and reflect about Gustavo Pereira proposal from a critical theory of justice based on discourse ethics. We finish our written in Chapter 7 exposing conclusions.
2016-01-08
