Moral Emotions, Principles, and the Locus of Moral Perception
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Moral Emotions, Principles, and the Locus of Moral Perception

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Moral Emotions, Principles, and the Locus of Moral Perception

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Corbí, Josep E. Perfil; Prades, Josep L.
This document is a artículoDate2006
I vindicate the thrust of the particularist position in moral deliberation. to this purpose, I focus on some elements that seem to play a crucial role in first-person moral deliberation and argue that they cannot be incorporated into a more sophisticated system of moral principles. More specifically, I emphasize some peculiarities of moral perception in the light of which I defend the irreducible deliberative relevance of a certain phenomenon, namely: the phenomenon of an agent morally coming across a particular situation. Following on from Bernard Williams, I talk of an agent's character as a factor that con- tributes to fixing what situations an agent comes morally across. A crucial point, in the debate, will be how an agent confronts the normatively loaded features of his own character when he is engaged in first-person deliberation.

    Corbí, Josep E. Prades, Josep L. 2006 Moral Emotions, Principles, and the Locus of Moral Perception European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 2 61 80

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