Mittelmann, Jorge | |
This document is a artículo publicadoDate2014 | |
Este documento está disponible también en : http://hdl.handle.net/10550/40207 |
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This paper deals with a seeming contradiction that may seriously impair Aristotle’s definition of the soul in his De Anima. While this definiens has been widely regarded as providing a non-dualistic account of life-functions, grounded in a hylomorphic approach to living beings, Aristotle sticks to an instrumental language vis-à-vis the body, which he consistently refers to as a tool of the soul. It is argued that this philosophical way of talking should be taken at face value, without dismiss- ing it as a stylistic feature or a theoretical hangover from Aristotle’s Platonic days. By paying close attention to the Peripatetic and Neoplatonic reception of the “soul – boatman analogy”, the paper concludes that organic bodies may be considered as instrumental in nature, without this entailing commitment to further individual souls conceived as “users”. | |
Mittelmann, Jorge. ¿Una imagen dualista en el De Anima de Aristóteles?. Quaderns de Filosofia; Vol 1, No 2 (2014). |
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https://ojs.uv.es/index.php/qfilosofia/article/view/4110 |