The main purpose of this paper was to show that the certainty and reflection effects of prospect theory do not occur when stimuli have an affective value. To this end, 160 participants were asked to reply to a series of problems originally designed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), but modified according to the contributions of Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001). The sample was divided into four experimental conditions, two in a gain situation and two in a loss situation. In both cases, affect-rich and affect-poor stimuli were applied in sure and probable alternatives. The findings showed that, in agreement with our hypotheses, the affective value of the stimuli altered the outcome predicted by prospect theory, showing response patterns contrary to certainty and reflection effects (p ≤ .01 and p ≤ .05 respectively). Therefore, this research supports the influence of the emotions in the decision-making process, and should be extended to other aspects of prospect theory.