A strategic approach for the discounted Shapley values
NAGIOS: RODERIC FUNCIONANDO

A strategic approach for the discounted Shapley values

DSpace Repository

A strategic approach for the discounted Shapley values

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Calvo, Emilio
dc.contributor.author Gutiérrez-López, Esther
dc.date.accessioned 2022-05-19T17:58:42Z
dc.date.available 2022-05-19T17:58:42Z
dc.date.issued 2015
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10550/82901
dc.description.abstract The family of discounted Shapley values is analyzed for cooperative games in coalitional form. We consider the bargaining protocol of the alternating random proposer introduced in Hart and Mas-Colell (Econometrica 64:357-380, 1996). We demonstrate that the discounted Shapley values arise as the expected payoffs associated with the bargaining equilibria when a time discount factor is considered. In a second model, we replace the time cost with the probability that the game ends without agreements. This model also implements these values in transferable utility games, moreover, the model implements the α-consistent values in the nontransferable utility setting.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartof Theory and decision, 2015, vol. 80, num. 2, p. 271-293
dc.source Calvo, Emilio Gutiérrez-López, Esther 2015 A strategic approach for the discounted Shapley values Theory and decision 80 2 271 293
dc.subject Economia Aspectes psicològics
dc.title A strategic approach for the discounted Shapley values
dc.type journal article es_ES
dc.date.updated 2022-05-19T17:58:42Z
dc.identifier.doi https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-015-9500-5
dc.identifier.idgrec 105921
dc.rights.accessRights open access es_ES

View       (616.3Kb)

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Search DSpace

Advanced Search

Browse

Statistics