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Moral Emotions, Principles, and the Locus of Moral Perception

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Moral Emotions, Principles, and the Locus of Moral Perception

dc.contributor.author	Corbí, Josep E.
dc.contributor.author	Prades, Josep L.
dc.date.accessioned	2022-01-10T11:39:27Z
dc.date.available	2022-01-10T11:39:27Z
dc.date.issued	2006
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10550/81260
dc.description.abstract	I vindicate the thrust of the particularist position in moral deliberation. to this purpose, I focus on some elements that seem to play a crucial role in first-person moral deliberation and argue that they cannot be incorporated into a more sophisticated system of moral principles. More specifically, I emphasize some peculiarities of moral perception in the light of which I defend the irreducible deliberative relevance of a certain phenomenon, namely: the phenomenon of an agent morally coming across a particular situation. Following on from Bernard Williams, I talk of an agent's character as a factor that con- tributes to fixing what situations an agent comes morally across. A crucial point, in the debate, will be how an agent confronts the normatively loaded features of his own character when he is engaged in first-person deliberation.
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartof	European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2006, vol. 2, num. 2, p. 61-80
dc.rights.uri	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source	Corbí, Josep E. Prades, Josep L. 2006 Moral Emotions, Principles, and the Locus of Moral Perception European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 2 61 80
dc.subject	Filosofia
dc.title	Moral Emotions, Principles, and the Locus of Moral Perception
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.date.updated	2022-01-10T11:39:28Z
dc.identifier.idgrec	036429