How not to Resist the Natural Kind Talk in Biology
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How not to Resist the Natural Kind Talk in Biology

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How not to Resist the Natural Kind Talk in Biology

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dc.contributor.author Ferreira Ruiz, Maria José es
dc.date.accessioned 2019-07-02T09:49:36Z
dc.date.available 2019-07-02T09:49:36Z
dc.date.issued 2019 es
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10550/70664
dc.description.abstract After the dawn of the traditional, essentialist view of natural kinds in contemporary philosophy (exacerbated in philosophy of biology by ?population thinking?), non-essentialist cluster conceptions of natural kinds have been extensively supported and applied to numerous biological categories. However, salient philosophers have put forward two challenging arguments against cluster kind theories. I argue that, in both cases, discontent with a cluster conception of natural kinds is motivated by tacit and previous assumptions that can be challenged. I conclude that the concerns expressed in the objections do not make good reasons to resist natural kinds talk in biology unless one is willing to share such commitments and assumptions with respect to natural kinds. Ultimately, the discussion can be used to point out that our very expectations regarding natural kinds theories could use a rethink. Keywords: natural kinds, essentialism, cluster kinds, Boyd, mechanisms. es
dc.source Ferreira Ruiz, Maria José. How not to Resist the Natural Kind Talk in Biology. En: Quaderns de filosofia, 6 1 2019: 47-58 es
dc.title How not to Resist the Natural Kind Talk in Biology es
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article en
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion en
dc.subject.unesco UNESCO::FILOSOFÍA es
dc.identifier.doi 10.7203/qfia.6.1.14824 es

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