¿Intuición o confianza racional?

¿Intuición o confianza racional?

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¿Intuición o confianza racional?

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García Arnaldos, María Dolores
This document is a artículoDate2018

Este documento está disponible también en : http://hdl.handle.net/10550/69013

According to the traditional conception, the justification of basic logical beliefs ?understood both inferentially and non-inferentially? cannot avoid either circularity or regression to infinity. To justify logical basic rules inferentially involves using logical principles, so a vicious circle is generated. Appealing to basic sources such as intuition, does not avoid such problems. I will argue that it is necessary to resort to an entitlement, a sub-class within the epistemic warrants. If we also accept that intuiting is something that we do and not something that happens to us, we can sustain that intuition, indeed, is based on a rational trust.

    García Arnaldos, María Dolores. ¿Intuición o confianza racional?. En: Quaderns de filosofia, 5 2 2018: 49-71

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