Strategic behaviour in Schelling dynamics: Theory and experimental evidence
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Strategic behaviour in Schelling dynamics: Theory and experimental evidence

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Strategic behaviour in Schelling dynamics: Theory and experimental evidence

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Benito, Jon; Brañas, Pablo; Hernández, Penélope; Sanchis Llopis, Juan Alberto
This document is a artículoDate2015

Este documento está disponible también en : http://hdl.handle.net/10550/68664
In this paper we experimentally test Schelling's (1971) segregation model and confirm the striking result of segregation. In addition, we extend Schelling's model theoretically by adding strategic behavior and moving costs. We obtain a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which rational agents facing moving costs may find it optimal not to move (anticipating other participants' movements). This equilibrium is far from full segregation. We run experiments for this extended Schelling model, and find that the percentage of strategic players dramatically increases with the cost of moving and that the degree of segregation depends on the distribution of strategic subjects.

    Benito, Jon Brañas, Pablo Hernández, Penélope Sanchis Llopis, Juan Alberto. 2015 Strategic behaviour in Schelling dynamics: Theory and experimental evidence Journal Of Behavioral And Experimental Economics 57 134 147

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