Free will and open alternatives

Free will and open alternatives

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Free will and open alternatives

Show simple item record Moya Espí, Carlos 2018-06-11T07:21:47Z 2018-06-11T07:21:47Z 2017
dc.description.abstract In her recent book Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio develops a distinctive version of an actual-sequence account of free will, according to which, when agents choose and act freely, their freedom is exclusively grounded in, and supervenes on, the actual causal history of such choices or actions. Against this proposal, I argue for an alternative- possibilities account, according to which agents' freedom is partly grounded in their ability to choose or act otherwise. Actual-sequence accounts of freedom (and moral responsibility) are motivated by a reflection on so-called Frankfurt cases. Instead, other cases, such as two pairs of examples originally designed by van Inwagen, threaten actualsequence accounts, including Sartorio's. On the basis of her (rather complex) view of causation, Sartorio contends, however, that the two members of each pair have different causal histories, so that her view is not undermined by those cases after all. I discuss these test cases further and defend my alternative-possibilities account of freedom.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartof Disputatio, 2017, vol. 9, num. 45, p. 167-191
dc.rights.uri info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source Moya Espí, Carlos 2017 Free will and open alternatives Disputatio 9 45 167 191
dc.subject Filosofia
dc.title Free will and open alternatives
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article 2018-06-11T07:21:49Z
dc.identifier.idgrec 125857

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