Mental Contents in a World of Causes
NAGIOS: RODERIC FUNCIONANDO

Mental Contents in a World of Causes

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Mental Contents in a World of Causes

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dc.contributor.author Corbí, Josep E.
dc.contributor.author Prades, J.L.
dc.date.accessioned 2017-08-31T12:41:13Z
dc.date.available 2017-08-31T12:41:13Z
dc.date.issued 1995 es_ES
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10550/60485
dc.description.abstract A fundamental issue in cognitive science is whether mental contents are causally efficacious and, therefore, should be preserved in scientific psychology. In this paper, we pursue some aspects of this issue by examining Fred Dretske's recent contributions to it. He defends the causal efficacy of mental content *qua* mental content, but imposes an important constraint: mental contents can operate as structuring, but not as triggering causes. We shall argue, by contrast, that mental contents can also intervene as triggering causes. es_ES
dc.language.iso en es_ES
dc.source Corbí, J.E y Prades, J.L. 1995, 'Mental Contents in a World of Causes', en J. Hill y P. Kotatko (eds.), Karlovy-Vary Studies in Reference and Meaning. Praga, Philosophy Publications, pp. 148-171 es_ES
dc.subject mind es_ES
dc.subject content es_ES
dc.subject causation es_ES
dc.title Mental Contents in a World of Causes es_ES
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart es_ES

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