NAGIOS: RODERIC FUNCIONANDO

Normativity, Moral Realism, and Unmasking Explanations

DSpace Repository

View (458.9Kb)


	Corbí, Josep E. Perfil
	This document is a artículoDate2004
	Este documento está disponible también en : http://hdl.handle.net/10550/42887
	Moral Projectivism must be able to specify under what conditions a certain inner response counts as a moral response. I argue, however, that moral projectivists cannot coherently do so because they must assume that there are moral properties in the world in order to fix the content of our moral judgements. To show this, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism, which is, nowadays, the most prom- ising version of moral projectivism. In this context, I call into question both David Lewis' dispositionalist account of colour and Chistine Korsgaard's procedural realism.
	Corbí, Josep E. 2004 Normativity, Moral Realism, and Unmasking Explanations Theoria 19/2 50 155 172