Evidence and First-Person Authority

Evidence and First-Person Authority

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Evidence and First-Person Authority

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Corbí, Josep E. Perfil
This document is a artículoDate2011

Este documento está disponible también en : http://hdl.handle.net/10550/42642
In this paper, I challlenge David Finkelstein's claim that evidence does not contribute to first-person authority. To this end, I first argue that the phenomenon of first-person authority involves a certain combination of two kinds of authority, namely: an epistemic (insofar as evidence is at issue here) and a practical (insofar as the capacity to shape one's own psychological and dispositions is the central concern) kind of authority. Secondly, I defend the view that gathering evidence plays a crucial role regarding an agent's ability to preserve (or cultivate) her practical authority upon herself.

    Corbí, Josep E. 2011 Evidence and First-Person Authority Teorema 30 3 51 66

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