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Proper Beliefs and Quasi-Beliefs

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dc.contributor.author	Moya Espí, Carlos
dc.contributor.author	Grimaltos, Tobies
dc.date.accessioned	2014-05-06T11:11:30Z
dc.date.available	2014-05-06T11:11:30Z
dc.date.issued	2013
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10550/34923
dc.description.abstract	In this paper, we distinguish two ways in which someone can be said to believe a proposition. In the light of this distinction, we question the widely held equivalence between considering a proposition true and believing that proposition. In some cases, someone can consider a proposition true and not properly believe it. This leads to a distinction between the conventional meaning of the sentence by which a subject expresses a belief and the content of this belief. We also question some principles of belief ascription, suggest a solution to a famous puzzle about belief and defend the unity of the semantic and causal aspects of beliefs.
dc.relation.ispartof	Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2013, vol. XXXVIII, num. 4, p. 14-26
dc.rights.uri	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source	Moya Espí, Carlos Grimaltos, Tobies 2013 Proper Beliefs and Quasi-Beliefs Epistemology & Philosophy of Science XXXVIII 4 14 26
dc.subject	Coneixement, Teoria del
dc.title	Proper Beliefs and Quasi-Beliefs
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.date.updated	2014-05-06T11:11:30Z
dc.identifier.idgrec	092586