Proper Beliefs and Quasi-Beliefs

Proper Beliefs and Quasi-Beliefs

DSpace Repository

Proper Beliefs and Quasi-Beliefs

Show simple item record Moya Espí, Carlos Grimaltos, Tobies 2014-05-06T11:11:30Z 2014-05-06T11:11:30Z 2013
dc.description.abstract In this paper, we distinguish two ways in which someone can be said to believe a proposition. In the light of this distinction, we question the widely held equivalence between considering a proposition true and believing that proposition. In some cases, someone can consider a proposition true and not properly believe it. This leads to a distinction between the conventional meaning of the sentence by which a subject expresses a belief and the content of this belief. We also question some principles of belief ascription, suggest a solution to a famous puzzle about belief and defend the unity of the semantic and causal aspects of beliefs.
dc.relation.ispartof Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2013, vol. XXXVIII, num. 4, p. 14-26
dc.rights.uri info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source Moya Espí, Carlos Grimaltos, Tobies 2013 Proper Beliefs and Quasi-Beliefs Epistemology & Philosophy of Science XXXVIII 4 14 26
dc.subject Coneixement, Teoria del
dc.title Proper Beliefs and Quasi-Beliefs
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article 2014-05-06T11:11:30Z
dc.identifier.idgrec 092586

View       (508.4Kb)

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Search DSpace

Advanced Search