Proper Beliefs and Quasi-Beliefs
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Proper Beliefs and Quasi-Beliefs

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Proper Beliefs and Quasi-Beliefs

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Moya Espí, Carlos Perfil; Grimaltos, Tobies Perfil
This document is a artículoDate2013

Este documento está disponible también en : http://hdl.handle.net/10550/34923
In this paper, we distinguish two ways in which someone can be said to believe a proposition. In the light of this distinction, we question the widely held equivalence between considering a proposition true and believing that proposition. In some cases, someone can consider a proposition true and not properly believe it. This leads to a distinction between the conventional meaning of the sentence by which a subject expresses a belief and the content of this belief. We also question some principles of belief ascription, suggest a solution to a famous puzzle about belief and defend the unity of the semantic and causal aspects of beliefs.

    Moya Espí, Carlos Grimaltos, Tobies 2013 Proper Beliefs and Quasi-Beliefs Epistemology & Philosophy of Science XXXVIII 4 14 26

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