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On Lying: A Conceptual Argument for the Falsity Condition
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On Lying: A Conceptual Argument for the Falsity Condition
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| Grimaltos, Tobies Perfil; Rosell, Sergi | |
| This document is a Comunicación/PonenciaDate2013 | |
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Este documento está disponible también en : http://hdl.handle.net/10550/34866 |
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| In this paper, we put forward a conceptual argument for the Falsity Condition for lying, upon the assumption that lying is a form of deception. We argue that if the definition of lying did not include the Falsity Condition, then successful lying would not secure that the addressee ends up believing a falsehood (about what the lie is about), which is necessary for deceiving, and then successful lying (as such) would not necessarily be a form of deception. | |
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72 - Filosofia [1056]