How coincidence Bears on Persistence
NAGIOS: RODERIC FUNCIONANDO

How coincidence Bears on Persistence

DSpace Repository

How coincidence Bears on Persistence

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Rychter, Pablo
dc.date.accessioned 2014-04-30T07:22:56Z
dc.date.available 2014-04-30T07:22:56Z
dc.date.issued 2011
dc.identifier.uri http://www.springerlink.com/content/m8886r50p738641u/
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10550/34780
dc.description.abstract The"paradoxes of coincidence" are generally taken as an important factor for deciding between rival views on persistence through time. In particular, the ability to deal with apparent cases of temporary coincidence is usually regarded as a good reason for favouring perdurantism (or"four-dimensionalism") over endurantism (or"three-dimensionalism"). However, the recent work of C. Gilmore (2007) and M. McGrath (2007) challenges this standard view. For different reasons, both Gilmore and McGrath conclude that perdurantism does not really obtain support from the puzzles of temporary coincidence. In this paper, I will evaluate their arguments and defend the opposite view: that the paradoxes of coincidence do give some support to perdurantism. However, the way in which they do so is rather unexpected.
dc.relation.ispartof Philosophia. The Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 2011
dc.rights.uri info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source Rychter, Pablo 2011 How coincidence Bears on Persistence Philosophia. The Philosophical Quarterly of Israel
dc.subject Filosofia
dc.title How coincidence Bears on Persistence
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.date.updated 2014-04-30T07:22:56Z
dc.identifier.idgrec 066998

View       (147.8Kb)

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Search DSpace

Advanced Search

Browse

Statistics