

## 12. Academic careers and the tenure track system in Spain – coexistence of state and market logics

**Francisco Javier Ortega-Colomer, Carmen Corona-Sobrino, Julia Olmos-Peñuela, Óscar Llopis and Ana García-Granero**

---

### INTRODUCTION

Universities across the world are being forced to raise their standards of excellence due to increased international competition (Pérez-Esparrells, 2017; Rust & Kim, 2012; Whitley & Gläser, 2014). This is causing universities to make continuous efforts to ascend the academic rankings, increase their international visibility and prestige, and attract academic staff and students from countries across the world. In turn, this has made attraction and retention of academic talent a key priority for higher education managers, since the success of academic organisations depends, to a great extent, on their academic staff (Pietilä, 2015) and their ability to lure top academic talent (Argento & van Helden, 2021; Glenna et al., 2007).

Not all countries, however, compete in this global race for academic talent on the same footing. Each country has its own legal system and distinct financial capacity to compete for world-class scholars and scientists, so, how universities try to attract, recruit and retain academic talent varies significantly (Pérez-Esparrells, 2014). On the one hand, several countries rely on the tenure track system, which regulates how their universities design and implement the academic path to full professorship. In the USA, the tenure track system is well established (Long & Fox, 1995), which allows universities to offer new recruits a predictable path towards full professorship (Kaplan, 2010) and chances to negotiate wages (Chait, 2002). From an institutional logic perspective (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008), the tenure track system reflects the dominance of a ‘market logic’ applied to academic careers (Pietilä & Pinheiro, 2021) that emphasises career decisions based on free competition. Other countries

have adopted a rather different academic career structure, characterised by an absence of specific and strict time limits in the context of the career path, and lack of certainty about achievement of a permanent position in the university (Sanz-Menéndez et al., 2013). Decisions related to academic appointments, including job openings and promotions, depend mostly on the university's governance and available budget (Cañibano et al., 2018; Mora, 2001). This leaves very little space for the university to design and implement a bespoke attraction and hiring strategy. These universities can be described as operating under a 'state logic', where the academic career process is governed and monitored by government regulations and policies (Pietilä & Pinheiro, 2021).

In this chapter, we focus on the Spanish University System (SUS). We discuss what characterises academic careers in Spain and the complexities and challenges associated with the introduction of a tenure track system in this context. Traditionally, the SUS was characterised by a state-logic academic career system. Recent policy reforms, however, have encouraged the adoption of market-logic practices, some of which have a direct influence on the design of academic careers in Spain. Both logics coexist in the SUS in complex and often conflicting ways, which makes the Spanish case particularly suitable for portraying the inherent challenges and contradictions of adopting both logics.

The chapter is structured as follows. First, it describes and characterises the SUS. Specifically, we frame the SUS as governed by a state-logic perspective and discuss the process that academics need to follow to access the university system, and the incentive system for promotion and career development. Then we focus on the four Spanish universities that have implemented a tenure track system. We conclude by comparing the systems in place in Spain and summarising the pros and cons of a tenure track system in Spain.

## THE SPANISH UNIVERSITY SYSTEM

### **Dominance of a 'State Logic' Perspective**

From an institutional-logic viewpoint, the SUS has been governed mainly by state-logic practices. Most policy initiatives, including those related to the design of an academic career system, have been aimed at standardisation, uniformity and homogenisation of the SUS. The governance of Spanish universities is based on centralised management decisions, which means that supply of and demand for academics are governed, mostly, by the state, which funds, regulates and shapes academic careers. In what follows, we contextualise and present the characteristics and practices associated with this state-based logic that governs the academic career process in Spain.

## Evolution of the Spanish University System

The 1970 General Education Law established the main structures in the current SUS. The subsequent Organic<sup>1</sup> University Law Reform (LORU), passed in 1983, changed the governing structure of the SUS to adapt to the precepts of the 1978 Spanish Constitution, which, among other things, granted and guaranteed autonomy to Spanish universities. The primary functions of the SUS are regulated, currently, by the Organic University Law (LOU), which came into force in 2001. These primary functions relate to the three missions of research, teaching and knowledge transfer (Perez & Aldas, 2021; Sánchez-Barrioluengo, 2014). In 2007, another Organic Law (LOMLOU) adapted the system to the so-called Bologna process and the European Higher Education Area, which has been recently replaced by a new Organic Law of the University System (LOSU) (Ministerio de Universidades, 2023).

The SUS includes 84 universities (Perez & Aldas, 2021), distributed across the whole territory, of which 50 are public universities and 34 are private universities (Ministerio de Universidades, 2022). An interesting feature of the SUS is the high level of heterogeneity among the universities. For instance, Sánchez-Barrioluengo (2014) shows that the one-size-fits-all university model of excellence in education, research and the third mission is out of kilter with the SUS. The author shows that Spanish universities differ widely in their capabilities and their contribution to society; some provide very good teaching, while others excel more in research or third-mission activities.

In terms of the relative quality of Spanish universities, multiple rankings suggest that they generally lag behind the leading international universities. For instance, the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) (also known as the Shanghai Ranking),<sup>2</sup> includes the University of Barcelona as the only Spanish university within the range of institutions ranked between 151st and 200th.

---

<sup>1</sup> Article 81.1 of the Spanish Constitution (1978), Spanish supreme law, states: ‘Organic laws are those related to the development of fundamental rights and public liberties, those that approve Statutes of Autonomy and the general electoral regime, and others foreseen in the Constitution.’

<sup>2</sup> Data available on the ARWU website: [universityrankings.ch/results?ranking=Shanghai&q=Spain](https://www.universityrankings.ch/results?ranking=Shanghai&q=Spain).

## Academic Careers

We focus on public universities for two reasons: they represent most of the total SUS<sup>3</sup> (Ministerio de Universidades, 2022) and they display idiosyncratic features in the different stages of their academic recruitment and promotion processes. It should be noted that Spanish universities' hiring possibilities are constrained by state rules, with some regional differences, which set up modalities of access and promotion and leave the universities little room to modify or adapt these conditions (Cañibano et al., 2017).

Public universities' human resources policies are governed by the LOSU 2023, which established two broad categories for individuals involved in teaching and research. These two categories include tenured university staff, who are civil servants, and staff on temporary contracts (non-tenured staff) (see Figure 12.1).

Tenured positions:

- *Catedrático de Universidad*: Full professor (with or without civil servant status).
- *Profesor Titular de Universidad*: Associate professor II (with or without civil servant status).
- *Profesor Permanente Laboral*: Associate professor I (without civil servant status).

Non-tenured position:<sup>4</sup>

- *Profesor Ayudante Doctor*: Assistant professor (based on a non-extendable six-year contract).


## Accreditation and competitive selection process for tenured positions

Doctoral degree holders are required to obtain a form of accreditation, which varies depending on the tenured position, from ANECA (Agencia Nacional de Evaluación de la Calidad y Acreditación – National Agency for Quality Assessment and Accreditation) or some other regional accreditation authority, in order to be eligible to apply for a tenured position in a university, following

---

<sup>3</sup> In Spain, the pathways to academic positions differ between public and private universities. Access to tenured roles in public universities requires candidates to obtain formal accreditation for tenured positions and gaining the competitive selection process.

<sup>4</sup> These positions do not endow civil servant status.



Source: Adapted from Corona-Sobrino (2021) and Ministerio de Universidades (2023).

Figure 12.1 Traditional Spanish university academic career process for tenured positions

a traditional academic career.<sup>5</sup> Progress along the career path does not require the individual to have experience at all levels – individuals are eligible to apply for any position for which they have the appropriate accreditation.

The evaluation required for accreditation is performed by disciplinary commissions, composed of peers. Applicants must submit a condensed version of their CV emphasising the quality, relevance and scientific and societal impact of their contributions. Based on this information, the corresponding commissions evaluate the candidate's track records across such dimensions. Accreditation can be obtained in different ways, as different combinations of dimension scores can lead to an overall positive evaluation.

<sup>5</sup> ANECA is allowed to issue accreditations for all positions in the SUS; regional bodies are allowed to issue accreditation only for non-civil-servant positions (this could change with the LOSU implementation). For assistant professor the accreditation is not required.

Table 12.1 ANECA accreditation for assistant professor

| Assistant professor ( <i>Profesor Permanente Laboral</i> )          | Maximum points |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|
| Research experience                                                 | 60             |
| Training, teaching and professional experience                      | 35             |
| Other merits                                                        | 5              |
| Accreditation requires a minimum of 55 in the sum of all dimensions |                |

Source: Adapted from ANECA (2007).

To obtain accreditation for the non-civil servant associate professor<sup>6</sup> position (*Profesor Permanente Laboral*), the applicant must achieve a minimum score in both the ‘Research’ and ‘Teaching’ dimensions (see Table 12.1 for details). Each of these broader dimensions are further broken down into sub-dimensions, with maximum scores that can vary across different knowledge fields.

The accreditation process for civil servant academic positions is regulated by the recent Royal Decree 678/2023, enacted on July 18th. To obtain accreditation to the associate professor II figure (*Profesor Titular de Universidad*), the applicant must achieve a minimum of 50 points (out of 100) in each of the following evaluation dimensions: research activity, knowledge transfer and exchange, and teaching activity. The candidate must also meet the established minimum scores for each dimension. To obtain the accreditation to the full professor figure (*Catedrático de Universidad*), the same principle applies. However, for this academic rank, the assessment also incorporates a ‘leadership’ category in addition to the research, knowledge transfer and teaching dimensions. Table 12.2 depicts the minimum and maximum scores within each sub-dimension.<sup>7</sup>

Doctoral graduates usually apply for accreditation for a specific tenure track position, which allows them to apply for a tenure track position that becomes available at a public university. The availability of positions is subject to state-level decisions (for civil servant positions) and regional-level decisions (for non-civil servant positions). Once the position is advertised, candidates can apply to join the competitive selection process (*concurso-oposición*) (Docampo et al., 2022).

<sup>6</sup> Although non-civil servant positions can be evaluated by regional assessment bodies, for succinctness, we restrict our example to ANECA requirements.

<sup>7</sup> At the time of writing, ANECA had not yet adapted these general accreditation criteria to the specific requirements of each field of knowledge.

Table 12.2 ANECA accreditation for civil servant positions

| -                                                                                                   | Associate Professor II |             | Full Professor |             |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|
|                                                                                                     | Min.                   | Max.        | Min.           | Max.        |
| <b>1. Research, knowledge transfer and exchange activities</b>                                      |                        |             |                |             |
| 1.1. Research and knowledge transfer projects and contracts                                         | 0                      | 30          | 0              | 30          |
| 1.2. Results and dissemination of research, and knowledge transfer and exchange activities.         | 30                     | 40          | 30             | 40          |
| 1.3. Exchanges at universities and research centres                                                 | 0                      | 30          | 0              | 30          |
| 1.4. Other merits                                                                                   | 0                      | 10          | 0              | 10          |
| <b>2. Teaching activity</b>                                                                         | <b>Min.</b>            | <b>Max.</b> | <b>Min.</b>    | <b>Max.</b> |
| 2.1. Teaching experience                                                                            | 25                     | 45          | 25             | 45          |
| 2.2. Quality of teaching and innovation                                                             | 5                      | 40          | 5              | 40          |
| 2.3. Teaching tutoring                                                                              | 0                      | 15          | 5              | 15          |
| 2.4. Other merits                                                                                   | 0                      | 10          | 0              | 10          |
| <b>3. Leadership</b>                                                                                | <b>Min.</b>            | <b>Max.</b> | <b>Min.</b>    | <b>Max.</b> |
| 3.1. Management of teaching and research teams                                                      | -                      | -           | 0              | 30          |
| 3.2. Supervision of Doctoral and Master's Theses                                                    | -                      | -           | 10             | 30          |
| 3.3. Leadership in university and scientific management and administration                          | -                      | -           | 0              | 30          |
| 3.4. Recognition and responsibility in scientific organisations and scientific-technical committees | -                      | -           | 0              | 10          |
| 3.5. Other merits                                                                                   | -                      | -           | 0              | 10          |

Source: Adapted from ANECA (2024).

The Spanish academic system is characterised by a strong internal academic job market, which results in significant levels of ‘inbreeding’<sup>8</sup> (Cruz-Castro & Sanz-Menéndez, 2010). Aspects such as loyalty or seniority in the department

<sup>8</sup> According to a survey of over 1,500 academic scientists in Spain, 69 per cent of doctoral graduates remained at the university that awarded their PhD, 45.8 per cent stayed at the same university for their entire career (Bachelor’s degree, PhD, permanent position) and 60.8 per cent were awarded a permanent position

are well regarded in the traditional Spanish academic career system, which makes it difficult for external applicants (Cruz-Castro & Sanz-Menéndez, 2010).

### Remuneration scheme

The salaries linked to civil servant positions in the public SUS are established by law. Universities (and university departments) have limited bargaining power to offer incentives to attract candidates or set working conditions. Therefore, what is mainly at stake during recruitment processes is to obtain a tenured position, under the fixed conditions established by law (Cruz-Castro & Sanz-Menéndez, 2010).

Differences in remuneration across the same academic category depend on allowances (Sanz-Menéndez, 1995) related to seniority (*trienios*),<sup>9</sup> research (*sexenio de investigación*) and accredited teaching experience (*quinquenio de docencia*). A pilot scheme, introduced in 2018, allowed for knowledge transfer to be rewarded (*sexenio de transferencia*).

The research productivity bonus (*sexenio de investigación*) was introduced to increase the research productivity of tenured professors and researchers. It is awarded every six years, by ANECA, for up to six research periods (i.e., 36 years). This policy has had a positive impact: research productivity has increased considerably, with 4.3 times the number of scientific publications produced since 1996 (Docampo et al., 2022). Docampo (2021) compared Spain with other European countries and showed that an accreditation system and research incentives have been effective for increasing scientific production.

Teaching experience and teaching quality (*quinquenio de docencia*) are also rewarded by a bonus, aimed at recognising and improving teaching activity. This bonus is managed by the different universities and is awarded every five years with a limit of six bonuses per individual (i.e., 30 years in total). The teaching productivity bonus is evaluated on a basis only of the number of years of teaching experience and the lack of negative students' teaching assessments throughout the evaluated period. According to Docampo et al. (2022), since it is awarded to almost all professors, it has become a seniority bonus rather than a tool to improve teaching quality. As a result, ANECA introduced the Docencia scheme, designed to improve the evaluation of teaching quality in universities. This scheme considers a wide range of indicators to assess the quality of professors' teaching activity. More than 90 per cent of universities

---

in a department in the university that awarded their PhD (Cruz-Castro & Sanz-Menéndez, 2010).

<sup>9</sup> Seniority allowances (*trienios*) are awarded to everyone in a civil servant position across the Spanish public sector. Every three years, civil servants receive a salary rise.

participate in this scheme, but it does not include any financial incentive and, currently, the evaluation is managed at the university level. ANECA is working on the introduction of a new teaching incentive, *sexenio docente*, which, if implemented, will be granted for six-year periods, and will be overseen by ANECA, not the universities (ANECA, 2021a, 2021b).

The transfer productivity (*sexenio de transferencia*) was launched in 2018 as a pilot project to assess individual researchers' engagement in knowledge transfer and innovation activities and outputs. The assessment was based on a similar evaluation to that used to assess research productivity (*sexenio de investigación*) and was conducted by ANECA. This is considered a pioneering policy due to the wide typology and diversity of the knowledge transfer and innovation practices evaluated and the potential social stakeholders and results it encompasses (Giménez-Toledo et al., 2023; Rodríguez-Conde, 2020). Applicants were required to submit applications to one of four groups: 1) transfer through researcher training, 2) transfer generating economic value, 3) transfer of own knowledge through activities with other institutions, and 4) transfer generating social value. After this pilot experience, no other calls have been launched and ANECA is still working on its refinement and wider implementation.

## CHALLENGING THE DOMINANT LOGIC: THE TENURE TRACK SYSTEM IN SPAIN

While the SUS is dominated by state-logic practices, there are two broad hiring models that follow a tenure track system and represent an exception to the previously described hiring system. The first model comprises a series of recruitment processes, in line with a tenure track model, and has been adopted by a small number of universities. The second model is a postdoctoral contract (*Ramón y Cajal*) that also complies with the characteristics of the tenure track model.

The former model has been adopted by Carlos III and Pompeu Fabra universities and specific departments in the University of Alicante and the Autonomous University of Barcelona. All four universities share some common characteristics, such as more international teaching and student bodies, above average amount and quality of scientific production and a higher ratio of student-to-teacher resources (Escribá-Esteve et al., 2019).

This model contrasts with the traditional Spanish academic career system, which is characterised by a larger proportion of temporary staff and more difficulties in obtaining a consolidated position. Tenure track models are aimed at reducing the bottleneck formed in the scales prior to consolidation. Cañibano et al. (2018) point to the paradox of these variations in hiring with a rigid, bureaucratised and structured system such as in Spain, although they suggest

that these are the result of the degree of autonomy that applies to Spanish universities.

Tenure track positions are usually for six years, with interim evaluations leading eventually to a permanent position. Eligibility for a tenure track position requires either having completed the PhD in a different university from the one being applied to, or having considerable postdoctoral experience outside the university that offers the tenure track position. This model is highly competitive, involving few vacancies and a high number of applicants (Escribá-Esteve et al., 2019). The positions are often linked to specific evaluation criteria, mostly based on publications in a set of target journals with high impact factor in the field (Corona-Sobrino, 2021).

This tenure track model is rather inconsistent within the traditional SUS due to its adoption by only four institutions and its very specific characteristics. According to Escribá-Esteve et al. (2019), it is designed to promote internationalisation of university departments, excellence based on recruitment of specific profiles and more competitive salaries, closer to European standards. These practices are in line with a market logic (Pietilä & Pinheiro, 2021) where decentralised universities allow their departments to set their own recruitment conditions, based on competition and performance.

The second model, the *Ramón y Cajal* postdoctoral contract, involves a national call, centralised evaluation and hiring at the national level. Applicants must have obtained their doctoral degree within ten years of applying, must provide evidence of scientific excellence and have had at least 24 months working in a different institution if applying to the institution where they developed their PhD. This programme is very competitive (success rate in 2022 was 16.1 per cent). It offers one of the few opportunities for academics working abroad to return to the SUS. Once obtained, the awarded researcher can develop their career in any Spanish public research centre or public university. The contract is for five years, and, following a successful intermediate evaluation, the individual can apply for a permanent position in the category *Titular de Universidad* or equivalent in the focal research centre, although there is no full guarantee to obtain it. Evaluation is based mainly on scientific-technical contribution, internationalisation and leadership, in addition to other aspects with a lower weighting (such as service to the community).

This coexistence of state- and market-logic practices in the SUS is accompanied by problems and contradictions. First, the tenure track process does not necessarily lead to a permanent position. An individual might be successful in the tenure track process, but budget constraints or state-related restrictions might bar the university from offering them a permanent position. There may be differences between the number of individuals following the tenure track and the number of positions available (Cañibano et al., 2018), even if there has been a prior commitment to offering a permanent position. The *Ramón y*

*Cajal* programme also has some problems. A permanent position depends on the number of available public employment positions and there is no guarantee of the tenure track leading to a permanent position.

Another problem arising from the coexistence of both logics is the different remuneration linked to the tenure track processes and traditional access to the SUS. In the former, salaries are fixed by law; in the latter, there is freedom to create different positions to get around fixed salaries (such as the position of visiting professor). The department then is free to pay those on the tenure track, and remuneration is based on merit and research potential. This leads to the further problem that achievement of a permanent position (which is accompanied by civil servant status) means that the salary is fixed by law, which makes competition with universities outside the Spanish territory more difficult (Corona-Sobrino, 2021), and the SUS does not allow for negotiations over salaries or working conditions (Sanz-Menéndez et al., 2013). These tenure track models in place in Spain work to attract talent, but not to retain it (Cañibano et al., 2018; Corona-Sobrino, 2021). This raises the question of whether it is worth implementing a tenure track scheme, aimed at obtaining a permanent position, if, ultimately, the system is not capable of offering sufficiently attractive conditions to retain those who have successfully gone through the tenure track process.

A third problem is that both tenure track variants are based mainly on scientific merit and, to an extent, are exclusive (Herzog et al., 2015), resulting in only the most excellent candidates achieving a permanent position, with a large part of the applicant pool being excluded (Rodríguez-Victoriano, 2017).

At the same time, the tenure track model works to reduce inbreeding in the SUS (de la Torre et al., 2021; Navarro & Rivero, 2001). It includes specific rules that prevent institutions from hiring their own doctoral students, and excellence in terms of professional development seems to be more important than networks, loyalty and other similar strategies. It also works to increase internationalisation and quantity and quality of scientific production (Escribá-Esteve et al., 2019).

## CONCLUSIONS

This chapter compares the two main academic career models in Spain. We have discussed the traditional, and still dominant, model, adopted by most universities, which is based on a state logic and academic career progress built on uniform criteria and state-level formal accreditation. This accreditation process includes an assessment of the individual, overseen by different commissions. Candidates are assessed on multiple dimensions including teaching, research and knowledge transfer, and leadership. The underlying logic is that first, accreditation is an initial filter and ensures candidates achieve a minimum

threshold to apply for a position in the university system, second, it establishes a comparable academic hierarchy among the universities in SUS, and third, it determines the compensation of each faculty member and researcher, in a predictable and transparent manner.

The tenure track system has so far been adopted by only four Spanish universities. It is an example of a recruitment and promotion strategy based on a market-driven logic. It endows university departments with a high degree of discretion in hiring and promotion and allows equal competition between internal and external candidates.

Overall, the SUS is dominated by a state logic, with some aspects of a market logic (Goodrick & Reay, 2011). The SUS is plagued by a high level of inbreeding (Cruz-Castro & Sanz-Menéndez, 2010), which is the result of a strong internal academic research job market and the prevalence of a state-driven logic. Promotions are governed by informal rules, often related to the length of time working in the department. This traditional approach to human resource management, based on loyalty, is pervasive in the SUS and discourages external candidates from attempting to go through its competitive selection process (Cruz-Castro & Sanz-Menéndez, 2010).

The introduction of a tenure track system has eroded some of the dominant logic and was a response to three interrelated priorities outlined in the university legislation (LOU 2001, LOMLOU 2007 and LOSU 2023). First, to boost the inclusion of international academics in a context of increased global competition; second, to enhance academic efficiency and productivity in response to reduced budgets; and third, to attract international talent to the SUS by offering comparable and competitive labour conditions.

Overall, the Spanish case is an example of the inherent complexities associated with a dual logic setting, produced by the implementation of a tenure track process in a country with a long tradition of an academic system dominated by a state logic. Although we foresee increased problems resulting from extension of the tenure track system to the whole SUS, we hope that some sort of equilibrium will be achieved through the implementation of practices and components from both logics.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book chapter is part of projects PID2021-124474OA-I00 and PID2022-137124OA-I00, funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/ FEDER, UE.

## REFERENCES

- ANECA (2007). *Programa de evaluación de profesorado para la contratación*. Spanish Ministry of Universities. [aneca.es/documents/20123/52301/pep\\_guiad\\_eayuda\\_210212.pdf/c5519cbe-0f60-941a-fe1c-7e0f8656aaa5?t=1654079650129](https://aneca.es/documents/20123/52301/pep_guiad_eayuda_210212.pdf/c5519cbe-0f60-941a-fe1c-7e0f8656aaa5?t=1654079650129).
- ANECA (2021a). *Principios y directrices para la actualización de criterios de evaluación de la investigación de ANECA 2021*. Spanish Ministry of Universities. [aneca.es/documents/20123/48615/210930\\_Principios+y+directrices.pdf/cfeede9-4f47-89db-b377-d474d18ba57c?t=1658212529828](https://aneca.es/documents/20123/48615/210930_Principios+y+directrices.pdf/cfeede9-4f47-89db-b377-d474d18ba57c?t=1658212529828).
- ANECA (2021b). *Programa de apoyo para la evaluación de la calidad de la actividad docente del profesorado universitario*. Spanish Ministry of Universities. [aneca.es/documents/20123/78401/programaDOCENTIA\\_210527.pdf/c3998fbf-896d-2a46-acff-530ff2125f50?t=1655730839955](https://aneca.es/documents/20123/78401/programaDOCENTIA_210527.pdf/c3998fbf-896d-2a46-acff-530ff2125f50?t=1655730839955).
- ANECA (2024). Assessment criteria and minimum reference requirements for obtaining accreditation. [https://www.aneca.es/documents/20123/53669/report\\_Criterios200324\\_anexos\\_EN.pdf/6ee9e597-52bb-1cfc-14f1-9475b99f6670?t=171264316359](https://www.aneca.es/documents/20123/53669/report_Criterios200324_anexos_EN.pdf/6ee9e597-52bb-1cfc-14f1-9475b99f6670?t=171264316359).
- Argento, D. & van Helden, J. (2021). New development: University managers balancing between sense and sensibility. *Public Money & Management*, **41**, 487–90. doi.org/10.1080/09540962.2021.1890923.
- BOE (2015). *Real Decreto 420/2015, de 29 de mayo, de creación, reconocimiento, autorización y acreditación de universidades y centros universitarios*.
- Cañibano, C., Corona, C., Molas-Gallart, J. & Vilardell, I. (2017). Dinámicas organizativas en los departamentos universitarios españoles: Diversidad estratégica y rigideces institucionales. *Economiaz*, **92**, 274–300. [euskadi.eus/web01-a2reveko/es/k86aEconomiazWar/economiaz/abrirArticulo?idpubl=88&registro=16](https://euskadi.eus/web01-a2reveko/es/k86aEconomiazWar/economiaz/abrirArticulo?idpubl=88&registro=16).
- Cañibano, C., Vilardell, I., Corona, C. & Benito-Amat, C. (2018). The evaluation of research excellence and the dynamics of knowledge production in the humanities: The case of history in Spain. *Science and Public Policy*, **45**, 775–89. doi.org/10.1093/scipol/scy025.
- Chait, R.P. (2002). *The Questions of Tenure*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Corona-Sobrino, C. (2021). *Análisis de las dinámicas de producción de conocimiento científico bajo el sistema de evaluación de la calidad de la educación superior y la ciencia*. PhD thesis, University of Valencia. University of Valencia Repository RODERIC. <https://hdl.handle.net/10550/77921>.
- Cruz-Castro, L. & Sanz-Menéndez, L. (2010). Mobility versus job stability: Assessing tenure and productivity outcomes. *Research Policy*, **39**, 27–38. doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2009.11.008.
- de la Torre, E.M., Perez-Esparrells, C. & Romero-Madrid, T. (2021). Academic inbreeding in the Spanish public university system: A review of its institutional and context determinants (Endogamia en el sistema universitario público español: Una revisión de sus determinantes institucionales y contextuales). *Culture and Education*, **33**, 229–58. doi.org/10.1080/11356405.2021.1904658.
- Docampo, D. (2021). Los rankings académicos como herramienta de benchmarking institucional, in D. Docampo. (ed.), *Lecturas de política y gestión universitarias*. Aranzadi: Thomson Reuters, pp. 187–207.

- Docampo, D., Safón, V. & Albert, C. (2022). Research, teaching, and knowledge transfer assessment in Spain: Strategies and results. *Frontiers in Research Metrics and Analytics*, **7**. doi.org/10.3389/frma.2022.817031.
- Escribá-Esteve, A., Iborra, M. & Safón, V. (2019). *Modelos de Dirección Estratégica en universidades españolas de alto desempeño*. Bilbao: Fundación BBVA.
- Giménez-Toledo, E., Olmos-Peñuela, J., Castro-Martínez, E. & Perruchas, F. (2023). Beneath the tip of the iceberg: Knowledge transfer in Spain in the social sciences, humanities and arts. *Research Evaluation*, **rvad016**, doi.org/10.1093/reseval/rv-ad016.
- Glenna, L.L., Lacy, W.B., Welsh, R. & Biscotti, D. (2007). University administrators, agricultural biotechnology, and academic capitalism: Defining the public good to promote university-industry relationships. *Sociological Quarterly*, **48**, 141–63. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-8525.2007.00074.x.
- Goodrick, E. & Reay, T. (2011). Constellations of institutional logics: Changes in the professional work of pharmacists. *Work and Occupations*, **38**, 372–416. doi.org/10.1177/0730888411406824.
- Herzog, B., Pecourt, J. & Francesc Jesús, H.i.D. (2015). La dialéctica de la excelencia académica. *Arxius de ciències socials*, **32**, 69–82. hdl.handle.net/10550/49035.
- Kaplan, K. (2010). Academia: The changing face of tenure. *Nature*, **468**, 123–25. doi.org/10.1038/nj7320-123a.
- Long, J.S. & Fox, M.F. (1995). Scientific careers: Universalism and particularism. *Annual Review of Sociology*, **21**, 45–71. doi.org/10.1146/annurev.so.21.080195.000401.
- Ministerio de Universidades (2022). *Datos y Cifras del Sistema Universitario Español*. www.universidades.gob.es/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/DyC\_2023\_web\_v2.pdf.
- Ministerio de Universidades (2023). Ley Orgánica 2/2023, de 22 de marzo, del Sistema Universitario. Boletín Oficial del Estado (BOE), **70**, 23/03/2023.
- Mora, J.-G. (2001). The academic profession in Spain: Between the civil service and the market. *Higher Education*, **41**, 131–55. jstor.org/stable/3448122.
- Navarro, A. & Rivero, A. (2001). High rate of inbreeding in Spanish universities. *Nature*, **410** (14). doi.org/10.1038/35065259.
- Perez, F. & Aldas, J. (2021). *U-Ranking 2021. Indicadores sintéticos de las universidades españolas*. Fundación BBVA e IVIE. www.fbbva.es/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Informe-U-Ranking-FBBVA-Ivie-2021.pdf.
- Pérez-Esparrells, C. (2014). La financiación universitaria: Más dinero público y privado. *Nueva Revista*, **151**, 225–37. https://reunir.unir.net/handle/123456789/4440.
- Pérez-Esparrells, C. (2017). La reputación de las universidades a través de los rankings globales. *Nueva Revista*, **163**, 224–36. https://reunir.unir.net/handle/123456789/8508.
- Pietilä, M. (2015). Tenure track career system as a strategic instrument for academic leaders. *European Journal of Higher Education*, **5**, 371–387. doi.org/10.1080/21568235.2015.1046466.
- Pietilä, M. & Pinheiro, R. (2021). Reaching for different ends through tenure track: Institutional logics in university career systems. *Higher Education*, **81**, 1197–213. doi.org/10.1007/s10734-020-00606-2.
- Rodríguez-Conde, M.J. (2020). Sexenio de transferencia: Análisis de los criterios y resultados de evaluación de la prueba piloto. Paper presentation. Madrid: Retinde. retinde.es/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/20201216\_Charla\_RETINDE\_Transferencia\_definitivo.pdf.

- Rodríguez-Victoriano, J.M. (2017). La praxis de la excelencia universitaria entre la paranoia de sus promotores y la culpa de sus víctimas: Hacia la recuperación del deseo docente y la universidad pública. *Teknokultura. Revista de Cultura Digital y Movimientos Sociales*, **14**, 85–103. doi.org/10.5209/TEKN.55047.
- Rust, V.D. & Kim, S. (2012). The global competition in higher education. *World Studies in Education*, **13**, 5–20. doi.org/10.7459/wse/13.1.02.
- Sánchez-Barrioluengo, M. (2014). Articulating the ‘three-missions’ in Spanish universities. *Research Policy*, **43**, 1760–73. doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.06.001.
- Sanz-Menéndez, L. (1995). Research actors and the state: Research evaluation and evaluation of science and technology policies in Spain. *Research Evaluation*, **5**, 79–88. doi.org/10.1093/rev/5.1.79.
- Sanz-Menéndez, L., Cruz-Castro, L. & Alva, K. (2013). Time to tenure in Spanish universities: An event history analysis. *PloS One*, **8**, e77028. doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0077028.
- Thornton, P.H. & Ocasio, W.C. (2008). Institutional logics, in R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin & R. Suddaby (eds), *The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism*. London: Sage, pp. 99–129. doi.org/10.4135/9781849200387.n4.
- Whitley, R. & Gläser, J. (2014). The impact of institutional reforms on the nature of universities as organisations. *Organizational Transformation and Scientific Change*, **42**, 19–49. doi.org/10.1108/S0733-558X20140000042000.