

Ideologies as false communicative practices

Benno Herzog, Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, University of Valencia (Spain)

Benno.herzog@uv.es

Abstract

Against common understanding of ideology as being a specific form of knowledge or cognition, lately there is a rediscovering of the notion of ideology as practice. In these approaches, ideology is understood as a practice that ultimately contravenes its own intentions or normative claims. This understanding is already mentioned in Marx' famous dictum: "They do not know it, but they are doing it." Although discourse studies from its very beginnings was interested in text and talk as speech *acts*, the dominant notions of ideology, especially in CDA, very much focus on the cognitive aspect of ideologies exploring the role of ideology *for* practices but not *as* practices itself.

The aim of this article is to understand certain practices of discourse production that can produce discursive and material effects contradictory to the practice itself.

Therefore, I will first explore a Marxist notion of ideology as it is lately rediscovered by diverse strands of critical theory and that understands ideology as a practice, although not disattending the cognitive aspects of ideologies. I will then show how this concept of ideology connects well with the idea of discourse as speech act and communicative practice. Some examples mainly from discourses on migration and racism will exemplify the fertility of this approach. The research can help to overcome the pitfalls of some discursive practices especially in public communications.

Key words: ideology, Marxism, communicative action, Frankfurt School

The notion of ideology has several meanings and uses. In a critical tradition from the social sciences and humanities, the term not only refers to a set of ideas and to the study of its internal logics. The critical usage of ideology does not understand these terms as simple cosmovisions or forms of thinking. Instead, in the critical tradition, ideology always refers to some moment of falsity, such as in the oft-cited notion of “false consciousness”. While an understanding of ideology as a simple set of perceptions about the world leads to descriptive research into inner logics, as well as the conditions and consequences of this perception, a notion pointing towards some type of falsity necessarily includes a critical normative stance. The study of ideology becomes critique of ideology. However, this basic critical notion has been criticized itself for at least two main reasons.

On the one hand, the adjective of this first tentative definition of ideology has been criticized, i.e., the idea of some truth or falsity, which is included in the use of the concept. Terry Eagleton (1991) compared ideology to halitosis: we are always detecting it only in other persons. Sometimes it seems difficult (although this point, taken on its own, is no argument against this type of notion), sometimes impossible, and in the worst cases it is even dangerous to claim a privileged position from which the false consciousness of others can be detected, free of one’s own ideological distortions. In postmodern society with a wide range of legitimately competing ideas, so the critique, no privileged position can be named from “which consciousness” can be divided into ideological and non-ideological.

On the other hand, the substantive of the notion of “false consciousness” can also be criticized as too cognitivist. Already from a critical stance of the Young Hegelians, the relation of the material—or social— world and ideas was insisted on and argued against the notion of a world of free-floating ideas. In this sense, the analysis—and critique— of ideologies not only points towards cognitive mistakes but towards the social world with its practices, social relations and materialities.

In this critique of an overly cognitivist approach to ideology, we can already find some hints towards the solution of the first critique: the problem of detecting the falsities of ideologies. If we understand ideologies also as practices and social relations and if we follow the Young Hegelians and their approach of justifying critique immanently (see also Herzog, 2016a, b; Romero, 2014, Stahl, 2013), then ideology could be understood as a practice that undermines or contradicts its own normative principles. Ideological practices are a specific form of practice, i.e. false or inverted practices, but can refer to all kind of every practices of social reproduction. Marx himself points prominently to a series of practices in capitalism, from work to trading, which produce unintended results of maintenance of exploitive relationships contrary to the normative principles and emancipatory potential of those practices.

Although I develop the notion of practices of discourse production as ideologies from this very broad conception of Marx and marxism, this article ultimately aims on a very specific form of practice, i.e., on practices of discourse production. The notion of

discourse, although quite polysemic, always refers to some form of speech *act*. Practices of discourse production therefore always do something and always have some specific effect, not only on our cognition but also on social and material realities. Practices of discourse production, therefore, always are more than “just words”.

The aim of this contribution is to understand practices of discourse production as practices that could produce effects —understood as effects on the discourse itself and as material effects— that run contrary to the normative principle underlying the practice itself.

Therefore, as a first step, I explore the Marxist notion of ideology as presented in the writings of Karl Marx himself. Furthermore, I show that several elements present in the Marxist notion of ideology have lately been rediscovered by the critical social sciences and humanities. These new approaches aim to combine the critique of an overly cognitivist notion of ideology with some idea of falsity. In a second step, I then concentrate on practices of discourse production and explore some of the most important critical theories on discourse (Habermas, Foucault, etc.). I apply the concept of ideology to speech acts to ask how and why speech acts could fail, i.e., create a falsity in the sense that they contradict their own normative claims. Therefore, I present several examples mainly from the field of discrimination studies to make my point clearer. The argument that is unfolded here could help us to detect and overcome some ideological traps in processes of communication.

Marx and the Marxist notion of ideology

As stated in the introduction, the Marxist concept of ideology relates ideas to the material and social reality, to social relations and to practices, especially to those of social reproduction. This relationship is true in a triple sense (see also Herzog, 2018; Stahl, 2015):

- Ideas can have effects on material reality; they can influence social relations, practices, etc.;
- Material reality, its internal organization and its institutionalization influence the production of ideas; and
- Finally, ideologies can have social functions. They often serve powerful interests and often stabilize certain social conditions and relations of power (see also Fairclough, 1992).

In contrast to these conceptualizations, which understand ideologies simply as a set or system of ideas, the Marxist notion of ideology always points towards the *critique* of ideologies. This critique is related to the conviction that ideologies are false in a very specific sense. They are not only cognitive errors but also, since ideas are (co-)produced by the conditions of social reproduction, the critique of ideologies is always understood as a critique of material reality, i.e., of a somehow false reality and of a social order understood as pathological.

The notion of falsity is somehow imprecise since it says little about the type of error that characterizes the specific set of ideas and or false social relations. Marx himself did not speak of false consciousness. The term was used prominently in a letter from Engels to Mehring years after Marx' death (Engels, 1893). Marx himself, in reference to religion, which can be understood especially in his early writings as synonymous with ideology, speaks of the "inverted consciousness of the world" (*verkehrtes Weltbewußtsein*, Marx, 1944; similar also to the German Ideology in his critique of Feuerbach, Marx, 1958). Another expression often used by Marx is that of "appearance" (*Schein, Erscheinung*), in contraposition to the essence of social phenomena. Marxist dialectics give us an idea of the types of mistakes of ideologies. Appearance and essence are inverted in ideologies. Appearance is taken for the essence of social phenomena. Further, considering the role of material reality in the creation of inverted consciousness, it is the organization of the social that systematically produces this false appearance.

It was György Lukács (2000) who insisted on, and popularized, the less precise notion of "false" consciousness in his highly influential work on the understanding of ideologies, "History and Class Consciousness". For the understanding of the relationship between material reality and consciousness he described ideologies also as *necessarily* false (see also Browne, 2008) due to their strong relationship with social reality. Social reality is organized in such a way that creates systematically false appearances. This understanding also means that ideologies can be correct and false at the same time. They can be the correct expression of false social relations. Additionally, since ideological thinking and practices (re-)produce these false social relations, ideologies can be harmful for those who reproduce them. They produce a wrong or inverted being-in-the-world. The notion of falsity here not only refers to first-order beliefs about society but also to the second-order beliefs about these convictions, i.e., to the idea that one's own false beliefs are neither wrong nor beliefs but an objective truth. It is the belief that these ideas are not socially produced but universal and independent (Stahl, 2015: 239).

This argument is developed by Marx, especially in relation to the Young Hegelians: in his critique of Hegel (Marx, 1844), his critique of Feuerbach, his adaptation of Bauer and his contestation to Stirner (see especially Marx, 1958). Summarizing the argument, we can say that ideologies are not autonomous, free-floating sets of ideas. Ideologies do not exist independently of social relations, and they do not have unmediated power over these relations. As stated before, some ideas can be true and false at the same time. Thus, for example, in capitalist societies, human beings not only think of themselves as isolated individuals and feel alienated; they really are isolated and alienated in this society. However, at the same time, the perception of an isolated individual is false because the working class in classical industrialist societies shares isolation as a *collective* characteristic; feeling individually isolated is the correct perception of a false, i.e., pathological because suffering producing, society. This critique of false social relations also makes clear that critique of alienation cannot be a mere cognitive task. Critique must become practical and must lead to a change in pathological social relations, as Marx

prominently formulated in his eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: “Philosophers have hitherto only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point is to *change* it” (Marx, 1958).

The problem we are facing now is the following: if ideologies are false from an external point of view, but they can be correct from an internal one, how can we then criticize them? How can we justify our points of view of critiques and ensure that our critiques are not only the application of a personal, arbitrary and external point of view? This question leads us to the subsequent stage in Marx’s thinking.

In *Capital*, Marx digs deeper into the relationship between material reality and inverted consciousness. Although he does not develop an explicit theory of ideologies in the three volumes of his work, we can find an important number of reflections on the topic treated in this work. From the first chapter (e.g., Marx, 1998: p. 49-98) until the last volume (e.g., Marx, 2012, p. 370ff), he follows the dialectical idea that a certain economic essence leads to a specific appearance. Wealth, commodities, value, interests and so on “appear” or “present themselves” in a specific form, sometimes even being identified with certain characteristics typically ascribed to human beings. In this dialectic between essence — today, we likely would prefer speaking of “underlying social structures” or “social regularity” instead of “essence”— and appearance, appearance is not simply a false image. As an inverted perception, it contains, at the same time, the hints needed for understanding the essence. This perception is not only any appearance among others, but it is also the appearance of *the essence of social reproduction*.

Although the core problem of exploitation is identified as occurring within the sphere of production, for social actors, exploitation *appears* to occur in the sphere of circulation, in the form of financial capital and interests or even as particular characteristics of some capitalists. Marx, however, does not understand domination as a personalized phenomenon. Subjects are described as “character masks”, and instead of personal properties, Marx analyses the social functions of individuals and groups. In the famous section about commodity fetishism, we can perceive the apparent autonomy of capital, value and commodities, which, like religious fetishism, is the error of mistaking something for something else.

However, does not Marx being able to effectively deconstruct and to see behind the appearance of this autonomy, or of capitalism in general, refute the idea that ideologies are necessarily false or inverted perceptions, i.e., that social reality inevitably produces a certain way of thinking? Marx and those who follow his argument apparently are able to see underneath the surface of appearance and, thus, destroy ideologies; but this ability did not mean that this new understanding changed the social, material reality. In fact, following Marx, we now have the correct consciousness about capital, commodities, values, interests, etc., but social reality seems to be the same. It seems, at least for those who follow Marx, that social relations do not produce necessarily inverted understandings of the world.

The factual forces of the material world are such that intellectual deconstruction did not cause the pathological material reality to disappear. Moreover, it did not even dissolve ideology. The false appearance still exists and is reproducing itself in at least two ways. First, the very same discourse about commodity, capital, interests, value and so on still expresses social relations wrongly. We still speak about commodities as if they contain value on their own, even when we know now that commodities “do not contain an atom” (Marx) of value independently of social relations. It seems as if our ways of speaking, the discourse on commodities, etc., form part of those social practices that we cannot give up (Rehmann, 2008: 38). In other words, the critique of ideologies has turned into a critique of social needs. We are facing here not a cognitive critique but a critique of domination: although human beings are able to understand certain social relations correctly, they still are forced to coordinate certain actions in a way that prevents treating these social relations as relations created and therefore modifiable by human action.

Second, ideologies as practices not only appear in our ways of speaking and thinking but also in our everyday practices of social reproduction. “[W]henever, by an exchange, we equate as values our different products, by that very act, we also equate, as human labour, the different kinds of labour expended upon them. We are not aware of this, nevertheless we do it”, said Marx (1998: 88) regarding everyday practices, the scope of which escapes our understanding. In other words, following Marx, our practices produce certain undesired effects for the sole fact of being part of a pathological social order, and they do so independently of our consciousness and even independently of our will.

The practices to which Marx refers are mainly practices of social and economic reproduction. These practices constantly create an inverted image of the process of reproduction and of the practice itself, and they even contradict the normative claims contained in these practices. Work, as the most important practice of social reproduction but also the interchange of commodities (remember that work is considered a commodity by Marx), includes certain normative claims. In our society it is often claimed that work should be the main source of self-esteem, recognition, economic wellbeing, identity, autonomy and even solidarity and self-realization. However, the literature about labour relations now (e.g., Graeber, 2018; Sennett, 1998) and then (e.g., Engels, 1975) is full of examples that show that enormous parts of work in capitalism systematically undermine these claims, creating “debased, enslaved, abandoned, despicable beings” (Marx, 1844). At the same time, the social organization of the processes of reproduction create a false image of injustices in capitalist societies as being the product of the sphere of interchange. For Marx, in these spheres, injustices appear while actually being produced in the sphere and process of production. During the exchange of work as a commodity with money, a salary perceived as insufficient appears in comparison with the high prices of commodities of consumption, which appears in the exchange of the worker’s money for other commodities. In the same way, interests appear to be different from industrial benefit. While industrial benefit appears to be the result of work, interests appear to be external in the form of banks, the stock market or, generally speaking, the financial sector

or financial capital. As a form of parasitic capital, it even appears to be sometimes directly personalized as, historically, the figure of the Jewish profiteer. This inverted appearance is one of the reasons why opposition against the capitalist system often, and from all political walks of life, has been aimed against this circulation sphere and financial sector, instead of being aimed at the heart of capitalist reproduction: the sphere of wage labour, in which, following Marx, the systematic injustices are produced.

Taking a big leap in time towards current critical theory, we can see that there is a diverse range of authors related to the Frankfurt School that lately rediscovered in their work models of ideology as false practice inspired by Marx. Although faith in the practice of work and consequently in the working class as a normative experience of suffering and a driving engine of normative change has vanished, there are other practices that, instead of abolishing the situation that creates suffering, reproduce and reinforce these types of practices. Hartmut Rosa (2005, 2013), for example, presented practices of individual acceleration —although these practices clearly have a social character— that point towards greater autonomy, towards recovering meaningful social relations through more time autonomy *after* the accelerated practice. Therefore, for example, he mentions the practice of a university professor who rapidly answers some student emails, the housewife who uses the washing machine instead of washing by hand, or the everyday practice of driving one's car quickly from point A to B within the inner city. All of these practices have in common that they point towards accelerating *this* practice in *this* specific moment to not lose valuable time, i.e., to save time for more fulfilling or less alienating activities. However, Rosa showed with these and many other examples that the effects for the individual are, generally speaking, exactly the opposite, pointing towards more alienation and less autonomous time. Before the university professor leaves the office, the emails have been answered with the same speed, and they require, now and again, time and attention; instead of only once or twice per month, our clothes are being washed now every three days; and the car that we took to be quicker in the city centre now forms part of a traffic jam with the effect that, despite having faster cars than in the past, we now need more time to drive through urban areas than a few decades ago.

All of these examples would be false practices, i.e., practices of acceleration aiming at later deceleration but that only produce new accelerations and less, not more, autonomous time. Moreover, by being not only individual but also collective practices, they create a certain impression on the individual to comply with the norms of acceleration. What was, a few years ago, a quick answer to an email has now become the expected standard time.

These failed or inverted practices of acceleration to gain more autonomy do not present cases of individual failures but are somehow part of the DNA of the social logics of stabilization through acceleration. In our societies, it seems that stability can only be gained through processes of constant acceleration. Thus, for example, modern companies cannot continue to produce in the same way with the same economic effects for the next 40 years. They must constantly innovate, improve and accelerate to maintain their place

in the system of global competition. These practices do not even have to be conscience practices. We all are required to participate in this game of acceleration independently, whether we want or not. This fact is the practical-material power of ideologies: we are forced to participate in the game of acceleration, a game that drives us towards further domination through intensification and acceleration of our time.

Additionally, Axel Honneth, former director of the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt, described the possibility of ideology with regard to practices of social recognition. In his well-known theory of social recognition (Honneth, 1995), it is only through intersubjective practices of recognition that the individual creates a positive self-relationship and is able to live an autonomous life within society. However, there exists the possibility of false practices of recognition. Honneth noted prominently the praise of the good work of the slave or the honouring of women for being mothers and being dedicated to domestic work. Nonetheless, Honneth also admitted that it could be easy to detect such ideologies in the past, but it is difficult to do so for current practices. From our contemporary viewpoint, the aforementioned practices seemed to be mere symbolic acts of recognition that foster system-conforming attitudes without producing material recognition (Honneth 2010; regarding the idea that material recognition is a fundamental part of recognition, see also the debate on “redistribution or recognition”: Fraser & Honneth, 2003).

Nevertheless, for contemporary practices, the question of ideology cannot be answered so easily. We speak about real ideologies and not only about cognitive errors that can be easily dispersed because these ideologies are highly attractive for the implicated individuals. Individuals *really* feel recognized by these symbolic acts of recognition. Honneth’s proposal to differentiate justified and unjustified forms of recognition includes two arguments. First, regarding the normative core of the practice, he dismissed all of those forms of recognition that do not point towards the basic forms of love, equality or solidarity and their respective extensions but towards the limitation of these forms, e.g., in the form of exclusive forms of recognition. However, these forms of recognition are not ideological but simply false because they even stand in contradiction to the normative core of already established social institutions.

Honneth described also a second form of recognition that apparently recognizes basic needs, the moral capacity or the particular contributions of individuals or whole social groups. But these forms of recognition are ideological as they do so by remaining at a mere symbolic level. These practices are ideological because they do not provide, or even impede, institutional or material changes that would be needed to turn the justified—and symbolically recognized—normative claims into a broadening of autonomy. However, he admitted the possibility that the inability to provide institutional and material means for the broadening of autonomy could also be simply a question of temporal differentiation. In this case, symbolic recognition would be the driving force and not a hindrance of material and institutional recognition.

Often, it seems as if the affective reactions that people feel when not being recognized could serve better to detect ideological moments. These feelings of disrespect or social suffering (Renault, 2017) seem to be less contaminated by social influences and more original and authentic. However, we also know cases of false suffering. Suffering can be a pre-semantic form of critique (Adloff & Pfaller, 2017), but it is neither pre-social nor pre-discursive. Social relations also shape our possibility of suffering and cause suffering to appear. Human beings are able to suffer due to the most diverse reasons, like a caricature of a prophet, the presence of ethnic minorities or the lack of work. None of these forms of suffering could be considered an original or more authentic form of suffering that escapes the logic of ideology. Moreover, we should be able to point also to the forms of suffering towards those elements that contradict one's own practice of suffering. Therefore, it could be shown, for example, that xenophobia, as a social anxiety, does not diminish when the number of ethnic minorities diminishes. Therefore, believing that someone is suffering from migration or ethnic minorities and not from one's own xenophobia could in itself be considered ideological.

Ideologies as false practices of communication

If we understand ideology as a form of thinking and doing with practical and material causes and effects that fulfil certain social functions, then the research programme of ideologies seems quite similar to that of discourse studies. Discourse studies not only analyse the internal structure of language, i.e., of expressed ideas, but they are also interested in the relationship of language to practices and material conditions. On the one hand, language use occurs in specific material and practical conditions. On the other hand, language itself can produce effects for practical material reality. This fact is what Foucault (1981) called the “ponderous, formidable materiality” (p. 52) of discourse.

Discourses as “institutionalized forms of speaking” (Link, 1986) do reproduce certain underlying discursive structures and therewith material and practical effects, independent of the intentions of the speaker. We could paraphrase Marx here, stating that speakers are not aware of this outcome; nevertheless, they do it. In the same way in which we validate and reproduce grammatical structures when speaking, we also reproduce the semantic, material, practical and normative structures of discourse. We have to understand discourses as practices that are symbolic, interactive and material at the same time (see also Shi-xu, 2014). This particular understanding of discourse now opens the possibility of following the traced line of research on ideologies. Practices of discourse production can be false or inverted because they can contradict their own normative pretensions. They can then be criticized with the very same logic of critiques of ideologies. In what follows, the types of systematic and systemic errors that we can find in practices of discourse production are shown.

When discussing false or failed acts of speaking, we do not refer to the classical lapsus already described by Sigmund Freud. The origins of these mistakes are supposed to lie in

the subconscious. In this article, I refer to forms of communication and of false speech acts whose falsity originates from the inner, symbolic logics of discourses and its relation to the normative and material causes (discursive infrastructure) and effects. I call order of discourse the relative stable interplay between the symbolic and the material which organizes social practices.

To illustrate the possibility of a semantic order contradicting the intentions of the speaker, we can name one example that can be found in a similar way in several empirical studies (e.g., Beck-Gernsheim, 2004; Herzog, 2009; Holz, 2001). A sentence expressed with the best of intentions in a conversation in Spain, such as “Spaniards and Muslims can live together in peace”, can produce communicative effects contrary to the intentions of the speaker. In this example, we are not interested in the complete analysis of the sentence but only in one aspect of the communicated: the construction of two groups as opposed and exclusive, using categories that logically do not have to lead to this mutual exclusion. The combination of the categories of nationality and religion logically allows for the creation of four, not two, groups: Muslim Spaniards, non-Muslim Spaniards, Muslim foreigners and non-Muslim foreigners. However, what is communicated is that Spaniards are not Muslims and that the Muslim population of Spain does not belong to the group of Spaniards.

The described sentence could be part of a benevolent discourse. Nevertheless, it creates an unsurmountable division between the two groups. In the logic of the sentence, a mixture of both groups is not possible. There is only the possibility of “living together”. In this case, it is likely not the intention of the speaker to create this unsurmountable line between the two groups, and asked for clarification about the categories, it is possible that the speaker would admit immediately the existence of a mixture of these categories. Nevertheless, what is communicated, in this case by reproducing a pre-existing semantic structure, is a “discursive exclusion” of “Muslims” from “Spaniards”. The sentence reproduces a widespread racist semantic that distinguishes clearly between the two groups of “Them” and “Us”. This semantic is not only a cognitive construction but can be found in institutionalized form in the basic structures of the order of nation states, with their borders, immigration laws, nationality acts, migrant detention centres, and so on. By pronouncing this inconspicuous sentence, the speaker now is reproducing the validity of this exclusionary logics even against his or her own will.

Another example is described by Rancière (2004) with regard to the far-right political party *Front National* in France but that likely would also fit other similar parties in the Western world. Using an ironic tone, he describes what must be done if one wants to promote the far right, mentioning different strategies used by the left, the media and intellectuals to counter the far-right movement but that have had the reverse effects. One of his “advices” is not stopping to speak about the far right. The effect of this strategy is that the far right becomes normalized. It does not help—and can even have the opposite effects— if one constantly distances oneself from the right. Even calling this party

“fascist”, over the long run could water down the words and strip these types of words of their power to unmask reality.

Furthermore, of course, another inverted act of speaking would be looking for dialogue and understanding with these types of far-right groups, inviting them to public debates. There is no lack of knowledge about their positions. The positions of *Front National*, now called *Rassemblement National*, or oft *Vox* in Spain or *Alternative für Deutschland* in Germany can easily be found on their webpages. They are described there in detail and accessible to a broad public. Voters for these parties are not innocent, misled persons who have no access to the positions of these groups and who are wrong about their goals. Voters usually do not vote for a party despite their positions but precisely because of these positions.

With Habermas (1984), we can better understand these speech acts that consider seriously the positions of the far right. By entering into discursive interaction with extreme positions, they are presented implicitly as positions potentially of equal validity. In doing so, these positions are lifted up, from the limit of the rightful marginalized positions to the selected group of political opinions that could reasonably be discussed in public debates. Not honouring, normalizing and validating racist positions with invitations to public spaces of debate should be self-evident. Regrettably, in the run for audience and the mediatic attention of TV shows and other media platforms, the debate about extreme positions seems to bring clicks and raise the audience level. In other words, the discursive infrastructure, i.e., the social organization of the public discourse, has its own economic logic and laws of attention that sometimes even contradict the intentions of the speakers.

Luke Munn (2020), in his work on social media platforms, goes a step further in analysing the influence of the discursive infrastructure on hate speech and toxic communication. Munn calls “technical architectures” those environments created purposely, e.g., on Facebook or YouTube, to give a structure to the content. Thus, for example, by prioritizing news or comments that show high interactions (instead of promoting, e.g., recent content or content from close friends or trusted participants), these platforms promote implicitly and often involuntarily very emotional and often toxic communication. Since every interaction, whether agreeing or disagreeing, is considered an interaction, hate speech and toxic communication are far more often shown and more easily shared on these platforms than paused and complex reflections.

Another problem in debates with the far right has to do with what Erving Goffman (1974) called the frames of a debate. The frame of a painting allows for certain freedom regarding the content. At the same time, it also presents limitations that are almost impossible to cross, at least if one is to leave the frame intact. Therefore, for example, it has been criticized that, in Germany, there was an unusually high proliferation of television debates on the most diverse aspects of migration and cultural diversity and that almost all of these debates framed migration as a problem. Once one accepts migration —and migrants— as a problem, even the most benevolent speech acts, the most progressive interventions and the best of intentions are useless. What is communicated, independently of the will of the

participants, is the validity of the frame, i.e. the validity of the perception of migrants and migration as a problem. Similarly, Lakoff (2004) showed that identities or metaphors could also work in an analogous way. Once one accepts an identity or metaphor as valid, one is bound to the limits of it, like a painting is limited by the frame.

Last but not least, we can find ideological practices in the sense of speech acts with inverted effects also with regard to the effects of visibilization. By speaking, positions and the speaking subjects are visibilized. By speaking out publicly, ideas and speakers are visibilized publicly. However, there are situations, for example, in the case of illegalized migration, in which raising one's voice and defending a legitimate normative claim could lead to discriminatory effects related to the processes of visibilization (see also Herzog, 2020). Undocumented migrants who dare to speak out publicly can easily become victims of police repression, even leading to deportation. Here, the ideological moment can easily be identified: these practices of publicly speaking out and formulating justified normative claims aiming at more social recognition, instead of promoting the desired recognition, can lead to a form of social disrespect and discrimination.

All of these aforementioned examples would be ideological practices. Their "falsity" lies, generally speaking, in not considering that speech acts are acts with practical, material and normative conditions and effects. Speech acts constitute subjects, legitimate subject positions, that recognize or normalize the very same acts of speaking as acts of speaking and as practices; i.e., they produce and reproduce an order of discourse. We can differentiate two forms of materialization of normative claims in speech acts, which we can call roughly the Habermasian and the Foucauldian, leading us to two different types of ideologies.

In the Habermasian communicative action, the normative claims point towards some sort of understanding or emancipation. Here, we would call ideological those speech acts that, instead of producing emancipation, give way to a normative regression. Attempting to come to an understanding with Holocaust deniers would not be a step towards emancipation but towards (a new form of) barbarism. Under this category, we can summarize the speech acts that do not consider or underestimate speaking as a form of recognition. The topics treated in speech acts are recognized as relevant topics with a certain truth potential. The conversation partner is recognized as (equally) morally responsible. Further, by allowing someone to speak out, the speaker is recognized as a valid interaction partner with —principally— the same right to claim truth.

In the speech acts here called Foucauldian (because they could be better understood with reference to the Foucauldian order of discourse), the materialization of normativity points towards the opposite direction of emancipation, i.e., towards silent domination by the order of discourse. Ideological acts would then be those acts intended to be acts of liberation or emancipation, but that perpetuate the social relations instead of opening up spaces for new forms of social life. Here again, by most speech acts, the validity of the given order of discourse, is recognized implicitly, even when one attempts explicitly to

challenge the order. Thinking of language and the expression of ideas as detached from the imposition and maintenance of social relations would here be a type of ideology.

Conclusions

When analysing the possibility of speech acts being ideological, one must consider that the ideological moment in the sense of (post-)Marxist critique of ideology is not to be found at a cognitive level. Ideology is not a false speech act *as speech act*. Of course, speech acts can fall into cognitive, logical and internal mistakes. However, what turns a speech act into an ideological act is that it can present a case of inverted *practice*, with normative and material effects. The ideological moment lies in the ability of material practices to be in contradiction with their own normative claims, being the implicit social and structural claims or the explicit claims of the speakers. If a member of a racist party were invited to tell jokes on a television show, it would be a serious mistake to analyse only the jokes and the language used and not the normalization of the presence of racist positions and speakers in the public space. We would fall ourselves into an ideological mistake by only analysing what is said and disregarding what is done by the speaking (even independently of the words). One of the basic insights of discourse studies is that speaking is more than pronouncing words. Speaking is producing and reproducing a whole symbolic and material order.

Literature

Adloff, F., & Pfaller, L. (2017). Critique *in statu nascendi*? The Reluctance Towards Organ Donation. *Historical Social Research*, 42(3), 24–40.

Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2004). *Wir und die Anderen, Vom Blick der Deutschen auf Migranten und Minderheiten*. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp.

Browne, C. (2008). The End of Immanent Critique? *European Journal of Social Theory*, 11(1), 5–24.

Engels, F. (1893). *Letter to Mehring, London, July 14, 1893*. Online at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1893/letters/93_07_14.htm date of access. 15.2.2020.

Engels, F. (1975). "The Condition of the Working Class in England", In: Engels, F. & Marx, K. *Collected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Volume 4*, New York: International Publishers, pp. 295–596.

Eagleton, T. (1991). *Ideology. An introduction*. London: Verso.

Fairclough, N. (1992a). *Language and power*. London: Longman.

- Foucault, M. (1981). The Order of Discourse. In R. Young (Ed.), *Untying the Text: A Post-structural Anthology* (pp. 48–78). Boston, MA: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Fraser, N., & Honneth, A. (2003). *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*. London: Verso.
- Goffman, E. (1974). *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
- Graeber, D. (2018). *Bullshit Jobs. A theory*. London: Schuster & Schuster.
- Lukács, György (2000). *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
- Habermas, J. (1984). *Theory of Communicative Action Volume One: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Herzog, B. (2009). *Exclusión discursiva – el imaginario social sobre inmigración y drogas*. Valencia: PUV.
- Herzog, B. (2016a). Discourse Analysis as Immanent Critique: Possibilities and Limits of Normative Critique in Empirical Discourse Studies. *Discourse & Society*, 27(3), 278–292.
- Herzog, B. (2016b). *Discourse Analysis as Social Critique. Discursive and Non-Discursive Realities in Critical Social Research*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Herzog, B. (2018). Marx's critique of ideology for discourse analysis: from analysis of ideologies to social critique. *Critical Discourse Studies* Volume 15, - Issue 4: Marx and Discourse: 402-413.
- Herzog, B. (2020). *Invisibilization of Suffering. The Moral Grammar of Disrespect*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Holz, K. (2001). *Nationaler Antisemitismus – Wissenssoziologie einer Weltanschauung*. Hamburg: Institut für Sozialforschung.
- Honneth, A. (1995). *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*. Cambridge: Polity Press
- Honneth, A. (2001). Invisibility: On the Epistemology of Recognition. *Aristotelian Society*, 75(1), 111–126.
- Honneth, A. (2010). Anerkennung als Ideologie. Zum Zusammenhang von Moral und Macht, in: (ibid). *Das Ich im Wir. Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie*. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 103-130.
- Lakoff, G. (2004). *Don't Think of an Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame the Debate: The Essential Guide for Progressives*. White River Junction: Chelsea Green Publishing.

- Link, J. (1986). Noch einmal: Diskurs. Interdiskurs. Macht. *kultuRRevolution*, 11(4), 4–7.
- Marx, K. (1844). A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Available online at: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htm>, date of access: 15.2.2020.
- Marx, K. (1958). Die deutsche Ideologie. In *Marx-Engels Werke* (Vol. 3, pp. 9–530). Berlin: Dietz.
- Marx, K. (1998). *Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* (Vol. 1). Berlin: Dietz.
- Marx, K. (2012). *Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* (Vol. 3). Berlin: Dietz.
- Munn, L. (2020). *Angry by Design - Report by Digital Cultures Institute*, available online at: <https://dcult.org.nz/angry-by-design/>, date of access: 15.2.2020.
- Rancière, J. (2014). *Moments Politiques*. New York: Seven Stories Press.
- Rehmann, J. (2008). *Einführung in die Ideologietheorie*. Hamburg: Argument.
- Renault, E. (2017). *Social Suffering. Sociology, Psychology, Politics*. London: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Romero, J. M. (Ed.) (2014). *Immanente Kritik heute*. Bielefeld: Transcript.
- Rosa, H. (2005). *Beschleunigung. Die Veränderung der Zeitstrukturen in der Moderne*. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main.
- Rosa, H. (2013). *Beschleunigung und Entfremdung – Entwurf einer kritischen Theorie spätmoderner Zeitlichkeit*. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main.
- Sennett, R. (1998). *The Corrosion of Character, The Personal Consequences Of Work In the New Capitalism*, London / New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Shi-xu (2014). *Chinese Discourse Studies*. London: London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Stahl, T. (2013). *Immanente Kritik. Elemente einer Theorie sozialer Praktiken*. Frankfurt/Main and New York: Campus.
- Stahl, T. (2015). Ideologiekritik. In M. Quante & D. Schweikard (Eds.), *Marx-Handbuch* (pp. 238–252). Stuttgart: Metzler.