

Opening the Attitudinal Black Box: Three Dimensions of Latin American Elites' Attitudes about Gender Equality

Political Research Quarterly
2023, Vol. 76(3) 1265–1280
© The Author(s) 2022
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/10659129221133101
journals.sagepub.com/home/prq



Amy Alexander¹ , Asbel Bohigues² , and Jennifer M. Piscopo³ 

Abstract

This paper takes one of the first, direct approaches to understanding which factors shape which attitudes towards gender equality among political elites. We examine support for gender equality among legislators in 13 Latin American countries, using 10 new questions from the 2015–2018 wave of the Latin American elites survey (PELA). We argue that legislators' attitudes about gender equality fall into three distinct dimensions: holding egalitarian views, recognizing that gender inequality is a problem, and supporting state action to hasten gender equality. Overall, women express the more gender-equal orientation on all three dimensions, while factors like religiosity and ideology matter differently for different dimensions. These findings demonstrate the need for more nuance in measuring and analyzing attitudes towards gender equality, in order to better understand the link between descriptive and substantive representation.

Keywords

gender and politics, political elites, legislatures, attitudes, Latin America

Legislators' views about gender roles and gender equality matter. As representatives, legislators' expressed beliefs mirror but also shape constituents' views, cuing citizens about women's appropriate roles in society (Morgan and Buice 2013). Legislators can model more progressive postures, such as U.S. Senator Cory Booker declaring himself a feminist (Fessler 2018), or legitimize more hateful stances, like the misogynistic comments made by Brazilian congressman Eduardo Bolsonaro, son of president Jair Bolsonaro (Mattos, Clavery, and Barbiéri 2021). Legislators' gender equality attitudes—their beliefs about women's roles and the state's responsibility in hastening gender equality—also influence their prioritization of gender equality policy (Wängnerud 2015) and shape whether and how the processes and outcomes of democratic representation are more inclusive, just, and fair (Celis and Childs 2020).

Yet rarely do scholars have consistent, cross-national measures of legislators' attitudes or beliefs about gender equality. Elite surveys, especially surveys of sitting elected officials, are still rare (Clayton et al. 2019). Instead, researchers usually infer attitudes from legislators' activity, using outcomes like bill introduction (Barnes 2016; Htun, Lacalle, and Micozzi 2013; Swers 2005), floor speeches (Clayton, Josefsson, and Wang 2017;

Hinojosa, Carle, and Woodall 2018), and roll call votes (Frederick 2013). They then map these outcomes against legislators' demographic or biographical information (Barnes, Beall, and Holman 2021, Micozzi 2018), thus tying legislators' traits to their preferences. Yet attitudes are not always consistent with unveiled policy preferences, given that different lawmakers support policy outcomes for different reasons—some are acting on principles, but others may be trading favors or following party lines. Debate also exists about which legislators might be expected to hold gender equality attitudes in general. Some suggest that women consistently support gender equality more than men (Clayton et al. 2019; Coffé and Reiser 2018; Piscopo 2014; Wängnerud 2015). Others focus on the progressive views espoused by leftists (Htun and Power 2006; Beauregard 2018), since gender

¹University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden

²University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain

³Occidental College, Los Angeles, CA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Jennifer M. Piscopo, Politics, Occidental College, 1600 Campus Road, Los Angeles, CA 90041, USA.

Email: piscopo@oxy.edu

differences in attitudes may disappear once controlling for partisanship or ideology.

This paper takes one of the first, direct approaches to understanding which factors shape which attitudes towards gender equality among political elites. We use 10 new questions from the 2015–2018 survey of Latin American political elites conducted by the University of Salamanca (PELA by its Spanish acronym). The questions solicited legislators' views on gender roles, whether gender inequality exists, and what should be done about it. To date, no other elite survey has asked such questions. The PELA data thus offers unique, comprehensive insight into elite attitudes on gender equality in a region where women's political and economic empowerment is increasing. Since the 1990s, Latin America has elected record numbers of women, adopted reforms that have raised women's legal status, and improved women's access to education, jobs, and social security (Blofield, Ewig, and Piscopo 2017; Filguiera and Martínez Franzoni 2017).

We begin by theorizing that the 10 PELA questions tap into different dimensions of attitudes towards gender equality: believing that men and women are equal in their talents and capabilities rather than naturally different (*being egalitarian*); acknowledging that differences between women's and men's access to opportunities exist and that these differences undercut gender equality (*expressing recognition*); and believing the state should do something to hasten gender equality, such as pass gender quota laws (*supporting state action*). We argue that each grouping represents a distinct dimension of gender equality, and that the dimensions are not mutually exclusive: an individual could hold gender-equal attitudes in all three dimensions, or she could espouse beliefs consistent with one but not another. For instance, simply holding egalitarian views does not necessarily mean agreeing that the state should bring about equality. A legislator could believe that since men and women are equal, discrimination no longer occurs, or believe that state intervention is inappropriate no matter whether discrimination occurs or not. We use principal component analysis (PCA) and factor analysis to uphold our conceptualization of the three dimensions.

We then hypothesize that different factors may predict legislators' attitudes on different dimensions. Drawing from the literature tying legislators' attributes to their unveiled policy preferences, we propose that legislators' gender, religiosity, and ideology matter—but not for all dimensions. Here, we draw on theories emphasizing that different gender equality policies have different bases of support. For instance, scholars have shown that doctrinal beliefs affect support for policies that expand women's reproductive rights, but do not affect support for policies like state-funded

parental leave, since only the former challenge women's sexual roles (Blofield, Ewig, and Piscopo 2017; Htun and Weldon 2018). We transfer this intuition to gender equality attitudes, hypothesizing that women hold the more gender-equal position on all three dimensions, but that ideology and religiosity have different effects on different dimensions. We propose that ideology matters most for state action, as this dimension reflects attitudes about government intervention rather than attitudes about gender roles. Religiosity, by contrast, shapes attitudes towards gender roles and therefore matters most for egalitarianism and recognition.

We then run fixed-effects linear regressions, with the standardized PCA scores on egalitarianism, recognition, and state action as the dependent variables. Our findings are largely consistent with our expectations, which contributes new insights into the relationship between legislators' gender and their attitudes towards gender equality. First, we confirm that egalitarianism, recognition, and state action are indeed different types of gender equality attitudes, shaped by different factors in different ways. Second, we confirm that women indeed hold the most gender-equal attitude on all dimensions, and that ideology—but not religiosity—affects support for state action. Moreover, even at similar levels of ideology, women are more supportive of state action than men. In fact, ideology behaves as expected among men, with leftist men expressing more support of state action than rightist men, while leftist women and rightist women are equally supportive. Women's support for state action on gender equality appears to supersede ideological divides among them.

These results advance survey research on gender equality attitudes. Dividing gender equality attitudes into dimensions of egalitarianism, recognition, and state action, and mapping these dimensions onto different factors of support, is a novel approach to analyzing survey data. Our findings demonstrate the need for more nuance in measuring and analyzing attitudes towards gender equality. For example, using a single question—such as “do men make better political leaders than women?”—reveals attitudes about gender roles, but not attitudes about whether the state should mandate that parties run women candidates. Our results indicate that even legislators who hold egalitarian views about gender roles, and who are more cognizant about gender inequality, do not necessarily support state action to fix the problem. We find that predicting *beliefs* about gender equality is not the same as predicting *support* for gender equality policies. Still, that women legislators support state action more than men, even at similar levels of ideology, speaks to the link between descriptive and substantive representation. Women legislators *in particular* matter for advancing and

adopting policies that deepen women's rights (O'Brien and Piscopo 2019), and our state action finding suggests that individual beliefs help explain the descriptive-substantive link.

This paper is organized as follows. First, we review current approaches to identifying legislators' attitudes towards gender equality. Then, we present our conceptual grouping of the PELA questions into the three dimensions—being egalitarian, expressing recognition, and supporting state action—and provide empirical tests of this grouping. Lastly, we show how legislators' gender, ideology, and religiosity predict their attitudes on the different dimensions.

Identifying Preferences about Gender Equality

Scholars infrequently have direct measures of legislators' attitudes. The literature on women's substantive representation often infers "what legislators think about gender equality" by using national-level policy outcomes or individual-level legislative behavior. For example, countries with more women in parliament have more generous family leave policies (Kittilson 2008), which suggests that women, more than men, favor policies that facilitate women's workforce participation. The gender and politics literature indeed broadly finds that, on average, women lawmakers more than men express progressive stances on gender and gender roles (Piscopo 2014; Xydias 2013). When it comes to directly predicting individual attitudes about gender equality, however, most scholars rely on mass surveys rather than elite surveys (e.g., Alexander 2012; Barnes and Córdova 2016; Morgan and Buice 2013; Setzler 2015; Smith et al. 2017). In studies of both women's substantive representation and public opinion, scholars find that beliefs about women and women's roles are shaped by individuals' gender and ideology but also by other factors, such as religiosity.

Women Legislators and the Descriptive-Substantive Link

At the national level, scholars explaining the adoption of gender equality policies—in areas like family leave, violence against women, family status law, and abortion—have focused on myriad explanatory variables, many of which point to advocacy from women, whether as parliamentarians or civil society activists and advocates (e.g., Blofield, Ewig, and Piscopo 2017; Htun and Weldon 2018; Kang and Tripp 2018). At the individual level, scholars rely on legislators' unveiled preferences, comparing men's and women's behavior

on bill introduction (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Htun Lacalle, and Micozzi 2013; Barnes, 2016), floor speeches (Carle, Hinojosa, and Woodall 2018; Clayton, Josefsson, and Wang 2017), or roll call votes (Frederick 2013). While this research focuses on identifying preferences, and not on quantifying individual attitudes per se, preferences and attitudes do seem linked. Women legislators seem more likely to prioritize the rights and wellbeing of women and girls, all else equal, as summarized by O'Brien and Piscopo: "The global evidence thus suggests a link between women's descriptive representation and substantive representation" (2019, 57). Women likely care about gender equality more than men because they have been the victim of inequality more frequently, meaning women's different lived experiences likely inform their beliefs, and therefore their policy goals.

Those few studies that directly measure elite preferences echo the link between descriptive and substantive representation. Parliamentary candidates in Germany believe women representatives are better at representing women's interests (Coffé and Reiser 2018). Women members of the European Parliament are consistently to the left of men on abortion (McEvoy 2016). Latin American women legislators place a higher priority on women's issues when compared to their male colleagues (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Schwindt-Bayer 2006) and they express more support for gender quotas than men (Bohigues and Piscopo 2021). Women also more readily recognize gender inequality as problematic: among party members in Belgium and lawmakers in Denmark and Uruguay, for instance, women were more likely than men to believe that gender discrimination hinders women's political careers (Dahlerup 2018, Josefsson 2020, Meier 2012). In Sweden in 2010, 54% of women MPs reported prioritizing representing women's issues *and* believing this priority mattered for policy outcomes—compared to just 30% of men MPs (Wängnerud 2015, 55). Women parliamentarians in Rwanda felt they were better at representing women's interests than men (Coffé 2012). In Sub-Saharan Africa overall, almost 10% of women parliamentarians marked women's rights as among their top-three political priorities, compared to less than 1% of men parliamentarians (Clayton et al. 2019, 81).

Political Ideology and Gender Equality

The link between legislators' descriptive identity and their substantive policy preferences often sits uneasily with the classic link between partisanship and preferences. Since lawmakers' behavior is rationally driven, legislators seeking election and reelection follow the preferences of voters and their parties (Dalton 2019, 231–246). This theory holds that party and party

ideology—not gender—explains legislators’ preferences about gender equality (Htun and Powers 2006; Jenkins 2012). Yet others caution that party membership cannot fully explain individual views, especially as parties do not always cohere programmatically in some places, like Latin America (Kitschelt et al. 2010).

Where scholars have used party membership to proxy legislators’ ideology, they have found that gender and left/right positioning interact. Women in right parties may care about women’s issues but prioritize supporting mothers over adopting gender quotas (Piscopo 2014). Right women may nonetheless express more progressive views on gender roles relative to right men (de Geus and Shorrocks 2020; Piscopo 2014; Xydias 2013). Overall, right-wing and left-wing women may have policy priorities that are more similar than different (Barnes and Beall 2020), especially when it comes to equal opportunity (Xydias 2013). Indeed, Latin American women legislators at every point on the ideological spectrum were consistently more supportive of gender quotas than men legislators at the same point on the ideological spectrum (Bohigues and Piscopo 2021).

Religiosity and Gender Equality

Scholars also consider other factors that may shape legislators’ preferences about gender equality policies, including legislators’ occupation (Barnes, Beall, and Holman 2021) and age (Xydias 2014). Research predicting mass attitudes toward women’s roles and gender equality has underscored the importance of generational cohort, family background, education status, income, age, and religiosity (Alexander and Welzel 2011; Alexander, Inglehart and Welzel 2016; Inglehart and Norris 2003). Of these factors, religion and religiosity stand out as particularly salient. For instance, doctrinal attitudes impede reforms that liberalize abortion and personal status laws (Htun and Weldon 2018). Survey respondents with greater religiosity generally have less egalitarian attitudes: they are more likely to say that men make better political leaders than women (Setzler 2015), even after living in places governed by women leaders (Kerevel and Atkeson 2015).¹

Broadly, the mass attitude research finds that less religious individuals are more likely to support equality between women and men in education, the labor market, and politics (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Alexander and Welzel 2011; Seguino 2011). More secular individuals are also more likely to support individuals’ autonomy on matters of sexuality, including marriage, abortion, and sexual orientation (Alexander, Inglehart and Welzel 2016). In addition, more secular individuals are less sexist (Mikołajczak and Pietrzak 2014).

Additionally, religiosity shapes gender equality attitudes more than differences in religious denominations (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Seguino 2011; Mikołajczak and Pietrzak 2014). Scholars studying Latin America’s backlash politics likewise note that denominations matter less than religious fervor itself: whether strong Catholics or newly-energized Protestant converts, believers oppose progressive ideas about gender and sexuality (Biroli and Caminotti 2020; Zaremborg 2020).

Three Dimensions of Legislators’ Attitudes about Gender Equality

The previous discussion draws from studies of women’s substantive representation and public opinion to identify those factors shaping attitudes towards gender equality, focusing on individuals’ gender, ideology, and religiosity. We return to these factors below, but here we propose that the dependent variable itself—attitudes about gender equality—is not a singular outcome. We base this intuition on scholars’ theorizing about gender equality policies: different policies advance women’s rights in different ways, and therefore they do not share the same bases of support (Blofield, Ewig, and Piscopo 2017; Htun and Weldon 2018). For instance, policies like gender quotas for women candidates differ from policies altering marriage and divorce laws because the former improve women’s status without necessarily challenging deeply-seated religious views (Htun and Weldon 2018). Consequently, women legislators who are highly religious and/or members of conservative parties may disagree with their secular and/or left-leaning colleagues about policies related to family structures and reproductive rights but may find common ground on questions like gender quotas, which benefit women’s political careers (Bohigues and Piscopo 2021).

With this insight in mind, we turn to the 2015–2018 wave of the Latin American parliamentary elites survey run by the University of Salamanca (known by its Spanish acronym, PELA-USAL or PELA for short). This wave included 10 questions designed to assess legislators’ attitudes towards gender equality. To our knowledge, these 10 questions constitute the largest set of gender equality measures ever fielded in a cross-national elite survey. The PELA questions borrow and build from items usually found in mass surveys, like the World Values Survey and the AmericasBarometer. For instance, PELA asked respondents to agree or disagree with the statement, “in general, men make better political leaders than women,” the same question used by other researchers to proxy voters’ egalitarian attitudes (Alexander 2012; Kerevel and Atkeson 2015; Morgan and Buice 2013; Setzler 2015;

Smith et al. 2017). PELA also asked, “quotas are necessary to increase the number of women in parliament,” variations of which have been used to study both mass and elite support for affirmative action (Barnes and Córdova 2016; Batista Pereira and Porto 2020; Bohigues and Piscopo 2021). A first glance suggests that these two questions do not tap into the same constructs. Asking whether men are better at something measures respondents’ sexism (Batista Pereira and Porto 2020), whereas asking about gender quotas measures respondents’ attitudes about government intervention (Barnes and Córdova 2016; Bohigues and Piscopo 2021; Möhring and Teney 2019).

For this reason, we contend that PELA’s 10 questions are not equivalent measures of the same idea. We group the questions conceptually, as shown in Figure 1. First, we group questions that ask respondents about women’s roles: whether men make better political leaders, whether men have more rights to jobs, whether boys have more rights to education, and whether men are better managers. Following Morgan and Buice (2013) and Barnes and Córdova (2016), who viewed disagreeing with the statement “men make better political leaders than women” as signaling gender egalitarianism, we view these four questions as measuring *egalitarian* (as opposed to sexist) attitudes.

Second, we group questions that ask respondents to admit that women and men are not equal in practice: whether respondents agree that gender inequality is a problem in the country, that women do not have the same chances as men to pursue political careers, and that

women earning more than men have problems. These questions tap into *recognition*, namely, understanding that women still experience bias. Third and finally, we group questions that indicate support for policy change: when respondents disagree that women seeking equality want special favors, and when respondents agree that the state must implement gender equality policies generally and gender quotas specifically. These questions tap into support for *state action*.

Our notion that the dimensions are distinctive and that individuals could hold gender-equal views in one dimension but not the other is supported by qualitative explorations of legislators’ statements about gender equality. For example, some Latin American women politicians recognize the structural barriers that women face in their political careers, while others are “difference deniers”: they believe men and women are equal and therefore do not think systematic gender discrimination occurs (Franceschet, Piscopo, and Thomas 2016). Both positions would count as egalitarian—both hold that women and men alike make good political leaders—but difference deniers are *not* recognizers.

True, the dimensions could be related. Being egalitarian might seem necessary in order to recognize that inequality is problematic, and recognizing that inequality is problematic might seem necessary for supporting policy solutions. Failing to recognize gender inequality can lower support for gender quotas, for example (Bohigues and Piscopo 2021; Galligan and Clavero 2008; Meier 2012). Still, even if related, the dimensions appear




Figure 1. Three dimensions of legislators’ attitudes about gender equality. Source: own elaboration.

distinctive in their own right. Lawmakers could oppose state action no matter their level of egalitarianism or recognition since support for state action taps into attitudes about the government and its role (Barnes and Córdova 2016; Möhring and Teney 2019). Similarly, Wängernud (2015, 55) separates attitudes that acknowledge the unequal balance of power between men and women from attitudes that support policies aiming to increase women citizens' rights and autonomy. This approach leads to our first hypothesis: the gender equality attitudes measured in the PELA surveys cohere into three conceptually distinct dimensions, namely, egalitarianism, recognition, and state action (Hypothesis DV-1).

If the dimensions are different, are their explanatory factors also different? Asked another way, what factors might shape whether individual legislators are more egalitarian, recognizing, or supportive of state action? To offer hypotheses about our independent variables, we return to the literature reviewed above. First, we recall that studies explaining women's substantive representation in and across countries consistently point to a link between descriptive and substantive representation. This link suggests that women are more likely to hold egalitarian views, express recognition, and support state action. We therefore expect that women legislators will express more gender-equal attitudes than men on all three dimensions (Hypothesis IV-1). We also draw from work showing the importance of party ideology and propose that left legislators will express more gender-equal attitudes than right legislators on all three dimensions, but we anticipate that ideology will have the largest effect on the state action dimension (Hypothesis IV-2). The connection between political ideology and attitudes about the state's role suggests that right legislators might especially differ from left legislators on leveraging state power, no matter their level of egalitarianism or recognition.

Finally, we build from the mass-survey research emphasizing the importance of religiosity and propose that more secular legislators will express more gender-equal attitudes than legislators with greater religiosity, but here we anticipate the largest effects in the egalitarianism and recognition dimensions (Hypothesis IV-3). We anticipate that religiosity matters less for state action largely because of the questions that PELA asks: the questions capture support for government intervention generally, and for quota policies specifically, but do not ask about government intervention in doctrinal areas of family law or reproductive health. Given the centrality of religiosity for doctrinal questions (Htun and Weldon 2018), we do not expect religiosity to shape support for state action. By contrast, the questions measuring egalitarianism and recognition tap into beliefs about whether men and women have different roles and whether gender inequality

causes problems, respectively. We expect more religious individuals to normalize gender role differences and therefore not view these differences as causing problems.

Studying Latin American Legislators' Gender Equality Attitudes

Latin America has made dramatic progress on gender equality in recent decades. For instance, female labor force participation among women aged 24 to 54 increased from 47% in 1990 to nearly 67% in 2014 (Filgueira and Martínez Franzoni 2017, 374). Governments have invested in education, especially higher education, and legislatures have removed gendered barriers to access—like Chile's education reform in 2000 prohibiting universities from expelling pregnant students. Latin America elects more women parliamentarians than any other world region, with proportions increasing from 9% in 1990 to over 25% by 2015 and 30% by 2020 (Piscopo 2020). These improvements to Latin American women's status were hastened by public policy, from increased social spending on early childhood education and childcare (Filgueira and Martínez Franzoni 2017) to the adoption of gender quota laws for women candidates in 15 of the 18 democratic Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries of the region (Piscopo 2020).

The region's progress on narrowing gender gaps in education, employment, and political participation makes this study timely. Developments across Latin America are not uniform, but they have been achieved through similar policy instruments and have resulted in comparable gains. For example, on the World Economic Forum's 2018 Gender Gap ratings—calculated in the final year of the PELA survey—just .141 points separates the Spanish-speaking Latin American country with the smallest gap (Nicaragua) from the country with the largest gap (Guatemala), a difference smaller than that separating the highest and lowest achievers in East Asia and the Pacific, the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and even Western Europe (World Economic Forum 2018, 16–17). Latin American countries are also similar in other ways: they share a common colonial and therefore linguistic, cultural, and religious heritage; they participated in the third-wave of democratization; and all have presidential, multiparty systems with regular elections (Smith and Sells 2017). Given this shared political and cultural milieu, do Latin American elites in fact hold progressive views about women's roles and the use of state power to transform their roles?

The PELA data allows us to unpack Latin American elites' gender attitudes by pooling data from 13 of the 18 Latin American countries, for a total of 972

responses (see [Online Appendix A](#), Table A1 for fieldwork year, response rates, and sample size for each country). While scholars have pointed out that questions on mass surveys measuring cultural or political values may convey different meanings in different regional or national contexts—and thus may end up *not* measuring the same underlying construct from country to country ([Sokolov 2018](#))—we believe looking among elites *within* Latin America diminishes this concern. The PELA questions are asking about women, women's roles, and the use of state power within similar countries. We do not have strong reason to believe that a question like “do men make better political leaders than women” measures one construct in Mexico but another one in Chile, for example. Indeed, other scholars working on Latin America have pooled mass survey data across countries and have found that a greater number of individual factors relative to country factors shape responses to gender attitude questions ([Morgan and Buice 2013](#); [Smith et al. 2017](#)).

The PELA surveys are conducted in the lower or unicameral house after each country's legislative election. Enumerators collect the data via in-person interviews with each legislator, but legislators are informed that data collection itself is anonymous. Analyses using PELA data have confirmed that legislators largely express their own opinion, unencumbered by parties' or constituents' expectations, and with few social desirability effects ([Carnes and Lupu 2015](#); [Saiegh 2009](#)). Enumerators gather a representative sample, and legislators' responses are weighted according to their political party's size in the chamber ([Mateos and Corral 2022](#); [PELA-USAL 2022](#)). To further protect respondents' anonymity, legislators whose parties obtained five or fewer seats are not identified by party, but grouped into the “others” category.²

Three Different Dimensions of Gender-Equality Attitudes

We began with testing our intuition about the conceptual grouping of the PELA questions into the egalitarianism, recognition, and state action dimensions (see [Figure 1](#)). We reverse coded several questions so that higher scores always indicate the more gender-equal orientation. For example, *disagreeing* that men make better political leaders than women is the gender-equal response, while *agreeing* that quotas are necessary to raise the number of women legislators is the gender-equal response. [Table 1](#) displays descriptive statistics for the 10 questions.

We use a principal component analysis (PCA) with an oblique promax rotation to empirically build our

grouping of the PELA questions. The PCA returns the number of components that the data contain, without the researchers specifying a number *ex ante*. In our case, it returned three components that map onto our theoretical expectations about three dimensions. [Table 2](#) reports the PCA results, and we add column labels to connect the returned PCA component with our theorized dimension (full PCA appears in [Online Appendix B](#)). The questions about gender roles (*leadership*, *job*, *education*, and *management*) correlate with the first component, which supports our intuition about the egalitarianism dimension. The questions about policy change (*demands*, *policies*, and *quotas*) all correlate highly or moderately-highly with the second component, which supports our intuition about the state action dimension. Finally, questions about gender inequality existing and causing problems (*salary*, *political parties*, and *important*) all correlate well or very well with the third component, which corresponds to our recognition dimension.

The PCA supports hypothesis DV-1, that the PELA questions fall into three conceptually distinct dimensions. This grouping exists despite some potential imprecision with PELA's framing of certain questions. In framing gender equality as a “special favor,” the *demands* question conveys a dismissive attitude towards women, a negative connotation that could affect both egalitarianism and recognition. Conceptually, we keep *demands* grouped in state action, since the *demands* question does not tap into gender roles as neatly and cleanly as the *leadership*, *job*, *education*, and *management* questions. Empirically, *demands* also correlates more highly with state action than with egalitarianism.

The *salary* question also poses some awkwardness. Conceptually, we hold that agreeing with the statement, “when a woman earns more than a man, she will certainly have problems” means recognizing the backlash that occurs when women overstep their traditional roles. Empirically, the PCA supports grouping *salary* with recognition. Yet an inequalitarian (sexist) respondent could also agree with this question, because he thinks women *deserve* backlash for overstepping. The PCA results do not support this interpretation, but to address the potential conceptual imprecisions raised by *salary* as well as *demands*, we re-ran the PCA without these questions. The overall results did not change ([Online Appendix F](#)). We still saw clear groupings where the egalitarian questions correlated with component 1, the (remaining) state action questions correlated with component 2, and the (remaining) recognition questions correlated with component 3.

As an alternative check on the overall grouping, we also ran a factor analysis, including both exploratory and confirmatory analyses (see [Online Appendix G](#)). The latent variables specified in the exploratory factor analysis

Table 1. Descriptive statistics for PELA's gender equality questions.

Variable	Question	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Scale	
					Min	Max
Egalitarianism						
Leadership	In general, men make better political leaders than women*	961	4.45	0.96	1	5
Job	When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women*	951	4.54	0.93	1	5
Education	University education is more important for a boy than for a girl*	947	4.71	0.72	1	5
Management	In general, men have better managerial skills than women*	947	4.58	0.90	1	5
Recognition						
Important	Inequalities between men and women are a problem in the country	966	6.89	2.43	1	10
Parties	Women have the same chances as anyone to access positions of power and decision making within the party*	959	1.91	1.24	1	5
Salary	If the woman earns more than the man, she will almost certainly have problems	958	2.49	1.49	1	5
State action						
Demands	When women demand equality nowadays, they are actually looking for special favors*	958	4.18	1.20	1	5
Policies	The state must implement public policies to reduce inequalities between men and women	959	6.40	1.17	1	7
Quotas	Quotas are necessary to increase the number of women in parliament	960	3.69	1.46	1	5

* Question was reverse coded so that higher values indicate the more gender-equal response.

Source: own elaboration from PELA.

Table 2. Rotated components (PCA).

	First component (<i>egalitarianism</i>)	Second component (<i>state action</i>)	Third component (<i>recognition</i>)
Leadership	0.454	0.012	0.006
Job	0.493	−0.078	0.010
Education	0.480	−0.018	0.064
Management	0.475	−0.038	0.015
Important	0.055	0.248	0.432
Political parties	0.157	−0.054	0.584
Salary	−0.083	0.000	0.614
Demands	0.228	0.387	−0.274
Policies	−0.023	0.645	−0.051
Quotas	−0.103	0.603	0.118

Principal Component Analysis. Rotation: oblique promax. Higher contributions in bold.

Source: own elaboration based on PELA-USAL.

(EFA) are strongly related to the items used to measure each factor, and the overall models fit very well according to the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Importantly, the factor analysis shows the same result as the PCA: the very variables that the PCA groups into components 1, 2, and 3 are the variables that the factor analysis groups into factors

1, 2, and 3. We find almost no differences between the PCA and the factor analysis; instead, the factor analysis corroborates that the same questions group into the same three dimensions. Moving forward, we use the PCA results because that analysis yielded three components without us specifying the desired number ex-ante, but we

continue to provide robustness checks using the factor analysis results.

Each Dimension as Distinctive

We saved each of the three PCA components as its own variable, so we now have three variables that correspond to attitudes on three dimensions: egalitarianism, recognition, and support for state action. We then standardized the PCA scores. Figure 2 shows each country's standardized PCA score relative to the total mean and the band around the mean shows the standard deviation (the raw country-level averages for each dimension's constitutive questions are in Online Appendix A, Table A4). The horizontal axis orders countries based on the lowest to

highest average score on egalitarianism, starting with Bolivia, which falls well below the mean (-0.67), and ending with Uruguay, which falls well above the mean (0.60).

If all PELA questions were tapping into the same concept, we would expect the country-level distributions to look similar across all dimensions. Instead, they vary considerably. Take Uruguay compared to Bolivia: in Uruguay, legislators express above-average levels of egalitarianism, but below-average levels of recognition and state action, while in Bolivia, legislators express below-average levels of egalitarianism and recognition, while having above-average support for state action. This contrast also reveals that while the dimensions may be related, they are still distinctive. Elites in




Figure 2. Legislators' average gender-equality orientation, by dimension and country. Standardized dimensions, with zero set as the dimension total mean and bands showing the standard deviation. Source: own elaboration based on PELA-USAL.

Bolivia alongside those in the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Mexico have higher average support for state action than recognition of inequality, which is not the expected outcome *if* recognizing gender inequality as problematic were a precursor to supporting state action as a corrective.

Figure 2 offers further support for our conceptual contribution. As we intuited and as principal component and factor analyses confirmed, the 10 PELA questions are measuring conceptually distinct dimensions of gender equality attitudes. Figure 2 also suggests more variation exists within rather than between countries. The standard deviation bands cross the mean in every case except for egalitarianism in Uruguay, suggesting that elites *within countries* hold diverging views. Said another way, in no country and on no dimension do elites' views seem tightly clustered (again save egalitarianism in Uruguay).

Still, as we move towards predicting which independent variables affect attitudes on each dimension, we did check for country-level patterns. Next, we present regression models that treat each standardized PCA score as a linear dependent variable. We initially ran multi-level models that included our three individual-level independent variables—legislator gender, ideology, and religiosity—alongside several country-level independent variables. The latter included countries' progress on gender equality (the United Nations' Gender Inequality Index), the proportion of women in parliament, the strength of the gender quota law, level of democracy, election of a left president, and mass religiosity. The rationale for each country-level variable and the full models are in [Online Appendix D](#), but in short, we find no effects at the country level.

Predicting Individual Attitudes about Gender Equality

We hypothesized that gender, ideology, and religiosity would shape legislators' attitudes towards gender equality. The data for these measures and all controls comes from the PELA survey. We proxy gender using legislators' self-reported sex (0=man, 1=woman). To measure ideology, we include self-reported ideology using the traditional 1-left–10-right scale. As an additional measure of ideology, we include legislators' self-position on a 1-state–10-market scale, another important cleavage in Latin American politics ([Bohigues and Rivas 2019](#), 9). The questions correlate at 0.47.

We do not measure ideology as legislators' party membership, for several reasons. Other scholars have demonstrated that Latin American legislators' self-placement on the left-right axis does not always correspond to their

parties' platforms. Legislators from different parties often place themselves in similar positions on the left-right axis, even as their parties' programmatic goals or stated ideological positions objectively differ ([Barnes and Saxton 2019](#); [Kitschelt et al. 2010](#)). Indeed, ideology and party identification in Latin America are not consistently related, as bolstered by the regional trend towards party system fragmentation ([Mainwaring 2018](#)) and a lack of programmatic coherence *within* parties ([Lupu 2016](#)).

The sample reflects these trends. [Online Appendix A](#) Table A3 shows the 61 parties included in the 13-country sample, by number of legislators surveyed within each party. The average number of legislators represented per party is 15, and in only 17 parties do we have more than 20 legislators represented. Moreover, PELA excludes party labels for respondents who belong to parties that hold less than 5 seats in the legislature (to preserve anonymity), and there are 59 legislators for whom we cannot identify their party label. The anonymization in turn suggests that (i) the actual number of parties contained in the dataset is much higher than 61 and (ii) the average number of legislators represented per party is actually less than 15. These features of the data reflect the regional trend of party system fragmentation and make detecting by-party variation extremely difficult. As further proof that Latin American parties—and therefore their brands—are weak ([Lupu 2016](#)), 20% of the parties included in our sample had completely disappeared from parliaments by May 2022.

Turning to religiosity, PELA includes two measures: denomination and frequency of attending religious services. Despite Evangelicalism's rising appeal in Latin America, most legislators are still Catholic: 80% in the PELA surveys. Since denomination lacks variation, and since the fervor of religious beliefs likely matters more than denomination ([Biroli and Caminotti 2020](#); [Zarembeg 2020](#)), we include attendance at religious services, measured on a 6-pt scale (0=non-believer and 5=attending services more than once a week). Finally, recalling that women may diverge from men in their gender equality attitudes while sharing conservative views in other spheres ([de Geus and Shorrocks 2020](#); [Piscopo 2014](#); [Xydias 2013](#)), we include interaction terms that capture how religiosity and ideology may operate differently for men and women: woman*religiosity and woman*ideology.

We include two groups of control variables. First, we include other sociodemographic controls thought to influence attitudes about gender equality.³ Scholars have found that age and background affect elite preferences, echoing the importance of these variables in studies of mass attitudes. For instance, older candidates express less support for women's equality ([de Geus and Shorrocks 2020](#)) and working-class legislators favor

state distribution (Barnes, Beall, and Holman 2021; Micozzi 2018). To proxy backgrounds, we include PELA's measures of income (categorical measure), education (categorical measure based on level attained), and parents' education (0=no parent went to university, 1=at least one of them did). We also include age (continuous variable).⁴ We expect that older legislators may express more conservative attitudes and that upper-class legislators—as proxied by income and their parents' education—might also express more conservative attitudes. We also expect that educated legislators may express more gender-equal attitudes.

Second, we include measures of legislators' political careers, namely, whether legislators are serving their first-ever term (1=yes, 0=no) and whether their party is in the government or the opposition (1=yes, 0=no). These variables control for potential sources of respondent bias. Other analyses using PELA data have noted that veteran and opposition members tend to answer *all* questions more negatively, perhaps because their longer tenure and/or exclusion from the governing party makes them more critical (Singer 2021). Being in the government or opposition also offers another way to control for the effect of political parties. As noted, party systems in Latin America are highly fragmented and constantly shifting, and parties are themselves internally heterogeneous (Lupu 2016; Mainwaring 2018). We also have few parties in the sample

with more than 20 legislators represented, so fixed-effects for party membership have low validity and would mathematically stretch the models too far. Previous analyses using the PELA data have argued that, given these limitations, relying on a government-opposition dummy to proxy political parties offers a reasonable solution (Bohigues and Fernández-i-Marín 2022). Descriptive statistics for all variables appear in Online Appendix A, Table A2.

As described above, each dependent variable corresponds to the standardized component. The DV is therefore a standardized continuous variable. We run three linear regressions with country-fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the country level, as shown in Table 3 (for ease of presentation, we omit reporting the country-fixed effects; see Online Appendix C for the full model).⁵ An alternative model using the same set of independent and control variables, but with the factor analysis scores as the dependent variable, yields similar results (see Online Appendix H).

The regression results provide support for all three hypotheses. First, women legislators are more likely than men to hold egalitarian attitudes, to recognize inequality as a problem, and to support state action to hasten equality (statistically significant at 1% in all three base models). Second, the more religious the legislator, the less likely they are to hold egalitarian attitudes and express

Table 3. Predicting legislators' gender equality attitudes (fixed-effects linear regressions).

	Egalitarianism				Recognition				State action			
Woman	0.30	(0.08)***	0.25	(0.11)**	0.27	(0.09)***	0.27	(0.16)	0.62	(0.07)***	0.36	(0.17)*
Religiosity	−0.08	(0.02)***	−0.09	(0.02)***	−0.06	(0.02)**	−0.07	(0.02)***	−0.02	(0.03)	−0.01	(0.04)
Left/Right	−0.03	(0.02)	−0.03	(0.02)	0.05	(0.02)**	0.06	(0.03)**	−0.04	(0.03)	−0.07	(0.03)*
State/Market	−0.01	(0.02)	0.00	(0.02)	0.02	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)*	−0.02	(0.02)	−0.02	(0.02)
Demographics												
Age	0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	0.01	(0.00)*	0.01	(0.00)*
Income	0.02	(0.03)	0.02	(0.03)	−0.01	(0.04)	−0.01	(0.04)	−0.10	(0.07)	−0.08	(0.07)
Own studies	0.07	(0.04)*	0.07	(0.04)*	0.09	(0.04)*	0.09	(0.04)*	0.01	(0.04)	0.01	(0.04)
Parents' studies	0.25	(0.10)**	0.25	(0.10)**	0.08	(0.07)	0.08	(0.07)	0.01	(0.09)	0.00	(0.08)
Political career												
First term	0.10	(0.07)	0.10	(0.07)	0.02	(0.10)	0.02	(0.09)	0.14	(0.09)	0.13	(0.08)
Opposition	−0.09	(0.08)	−0.09	(0.08)	0.11	(0.09)	0.12	(0.09)	0.26	(0.13)*	0.25	(0.13)*
Interactions												
Woman X religiosity			0.03	(0.03)			0.04	(0.05)			−0.02	(0.06)
Woman X Left/Right			−0.01	(0.02)			−0.02	(0.03)			0.07	(0.03)*
Constant	−0.21	(0.28)	−0.19	(0.27)	−0.64	(0.28)**	−0.64	(0.27)**	−0.02	(0.34)	0.05	(0.34)
R-squared	0.21		0.21		0.18		0.18		0.19		0.20	
N	759		759		759		759		759		759	

***<0.01; **<0.05. *<0.1. Clustered standard errors for country in parenthesis. Country-fixed effects not shown in the table.

Note: We drop from over 908 cases to 759 because only cases with scores on all items are included.

Source: authors' own elaboration.

recognition (statistically significant at 1% and 5%, respectively). Religiosity has no effect on legislators' support for state action, however. Third, legislators' left-right placement has no effect on their egalitarianism, but *does* shape recognition in the base and interaction models and does shape support for state action in the interaction model only.

We therefore find support for hypotheses IV-1 and IV-2 about gender and religiosity, respectively, but mixed support for hypothesis IV-3 about ideology. We had predicted that ideology would have the largest effect on the state action dimension, but instead we see that in the base models, ideology is only a statistically significant predictor of recognition. Moreover, the direction is slightly counter-intuitive: *right* legislators are more likely than left legislators to recognize gender inequality as problematic. Yet this outcome disappears in our robustness checks, where we run linear regression models predicting legislators' answers on the original 10 questions, using the same set of independent and control variables (see [Online Appendix E](#)). Here, ideology predicts legislators' answers on none of three questions that compose the recognition dimension (*salary*, *parties*, and *important*). Further, moving to the left is statistically associated with expressing more support on all state action questions (statistically significant at the 1% level for *policies* and *quotas* and at 5% for *demands*).⁶ Also in line with our hypotheses about gender and religiosity, gender predicts the more gender-equal response on all 10 questions (statistically significant in all cases) and greater religiosity lowers the likelihood of the more gender-equal response on all questions in the egalitarian dimension and all questions in the recognition dimension save *salary*.

In the main [Table 2](#) models, the control variables exert little effect on legislators' gender equality attitudes. Age only matters for state action. Parents' education leads to more egalitarianism and legislators' higher education leads to more egalitarianism and recognition. First-term legislators do not differ from veteran legislators in their gender equality attitudes, and legislators in the opposition are more likely to support state action.

Together, these results bolster our intuition that the PELA questions tap into three different dimensions of attitudes about gender equality. If all 10 PELA questions were tapping into the same idea, we would expect the predictors to behave the same, but instead we see differences in which variables predict egalitarianism and recognition, on the one hand, and which predict support for state action, on the other hand. Still, gender predicts the more gender-equal attitude across the board.

Moreover, being a woman predicts greater support for state action even when interacted with ideology.

[Figure 3](#) plots the marginal effects (adjusted linear predictions) of ideology by gender for state action. Among women, above-average support for state action appears constant, no matter their left-right positioning. By contrast, men on the left have above-average support for state action, in contrast to men on the right, who hold below-average support, and the gap between women and men increases moving from left to right. In fact, the linear prediction indicates that a woman on the extreme right (at position 10) evinces more support than a man on the extreme left (position 1). Rightist women are more supportive of state action on gender equality than both rightist men *and* leftist men, and so women legislators are always more likely than men to support leveraging government power to hasten gender equality.

The Salience of Legislator Gender across Three Dimensions of Gender Equality

Our analysis of Latin American legislators' attitudes towards gender equality offers two central insights. First, we leverage the PELA data—the first cross-national elite survey to ask a comprehensive set of questions about gender equality—to uncover three different dimensions: being egalitarian, recognizing that gender inequality exists and causes problems, and supporting public policies that advance gender equality. Relying on single indicators to capture mass or elite orientations towards gender equality may therefore create a misleading picture.

Second, we answer the question, which predictors explain elites' attitudes towards gender equality? This question matters because elites do more than just pass policy: they model gender equality norms for citizens ([Alexander 2012](#); [Morgan and Buice 2013](#)) and they




Figure 3. Effects of gender on expressing the most gender-equal attitude towards state action, mediated by ideology. Adjusted Linear Predictions with 95% CIs. Stata command *margins*. Source: authors' own elaboration.

shape whether political spaces are welcoming or hostile spaces for women politicians (O'Brien and Piscopo 2019). Yet scholars rarely have direct measures of elite attitudes, instead inferring preferences from actions like bill introduction and policy outcomes. Such work examining the link between descriptive and substantive representation has suggested that legislator gender matters, and our analysis helps confirm that women elites are indeed more likely than men elites to hold gender-equal attitudes.

While women express more gender-equal attitudes than men on all three dimensions, we do find that other individual-level factors matter as well. All else equal, religiosity explains legislators' attitudes about egalitarianism and recognition but not state action, while left/right ideology explains legislators' attitudes about recognition and state action. Consequently, when it comes to attitudes about gender equality, personal beliefs differ from political calculations. As a personal belief, religiosity shapes whether legislators see men and women as equal in their talents and capabilities, and whether they believe that inequality between men and women matters—but not whether they will support public policies that advance gender equality. Ideology shapes the latter, and moreover, women legislators are more supportive of state action than men legislators even at the same levels of ideology.

Our findings still leave questions open for future research. Our study emphasizes the importance of individual-level factors rather than country-level factors, but our data are cross-sectional, and cannot capture whether significant changes in countries' contexts—such as big jumps in electing women—might change gender equality attitudes. For instance, *increases* in elected women can make people more likely to think women are good political leaders (Alexander 2012; Keverel and Atkeson 2015), so Latin American countries that progress faster on gender equality might also produce elites whose gender-equality attitudes are universally more favorable. Such longitudinal questions can be answered after the next PELA wave.

Future research might also interrogate the relationship between egalitarianism, recognition, and state action, as well as look for more precise measures of each. We contend that egalitarianism, recognition, and state action are conceptually distinctive—but they may well exist in causal relationships to each other. Though we see numerous instances where elites support state action to hasten gender equality without necessarily thinking that gender *inequality* is problematic, recognizing that inequality exists could still shape elite preferences towards certain policies. We acknowledge that PELA's *políticas* question is rather generic. Questions about attitudes towards specific policies might reveal that recognition matters for certain kinds of state

action but not others. For instance, perhaps recognizing inequality as problematic shapes support for maternity leave but not legal abortion, since a religious recognizer could more easily endorse the former rather than the latter. Further, questions that ask elites about their own legislative activity relative to gender equality would also tie attitudes to outcomes more concretely, allowing researchers to see whether expressing egalitarianism, recognition, or support for state action actually translates into substantive representation. Finally, we need to know more about how partisanship interacts with ideology. In Latin America, party system fragmentation means that we have too few responses per party to understand whether and how party predicts elite attitudes.

These unanswered questions underscore the importance of incorporating more questions designed to measure gender equality into elite and mass surveys conducted in Latin America and in other world regions. The PELA survey's battery of 10 questions is unique. Even the most prestigious mass survey in Latin America, the AmericasBarometer, does not contain as many questions designed to measure gender equality attitudes. These gaps limit the ability to know whether elite and mass attitudes are shaped by the same or different factors, and whether any such patterns are consistent or different across world regions. We hope that future surveys can be designed to explore these topics.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank Tiffany Barnes, Amanda Clayton, Mariana Sendra, Michelle Taylor-Robinson, and the anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. The authors also thank colleagues at Australian National University, the Quality of Government Institute at the University of Gothenburg, and the University of Salamanca, who gave feedback on this manuscript at workshops and conferences.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The article is integrated into the research project “El rol representativo de mujeres y hombres en los Parlamentos latinoamericanos (PELA mujeres)” supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades. Ref.: RTI2018-094972-B-I00.

Data Availability Statement

All data, replication files, and appendices referenced in this manuscript are available from Bohigues, Alexander, and Piscopo

(2022) via the Harvard Dataverse at <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/WSL5YR>.

ORCID iDs

Amy Alexander  <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7888-4617>
 Asbel Bohigues  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9875-7743>
 Jennifer M. Piscopo  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9043-1810>

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

1. Though Morgan and Buice (2013) find no effect for church attendance on respondents' answer to the same question.
2. More information on the dataset can be found at <https://oir.org.es/pela/en/>.
3. PELA also asks legislators their marital status. However, most men legislators are married, reducing the variation. For this reason, we did not include this indicator.
4. We ran alternative models with age recoded by cohorts (18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60+) and the results did not significantly differ from those using age as a continuous variable.
5. The models with only country-fixed effects, or with only clustered standard errors at the country level, produce minor changes in coefficients. For this reason, we keep both in Table 3.
6. Religiosity is also negatively associated with the most gender-equal response on demands (statistically significant at the 1 percent level), but above we suggest that demands—as phrased in the PELA surveys—could also measure egalitarianism. If demands also captures respondents' sexism, then religiosity's significance is consistent with our theory.

References

- Alexander, Amy C. 2012. "Change in Women's Descriptive Representation and the Belief in Women's Ability to Govern: A Virtuous Circle." *Politics & Gender* 8 (4): 437–464.
- Alexander, Amy C., and Christian Welzel. Islam and Patriarchy: How Robust is Muslim Support for Patriarchal Values? *International Review of Sociology* 2011; 21(2): 249–276.
- Alexander, Amy C., Ronald Inglehart, and Christian Welzel. Emancipating sexuality: Breakthroughs into a Bulwark of Tradition. *Social Indicators Research* 2016; 129(2): 909–935.
- Barnes, Tiffany. 2016. *Gendering Legislative Behavior*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Barnes, Tiffany, Victoria Beall, and Mirya Holman. 2021. "Pink Collar Representation and Budgetary Outcomes in the U.S. States." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 46 (1): 119–154.
- Barnes, Tiffany, and Abby Córdova. 2016. "Making Space for Women: Explaining Citizen Support for Legislative Gender Quotas in Latin America." *The Journal of Politics* 78 (3): 760–636.
- Barnes, Tiffany, and Gregory Saxton. 2019. "Working-Class Legislators and Perceptions of Representation in Latin America." *Political Research Quarterly* 72 (4): 910–928.
- Batista Pereira, Frederico, and Nathália F.F. Porto. 2020. "Gender Attitudes and Public Opinion Towards Electoral Gender Quotas in Brazil." *Political Psychology* 41 (5): 887–899.
- Beall, Victoria, and Tiffany Barnes. 2020. "Mapping Right-Wing Women's Policy Priorities in Latin America." *Journal of Women, Politics, and Policy* 41 (1): 36–65.
- Beauregard, Katrine. 2018. "Partisanship and the Gender Gap: Support for Gender Quotas in Australia." *Australian Journal of Political Science* 53 (3): 290–319.
- Biroli, Flávia, and Mariana Caminotti. 2020. "The Conservative Backlash against Gender in Latin America." *Politics & Gender* 16 (1): 1–6.
- Blofield, Merike, Christina Ewig, and Jennifer M. Piscopo. 2017. "The Reactive Left: Gender Equality and the Latin American Pink Tide." *Social Politics* 24 (4): 345–369.
- Bohigues, Asbel, and Xavier Fernández-i-Marín. 2022. "Drug Legalization, Elite Support, and Government Effectiveness in Latin America." *Journal of Drug Issues* 52 (2): 250–267. doi:10.1177/00220426211055434
- Bohigues Asbel, Amy Alexander, and M Piscopo Jennifer. 2022. "Replication Data for: Opening the Attitudinal Black Box: Three Dimensions of Latin American Elites' Attitudes about Gender Equality (PRQ)." *Harvard Dataverse*, V1, UNF:6:aRgrEcM0eXxfOJI84F8Y6w== [fileUNF].
- Bohigues, Asbel, and Jennifer M. Piscopo. 2021. "¿Identidad de Grupo, Ideología o Reconocimiento? El Apoyo de los y las Legisladoras a Las Cuotas de Género en América Latina." *Revista CIDOB d' Afers Internacionals* 127 (April): 95–120.
- Bohigues, Asbel, and José Manuel Rivas. 2019. "Free Trade Agreements and Regional Alliances: Support from Latin American Legislators." *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 62 (1): 1–22.
- Carnes, Nicholas, and Noam Lupu. 2015. "Rethinking the Comparative Perspective on Class and Representation: Evidence from Latin America." *American Journal of Political Science* 59: 1–18.
- Celis, Karen, and Sarah Childs. 2020. *Feminist Democratic Representation*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Clayton, Amanda, Cecilia Josefsson, Robert Mattes, and Shaheen Mozaffar. 2019. "In Whose Interest? Gender and Mass-Elite Priority Congruence in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Comparative Political Studies* 51 (2): 69–101.
- Clayton, Amanda, Cecilia Josefsson, and Vibeke Wang. 2017. "Quotas and Women's Substantive Representation: A

- Content Analysis of Ugandan Plenary Debates.” *Politics & Gender* 13 (2): 276–304.
- Coffé, Hilde. 2012. “Conceptions of Female Political Representation: Perspectives of Rwandan Female Representatives.” *Women’s Studies International Forum* 35 (4): 286–297.
- Coffé, Hilde, and Marion Reiser. Political Candidates’ Attitudes Towards Group Representation. *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 2018; 24(3): 272–297.
- Dahlerup, Drude. 2018. “Gender Equality as a Closed Case: A Survey among the Members of the 2015 Danish Parliament.” *Scandinavian Political Studies* 41 (2): 188–209.
- Dalton, Russel. 2019. *Citizen Politics*. Los Angeles: CQ Press.
- De Geus, Roosmarijn, and Rosalind Shorrocks. 2020. “Where do Female Conservatives Stand? A Cross-National Analysis of the Issue Positions and Ideological Placement of Female Right-Wing Candidates.” *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy* 41 (1): 7–35.
- Fessler, Leah. 2018. “US Senator Cory Booker on Me Too and Why ‘We Won’t Legislate Our Way to Full Equality’.” *Quartz at Work*, October 30. <https://qz.com/work/1415143/hww4-cory-booker/> (Accessed August 1, 2022).
- Filgueira, Fernando, and Juliana Martínez Franzoni. 2017. “The Diverge in Women’s Economic Empowerment: Class and Gender under the Pink Tide.” *Social Politics* 24 (4): 370–398.
- Franceschet, Susan, and Jennifer M. Piscopo. 2008. “Gender Quotas and Women’s Substantive Representation: Lessons from Argentina.” *Politics & Gender* 4 (3): 393–425.
- Franceschet, Susan, Jennifer M. Piscopo, and Gwynn Thomas. 2016. “Supermadres, Maternal Legacies, and Women’s Political Participation in Contemporary Latin America.” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 48 (1): 1–32.
- Frederick, Brian. 2013. “Gender and Roll Call Voting Behavior in Congress: A Cross-Chamber Analysis.” *The American Review of Politics* 34: 1–20.
- Galligan, Yvonne, and Sara Clavero. 2008. “Prospects for Women’s Legislative Representation in Postsocialist Europe: The Views of Female Politicians.” *Gender & Society* 22 (2): 149–171.
- Hinojosa, Magda, Jill Carle, and Gina Serignese Woodall. 2018. “Speaking as a Woman: Descriptive Presentation in Costa Rica’s Legislative Assembly.” *Journal of Women, Politics, and Policy* 39 (4): 407–429.
- Htun, Mala, Marina Lacalle, and Juan Pablo Micozzi. 2013. “Does Women’s Presence Change Legislative Behavior? Evidence from Argentina, 1983–2007.” *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 5 (1): 95–125.
- Htun, Mala, and Timothy J. Power. 2006. “Gender, Parties, and Support for Equal Rights in the Brazilian Congress.” *Latin American Politics and Society* 48 (4): 83–104.
- Htun, Mala, and S. Laurel Weldon. 2018. *The Logics of Gender Justice: State Action on Women’s Rights Around the World*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2003. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Jenkins, Shannon. How Gender Influences Roll Call Voting. *Social Science Quarterly* 2012; 93(2): 415–433.
- Josefsson, Cecilia. 2020. “How Candidate Selection Structures and Genders Political Ambition: Illustrations from Uruguay.” *European Journal of Politics and Gender* 3 (1): 61–78.
- Kang, Alice J., and Aili Mari Tripp. 2018. “Coalitions Matter: Citizenship, Women, and Quota Adoption in Africa.” *Perspectives on Politics* 16 (1): 73–91.
- Kerevel, Yann P., and Lonna Rae Atkeson. 2015. “Reducing Stereotypes of Female Political Leaders in Mexico.” *Political Research Quarterly* 68 (4): 732–744.
- Kittilson, Miki Caul. 2008. “Representing Women: The Adoption of Family Leave in Comparative Perspective.” *Journal of Politics* 70 (2): 323–334.
- Kitschelt, Herbert, Kirk A. Hawkins, Juan Pablo Luna, Guillermo Rosas, and Elizabeth J. Zeichmeister. (eds). 2010. *Latin American Party Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lupu, Noam. 2016. *Party Brands in Crisis: Partisanship, Brand Dilution, and the Breakdown of Political Parties in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Mainwaring, Scott (ed). 2018. *Party Systems in Latin America: Institutionalization, Decay, and Collapse*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Mateos, Araceli, and Margarita Corral. 2022. “Partial Non-Response in Political Elite Studies: An Approach to Parliamentary Elites in Latin America.” *Quality & Quantity*, Online first. doi:10.1007/s11135-022-01317-9
- Mattos, Marcela, Elisa Clavery, and Luiz Felipe Barbiéri. 2021. “Partidos Acionam Conselho da Ética da Câmara e Apontam Fala Misógina de Eduardo Bolsonaro.” *G1 e TV Globo*, April 13. <https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2021/04/13/partidos-acionam-conselho-de-etica-da-camara-e-apontam-fala-misogina-de-eduardo-bolsonaro.ghtml> (accessed August 1, 2022).
- Meier, Petra. 2012. “Paradoxes in the Meanings of Quotas in Belgium.” In *The Impact of Gender Quotas*, edited by Susan Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook, and Jennifer M. Piscopo, 157–712. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Micozzi, Juan Pablo. 2018. “Division or Union of Labor? Analyzing Workers’ Representation in the Argentine Congress.” *Latin American Politics and Society* 60 (4): 93–112.
- Mikolajczak, Małgorzata, and Janina Pietrzak. Ambivalent Sexism and Religion: Connected Through Values. *Sex Roles* 2014; 70(9–10): 387–399.
- Möhring, Katja, and Céline Teney. 2019. “Equality Prescribed? Contextual Determinants of Citizens’ Support for Gender Boardroom Quotas Across Europe.” *Comparative European Politics* 17 (6): 1–30.

- Morgan, Jana, and Melissa Buice. 2013. "Latin American Attitudes toward Women in Politics: The Influence of Elite Cues, Female Advancement, and Individual Characteristics." *American Political Science Review* 107 (4): 644–662.
- O'Brien, Diana, and Jennifer M. Piscopo. 2019. "The Impact of Women in Parliament." In *The Handbook of Women's Political Rights*, edited by Susan Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook, and Netina Tan, 53–72. New York: Palgrave.
- PELA-USAL. 2022. *Methodology*. <https://oir.org.es/pela/en/methodology/>
- Piscopo, Jennifer M. 2020. "Women in Politics in Latin America." In *Women, Policy, and Political Leadership*, edited by Christian Echle and Megha Sarmah, 77–88. Singapore: UN Women and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.
- Piscopo, Jennifer M. Beyond Hearth and Home: Female Legislators, Feminist Policy Change and Substantive Representation in Mexico. *Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política* 2014; 23(2): 87–110.
- Saiegh, Sebastian M. 2009. "Recovering a Basic Space from Elite Surveys: Evidence from Latin America." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 34 (1): 117–145.
- Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie. 2006. "Still Supermadres? Gender and the Policy Priorities of Latin American Legislators." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (3): 570–585.
- Seguino, Stephanie. 2011. "Help or Hindrance? Religion's Impact on Gender Inequality in Attitudes and Outcomes." *World Development* 39 (8): 1308–1321.
- Setzler, Mark. 2015. "Does Religion Bias Individuals against Female Political Leadership in Latin America?" *The Latin Americanist* 59 (4): 47–72.
- Singer, Matthew. 2021. "Fiddling while Democracy Burns: Partisan Reactions to Weak Democracy in Latin America." *Perspectives on Politics*, FirstView, 1–18. doi:10.1017/S1537592721002899
- Smith, Amy Erica, Katherine Warming, and Valerie M. Hennings. 2017. "Refusing to Know a Woman's Place: The Causes and Consequences of Rejecting Stereotypes of Women Politicians in the Americas." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 5 (1): 132–151.
- Smith, Peter, and Cameron Sells. *Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Sokolov, Boris. 2018. "The Index of Emancipative Values: Measurement Model Misspecifications." *American Political Science Review* 112 (2): 395–408.
- Swers, Michele. 2005. "Connecting Descriptive and Substantive Representation: An Analysis of Sex Differences in Co-sponsorship Activity." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 30 (3): 407–433.
- Wängnerud, Lena. 2015. *The Principles of Gender-Sensitive Parliaments*. New York: Routledge.
- World Economic Forum. 2018. "The Global Gender Gap Report: 2018." Geneva, Switzerland. https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf (Accessed July 29, 2022).
- Xydias, Christina. 2014. "Women's Rights in Germany: Generations and Gender Quotas." *Politics & Gender* 10 (1): 4–32.
- Xydias, Christina. 2013. "Mapping the Language of Women's Interests: Sex and Party Affiliation in the Bundestag." *Political Studies* 61 (2): 319–340.
- Zaremborg, Gisela. 2020. "Feminism and Conservatism in Mexico." *Politics & Gender* 16 (1): 19–25.