The Epistemological Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism and Its Unavoidable Slide into Compatibilism
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The Epistemological Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism and Its Unavoidable Slide into Compatibilism

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The Epistemological Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism and Its Unavoidable Slide into Compatibilism

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dc.contributor.author Dal Monte, Daniel Dal Monte es
dc.date.accessioned 2020-03-03T10:53:06Z
dc.date.available 2020-03-03T10:53:06Z
dc.date.issued 2019 es
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10550/73343
dc.description.abstract This paper consists in two major parts. In the first part, I explain and defend Kant?s explicit rejection of compatibilist theories of freedom in the Critique of Practical Reason. I do this by a careful analysis of some contemporary compatibilist theories. In the second major part, I explain how the epistemological interpretation of Kant?s transcendental idealism inevitably degenerates into a compatibilist version of freedom. The upshot will be that epistemological interpretations of transcendental idealism are not viable because of their connection with compatibilism, which Kant rejected. es
dc.source Dal Monte, Daniel Dal Monte. The Epistemological Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism and Its Unavoidable Slide into Compatibilism. En: Revista de Estudios Kantianos: Publicación internacional de la Sociedad de Estudios Kantianos en Lengua Española, 4 2 2019: 476-507 es
dc.title The Epistemological Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism and Its Unavoidable Slide into Compatibilism es
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article en
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion en
dc.subject.unesco es
dc.identifier.doi 10.7203/REK.4.2.13939 es

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