Mental Contents, Tracking Counterfactuals, and Implementing Mechanisms
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Mental Contents, Tracking Counterfactuals, and Implementing Mechanisms

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Mental Contents, Tracking Counterfactuals, and Implementing Mechanisms

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Prades, J.L.; Corbí, Josep E. Perfil
This document is a Comunicación/PonenciaDate2001

Este documento está disponible también en : http://hdl.handle.net/10550/60480
In the ongoing debate, there are a set of mind-body theories sharing a certain physicallst assumption: whenever a genuine cause produces an effect, the causal efficacy of each of the non- physical properties that participate In that process is determined by the instantiation of a well-defined set of physical properties. These theories would then Insist that a nonphysical property could only be causally efficacious insofar as it is physically implemented. However, in what follows we will argue against the idea that fine- grained mental contents could be physically implemented In the way that functional properties are. Therefore, we will examine the metaphysical con- ditions under which the implementing mechanism of a particular instance of a functional property may be individuated, and see how genuine beliefs and desires-Insofar as they track the world-cannot meet such conditions.

    Corbí, J.L. y Prades, J.L. 2001, 'Mental Contents, Tracking Counterfactuals, and Implementing Mechanisms, en The Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy. Vol IX: Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Psychology, Philosophical Documentation Center.

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