The Principle of Inferential Justification, Scepticism, and Causal Beliefs
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The Principle of Inferential Justification, Scepticism, and Causal Beliefs

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The Principle of Inferential Justification, Scepticism, and Causal Beliefs

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Corbí, Josep E. Perfil
Aquest document és un/a article, creat/da en: 2000
There is an argumentative route that begins with a platitude like: The Principle of Inferential Justification (PIJ): 'To be justified in believing one proposition P on the basis of another proposition E, one must be (1) justified in believing E, (2) justified in believing that E makes probable P' and ends up by challenging our capacity to justifiedly believing propositions concerning physical objects and past events. This is, at least, what Richard Fumerton claims, but, like Christopher Hookway, I doubt that there is such a route. In the coming pages, I seek to show how Hookway's challenge may find additional motivation in a reflection on the content of a certain kind of belief, namely: beliefs about particular causal processes.

    Corbí, Josep E. 2000 The Principle of Inferential Justification, Scepticism, and Causal Beliefs Noûs 34 4 377 386
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