Evidence and First-Person Authority
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Evidence and First-Person Authority

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Evidence and First-Person Authority

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dc.contributor.author Corbí, Josep E.
dc.date.accessioned 2015-03-06T12:55:17Z
dc.date.available 2015-03-06T12:55:17Z
dc.date.issued 2011
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10550/42642
dc.description.abstract In this paper, I challlenge David Finkelstein's claim that evidence does not contribute to first-person authority. To this end, I first argue that the phenomenon of first-person authority involves a certain combination of two kinds of authority, namely: an epistemic (insofar as evidence is at issue here) and a practical (insofar as the capacity to shape one's own psychological and dispositions is the central concern) kind of authority. Secondly, I defend the view that gathering evidence plays a crucial role regarding an agent's ability to preserve (or cultivate) her practical authority upon herself.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartof Teorema, 2011, vol. 30, num. 3, p. 51-66
dc.rights.uri info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source Corbí, Josep E. 2011 Evidence and First-Person Authority Teorema 30 3 51 66
dc.subject Psicoanàlisi
dc.subject Coneixement, Teoria del
dc.subject Autoritat
dc.title Evidence and First-Person Authority
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.date.updated 2015-03-06T12:55:17Z
dc.identifier.idgrec 057603

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