Evidence and First-Person Authority

Evidence and First-Person Authority

Repositori DSpace/Manakin

Evidence and First-Person Authority

Mostra el registre complet de l'element

Visualització       (192.9Kb)

Exportar a Refworks
Corbí, Josep E. Perfil
Aquest document és un/a article, creat/da en: 2011
In this paper, I challlenge David Finkelstein's claim that evidence does not contribute to first-person authority. To this end, I first argue that the phenomenon of first-person authority involves a certain combination of two kinds of authority, namely: an epistemic (insofar as evidence is at issue here) and a practical (insofar as the capacity to shape one's own psychological and dispositions is the central concern) kind of authority. Secondly, I defend the view that gathering evidence plays a crucial role regarding an agent's ability to preserve (or cultivate) her practical authority upon herself.

    Corbí, Josep E. 2011 Evidence and First-Person Authority Teorema 30 3 51 66
distribuït sota llicència Creative Commons de Reconeixement-NoComercial 3.0 No adaptada

Aquest element apareix en la col·lecció o col·leccions següent(s)

Mostra el registre complet de l'element


Cerca avançada