Los límites del empirismo: a propósito de Kant y Russell
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Los límites del empirismo: a propósito de Kant y Russell

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Los límites del empirismo: a propósito de Kant y Russell

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Blasco Estellés, Josep Lluís, 1940-2003 Perfil
Aquest document és un/a article, creat/da en: 1986
...This paper attemps to contrast Kant's view on the limits of empiricism with the posing of the problem in the empiricism of this century, as exemplified by Bertrand Russell's thought. The conflict is approached analyzing two problems: the epistemological nature of mathematics, on the one hand, and the theory of subjectivity, on the other hand, both considered in Kant and Russell. As regards mathematics, the epistemological possibilities of Kant's constructivism are contrasted with the difficulties, from the point of view of empiricism, of accepting Russell's platonic logicism. As regards the theory of subjectivity, the paper presents the alternative between transcendental subjectivity as the limit and constitution of experience, and Russell's intent through neutral monism to constitute experience without a subject. Lastly, the paper analyzes the shortcoming of Russell's intent to lay the grounds of empiricism. The principles of inference postulated by Russell in Human Knowledge are not satisfactorily justified, and they do not extricate him from his early platonism

    Blasco Estellés, Josep Lluis, "Los límites del empirismo: a propósito de Kant y Russell" en Agora: Papeles de filosofía, ISSN 0211-6642, Nº 7, 1986, pp. 41-54.
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