¿Una imagen dualista en el De Anima de Aristóteles?
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¿Una imagen dualista en el De Anima de Aristóteles?

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¿Una imagen dualista en el De Anima de Aristóteles?

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Mittelmann, Jorge
Aquest document és un/a article publicat, creat/da en: 2014
This paper deals with a seeming contradiction that may seriously impair Aristotle’s definition of the soul in his De Anima. While this definiens has been widely regarded as providing a non-dualistic account of life-functions, grounded in a hylomorphic approach to living beings, Aristotle sticks to an instrumental language vis-à-vis the body, which he consistently refers to as a tool of the soul. It is argued that this philosophical way of talking should be taken at face value, without dismiss- ing it as a stylistic feature or a theoretical hangover from Aristotle’s Platonic days. By paying close attention to the Peripatetic and Neoplatonic reception of the “soul – boatman analogy”, the paper concludes that organic bodies may be considered as instrumental in nature, without this entailing commitment to further individual souls conceived as “users”.

    Mittelmann, Jorge. ¿Una imagen dualista en el De Anima de Aristóteles?. Quaderns de Filosofia; Vol 1, No 2 (2014).
https://ojs.uv.es/index.php/qfilosofia/article/view/4110
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