On Lying: A Conceptual Argument for the Falsity Condition
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On Lying: A Conceptual Argument for the Falsity Condition

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On Lying: A Conceptual Argument for the Falsity Condition

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dc.contributor.author Grimaltos, Tobies
dc.contributor.author Rosell, Sergi
dc.date.accessioned 2014-05-05T14:32:57Z
dc.date.available 2014-05-05T14:32:57Z
dc.date.issued 2013
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10550/34866
dc.description.abstract In this paper, we put forward a conceptual argument for the Falsity Condition for lying, upon the assumption that lying is a form of deception. We argue that if the definition of lying did not include the Falsity Condition, then successful lying would not secure that the addressee ends up believing a falsehood (about what the lie is about), which is necessary for deceiving, and then successful lying (as such) would not necessarily be a form of deception. es_ES
dc.language.iso en es_ES
dc.subject lying es_ES
dc.subject falsity condition es_ES
dc.subject deceiving es_ES
dc.title On Lying: A Conceptual Argument for the Falsity Condition es_ES
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject es_ES
dc.identifier.idgrec 106349 es_ES

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