What does Ramon Llull mean when he says «[el resclús] se maravellá com podia esser que Déus no exoya la natura humana de Jesucrist, qui pregava per son poble la natura divina», (Fèlix o Llibre de meravelles, Ch. 105, «De la oració»)?

Què vol dir Ramon Llull quan escriu «[el resclús] se maravellá com podia esser que Deus no exoya la natura humana de Jesucrist, qui pregava per son poble la natura divina», (Fèlix o Llibre de meravelles, Ch. 105, «De la oració»)?

Abstract: The proto-novel Fèlix, o Llibre de meravelles contains many unsettling «meravelles» or «wonders». One such consists in an observation made by a «reclus» —rather than by a professional theologian— concerning the prayers of Christ and of Mary and the angels, etc., to the effect that their prayers have been unable to call forth any response from God. The efficacy of such prayers is thus brought into question, as is the readiness of God's mercy and grace. By contextualising such matters within medieval currents of Neoplatonism, particularly the doctrine of causality, I argue that Llull presents a causally conceived theorisation of the hypostatic union. I identify Biblical and medieval precedents for and contrasts with Llull's position on prayer and relate this latter to the sometimes fluid notions of orthodoxy as regards Christological matters among medieval writers, pausing to focus in particular on Llull's use of the soul-body analogy for the union of natures in Christ. I examine the apparent contradiction present in Llull's construal of the efficacy of Christ's prayer—in this context, implicitly conceived as a prayer of petition—and attempt to resolve this contradiction in a way which indicates clearly Ramon Llull's relation to orthodoxy at least during the period 1274-89.

Keywords: Ramon Llull's Christology; doctrine of causality; hypostatic union; soul-body analogy; Christ's prayer

Resum: La proto-novel·la Fèlix, o Llibre de Meravelles, conté moltes inquietants «Meravelles» o «prodigis». Una d'aquestes consisteix en una observació feta per un «reclus» —en lloc de per un professional teòleg— relativa a les oracions de Crist i de Maria i els àngels, etc., en el sentit que les seues oracions no han estat suficients per provocar cap resposta de Déu. L'eficàcia d'aquestes oracions és, així, posada en dubte, ja que és la disposició de la misericòrdia i la gràcia de Déu. Per contextualitzar aquests assumptes dins dels corrents medievals de neoplatonisme, en particular la doctrina de la causalitat, sostinc que Llull presenta una teorització causalment concebuda de la unió hipostàtica. Identifique precedents bíblics i medievals a favor i en contra de la posició de Llull en l'oració, i relacione aquest últim amb les nocions de vegades subïls de l'ortodòxia, pel que fa a qüestions cristològiques entre els escriptors medievals, centrat-me en particular en l'ús que fa Llull de l'analogia ànima-cos per a la unió de naturaleses en Crist. Examine l'aparent contradicció present en la conceptualització de Llull de l'eficàcia de l'oració a Crist, en aquest context, concebut de manera implícita com una oració de petició i tracte de resoldre aquesta contradicció d'una manera que indica clarament la relació de Ramon Llull amb l'ortodòxia, almenys durant el període 1274-1289.

Paraules clau: Cristologia de Ramon Llull; doctrina de la causalitat; unió hipostàtica; analogia cos-ànima; pregària de Crist

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Introduction

The first thing we should bear in mind when examining the above question is that the work Fèlix o Llibre de meravelles was written during Llull’s first stay in Paris between the years 1287-9. During this period Llull is thought to have familiarised himself with the corpus dionysiacum, a body of texts strongly influenced by the writings of Proclus and in particular the latter’s Elementatio theologica, a Neoplatonic work concerning causality, among other things, and structured along Euclidean lines (Ruiz Simon 2005: 167-96, esp. 178-82; Dondaine 1953: 122-28). Although the scholastics were unaware that the writings of the Pseudo-Dionysius postdated those of Proclus, and attributed to the former almost apostolic authority, they did become aware, through the advertisements of St Thomas Aquinas, that the Liber de causis, a work formerly thought to have been part of the Aristotelian corpus, had as its primary source Proclus’ Elementatio theologica. This fact was revealed to Aquinas by William of Moerbeke’s recent translation for him of the latter from the Greek, completed in 1268, although it was probably also apparent to William himself.

The Liber de causis, on the other hand, had been widely circulated since the start of the thirteenth century in Europe under two titles, the Liber Aristotelis de expositione bonitatis purae and the Liber de causis, having been translated after 1167 from an Arabic exemplar in Toledo by Gerard of Cremona († 1187) (Anon. 1984: 4; Aquinas 1996: ix-xi; Proclus 2004 [2nd ed. 1963]: xxx). Aquinas, in turn, composed a commentary on this text, entitled Super Librum de causis expositio, probably written between 1269 and 1273, which represents part of as well as comments upon the Christian and Arabic mediation of Neoplatonism to the medieval Latin West. (The commentary on the same work produced earlier by his teacher Albert the Great, on the other hand, under the title of Liber de causis et processu universitatis still considered the Liber to be part of the Aristotelian corpus.) Aquinas’ Commentary also clearly marks the endpoint of a transmission from Greek via Arabic into Latin, though also possibly at least one of the starting points for further speculation on causality. His text also pointed towards the existence of strong similarities between the thought of Proclus and that
of the Pseudo-Dionysius, and clearly reveals that he made careful comparisions between the texts of the \textit{Liber de causis}, the \textit{Elementatio theologica} and Pseudo-Dionysian works (Ruiz Simon 2005: 185; Aquinas 1996: xx-xxi).

It is highly probable that Ramon Llull familiarised himself with most if not all of the works named above while he was at Paris. It is even possible that he read Aquinas’s Commentary as well. The works of the Pseudo-Dionysius and of the author of the \textit{Liber de causis}, having as they do Proclus’ \textit{Elementatio theologica} as their base or remote cause, are nevertheless unlike the latter insofar as they are monotheistic—and creationist—remodelings thereof and thus, in the eyes of Aquinas, at least, consonant with the Christian faith. What they all have in common, however, is their focus on the concept of causality, the Procline First Cause being equated in the aforementioned monotheistic texts with God. What these latter—i.e. Christian—texts have in common is that they collapse the self-subsistent Forms of Platonic origin, which in Procline Neoplatonism become a profusion of intermediary hypostases, into the attributes or Names of God.\footnote{According to Guagliardo, it is Aquinas interpretation of the first proposition of the \textit{Liber de causis}—relating as it does to the fundamental theorem of causality—in terms of the Aristotelian four causes and, more specifically, in terms of efficient causes that are universal and per se that obviates the need for separated (i.e. Platonic) forms as causes (Aquinas 1996: xx). It is only after he has dispensed with its separatist nature that Aquinas embraces the Platonic principle of causality and participation (Aquinas 1996: xx, n. 32). For the Pseudo-Dionysian \textit{correction} of Proclus regarding separatism, see Ruiz Simon (2005: 188, n. 32).}

We should note, however, as Brand does in the endnotes to his translation of the \textit{Book of Causes}, the differences between Neoplatonic and Aristotelian conceptions of causality. Brand states: «Causality in Neo-Platonism is not, as it is in Aristotelianism, to educe act from potency; rather, it is to imprint, impress, or give act to another» (Anon. 1984: 46, n. 7). As defined by the International Theological Commission (1981: II. B. 3.) the divine essence, at the very least, here in relation to theopaschite controversies, is immutable and impassible and therefore does not possess the «passivity that would permit a movement from potency to act», thus excluding explanations in keeping with Aristelian causality. Neoplatonic causality, as defined above, however, would seem to encounter no impediments to being applied to that essence.

This distinction may have some bearing on the question of whether Llull ever made the further distinction between the analogy of the mirror and that of the imprint or seal, a question raised by Mary Franklin Brown (Brown 2012: 368, n. 111). It should be mentioned in passing that in Chapter II, 5, of his \textit{De divinis nominibus} (hereafter \textit{DDN}), the Pseudo-Dionysius uses the example of the seal to illustrate how the entire wholeness of a thing participated is participated: ‘There are numerous impressions of the seal and these all have a share in the original prototype; it is the same whole seal in each of the impressions and none participates in only a part’ (Pseudo-Dionysius 1987: 62), and that the non-participation of the Godhead exceeds this example by far (ibid.: 63). The Latin version of the texts reads: «et sicut multae figulae sigilli expressae archetypum sigillum participant, et in unaqueque figura sigilli expressa totum et idem sigillum est, et in nulla figura...»
Robert Desmond Hughes. «[el resclús] se maravellà com podia esser que Déus no exoya la natura humana de Jesucrist, qui pregava per son poble la natura divina», (Fèlix o Llibre de meravelles, Ch. 105, «De la oració»)?


In the present article all references to «first cause» are to be taken in the Neoplatonic rather than Aristotelian sense. These two differing conceptions of causality are noted by Ruiz Simon (2005: 189, n. 34) and their co-presence can be observed at the very least in Chapter IV, 10, of DDN by the Pseudo-Dionysius (1987: 79; 1857: 705D). We also find both at work in the texts of Ramon Llull. Of special interest as regards the present article is that in his DDN, the Pseudo-Dionysius, when dispensing with the self-subsistent Forms, seems to make specific reference to the Names of God qua names as representing forms of praise, that is to say, worship. Colm Luibheid's translation of Chapter V, 2, has a different text from the one by John Scotus Eriugena in his Versio operum sancti Dionysii Areopagitae as given by Migne in PL 122, which latter states:

Non aliud autem esse optimum dicit, et aliud ens, et aliud vitam, vel sapientiam, neque multa caustalia, et aliorum alia creatrices deitas superemerentes et subditas: sed unius Dei totas optimas processiones, et a nobis laudatas divinas nominationes (Eriugena 1841-64: 1147 C; emphasis added).

The English translation simply reads: «But I hold that there is one God for all these good processions and that be is the possessor of the divine names» (Pseudo-Dionysius 1987: 97; emphasis added). The Latin version in PG, however, reads: «Non dicit (haec nostra tractatio) aliud esse bonum, et aliud ens, aludque vitam, vel sapientiam, neque multas causas, et alias aliorum effectrices divinitates, superiores et inferiores, sed unius Dei universas bonas emanationes, et nominationes Dei a nobis laudatas» (Pseudo-Dionysius 1857: 816D-817A; emphasis added), which can be seen to correspond in its major lines with Eriugena's version.

All this is of relevance to Llull's doctrine of God as primary cause, to his recasting of the Principles of his Art in the transition from the Quaternary to the Ternary Phase, and to his understanding of Christ in the hypostatic union as the conjunction of the uncreated with the created, the infinite with the finite—and, following Augustinian indications, the image with the exemplar and signum with res—as well as, of particular interest here, of the primary cause with the superlative effect (i.e. causa with causatum). Ramon Llull emphasises this point not least in the Compendium seu commentum artis demonstrativa (1289), Dist. 1, «De quarta parte figure». Per secundum modum multiplicationis, § 2, where he refers to the «major differentia, quam B (God) posit dare ipsi C (creature), est, quod intelligat magnum E, videlicet magnum distinctionem in divinis, et per consequens inter causam quae est ipsum B, et effectum, qui est ipsum C» (Llull 1722: 70 (363)). Should it surprise us that Llull is pointing to a great difference (E) between cause and caused in the Incarnation, we can be reassured that, had he in this particular instance articulated all the meanings of all the relevant letters of his Alphabet in this section of the work, he would surely have gone straight on to say that there was likewise a great concordance (F, the next letter) between cause and caused. Antoni Bordoy has described the latter conjunction in the following terms:
Malgrat que sembi una idea compatible amb el dogma cristià, la plasmació del *Verbum* en la creació no és quelcom freqüent en tant que implica un cert contacte entre la *Causa prima et suum effectum*, principi que trenca amb la transcendentalitat causal de Procle que adopten amb relativa facilitat els autors del segle XIII, entre els quals Tomàs d’Aquino no n’és una excepció (Bordoy 2006: 616).

We should also recall in this context the emphasis Ruiz Simon has placed on the importance of Ramon Llull’s understanding of causality to his reformulation of his Art as an overall «epistemological project» (Ruiz Simon 2005: 187). For our purposes, however, it is not necessary to be able to prove a direct influence upon Llull of St Thomas’s Commentary, nor even of the *Liber de causis* itself. It is sufficient merely to indicate that in the thirteenth century there existed what Vincent A. Guagliardo has called a “communally” worked out and so continually developing philosophical heritage surrounding the *Liber de causis* and its Procline predecessor (Aquinas 1996, xxxi).

Having said that, there are certain propositions in the *Liber de causis* which derive from corresponding ones in the *Elementatio theologica* and which might have proved very suggestive to Llull. The first of these is Proposition 1 from the *Liber*, one which has its roots in Propositions 56 and 70 of the latter work. Proposition 1.1 states, in fact, that «omnis causa primaria plus est influens super suum causatum quam causa secunda universalis». In other words, following Proclus, the effects of secondary causes are caused in virtue of the primary cause. Other propositions include numbers 9 [10], 18 [19] and 19 [20], as well as, less directly, 11 [12], 21 [22] and 23 [24], all of which are based on Proclus’ Proposition 173, from which the jointly ontological and epistemological principle «Quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur» (i.e. that of the limited receptivity of the created world)—a principle to which, as we shall see, Llull has constant recourse—ultimately derives. This principle was a scholastic adage which had its immediate roots in Thomas Aquinas’s *Summa theologiae*, Ia, q. 75, a. 5 co.: «omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo per modum recipientis»; IIIa, q. 11, a. 5 co., referring to Christ’s knowledge: «nam receptum est in recipiente per modum recipientis»; and *Summa contra gentiles*, I, Ch. 43: «Omnis actus alteri inhaerens terminationem recipit ex eo in quo est: quia quod est in altero, est in eo per modum recipientis»; as well as his *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Commentary on Proposition 4: «quia quod participatur non recipitur in participante secundum totam suam infinitatem sed particulariter» (Aquinas 1954: 30); which latter Guagliardo translates as: «because what is participated is not received in the one participating according to its entire infinity but in the manner of a particular» (Aquinas 1996: 33). This idea was already present, at least noetically, in the Pseudo-Dionysius’ *De divinis nominibus*, I, 1, which states that «the things of God are revealed to each mind in proportion to its capacities and the divine goodness is such that, out of concern for our salvation, it deals out the immeasurable and infinite in limited measures» (Pseudo-Dionysius 1987: 49) or, as the Latin text states: «pro singularum captu mentium divina revelantur, spectanturque, dum summa Dei bonitas, justitia salutari, rebus

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Aphorisms 98-99 of the Liber de causis, Proposition 9 [10], state the doctrine of «reception according to the capacity of the receiver», as this principle is sometimes called (Aquinas 1996: 75). The principle itself is thought to derive from Plotinus’ Enneads, VI, 4-5 (Anon. 1984: 48, n. 31 and 47, n. 26.). This notion is not present in Proclus’ Proposition 177, although it is present in Proposition 173: «For each principle participates its superiors in the measure of its natural capacity, and not in the measure of their being» and «participation varies with the distinctive character and capacity of the participants», as Proclus states (2004 [2nd ed.]: 151). At this point, I should just like to speculate that a remote source of Llull’s dynamic understanding of the hypostatic union in Christ might be found in Proclus’ Proposition 103 as specifically articulated in aphorism 106 of the Liber de causis, 11 [12], which latter asserts in a way the former does not that «every one of the First Things [i.e. Being, Life, Intelligence] is either a cause or an effect», or, as Brand glosses it, «is [simultaneously] both cause and effect». The Liber continues by stating that «[t]herefore, the effect is in the cause after the mode of the cause, and the cause is in the effect after the mode of the effect» (Anon. 1984: 30 and n. 35; cf. Aquinas 1996: 90). This last point is only a suggestion and requires further investigation, given that although Proclus and the Liber de causis deal with this question specifically in relation to the hierarchy of sense, Soul and Intelligence, it is Aquinas alone who fully draws out the more general implications for prior and posterior things, i.e. causes and things caused (Aquinas 1996: 90).

Table 1: Propositions from the Liber de causis which derive from either the Elementatio theologica or some other source:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liber de causis</th>
<th>Elementatio theologica</th>
<th>Other source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prop. 1</td>
<td>Prop. 56, 70</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. 9 [10]</td>
<td>Prop. 177, which depends on Prop. 173</td>
<td>Possible source for part of Prop. 173 in Plotinus’ Enneads, VI, 4-5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. 11 [12]</td>
<td>Prop. 103</td>
<td>-----</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prop. 18 [19]</td>
<td>Prop. 111</td>
<td>-----</td>
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<td>Prop. 19 [20]</td>
<td>Prop. 122</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prop. 21 [22]</td>
<td>No source in Proclus</td>
<td>Possible source in Plotinus’ Enneads, V, 2.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. 23 [24]</td>
<td>Prop. 142</td>
<td>-----</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

4 The combined information in this table is taken largely from the notes of Guagliardo in Aquinas (1996).
Robert Desmond Hughes. «[el resclús] se maravellà com podia esser que Déus no exoya la natura humana de Jesucrist, qui pregava per son poble la natura divina», (Fèlix o Llibre de meravelles, Ch. 105, «De la oració»)?

The context for the above table resides in the role the Liber de causis played in bringing about a symbiotic relationship between the works of Proclus and those of the Pseudo-Dionysius in the second half of the thirteenth century, the Liber also being used by medieval writers to interpret the latter’s texts as well as Christian theology in the light of what was presumed to be a work of Aristotelian philosophical theology (Ruiz Simon 2005: 184). The table itself can be summarised very briefly in terms of its conceptual content, at least as far as the Liber is concerned. First, Proposition 1 expresses the fundamental theorem of causality, from which we can glean the relative strengths of first and second causes. Second, Propositions 9 [10], 11 [12], 18 [19], 19 [20], 21 [22] and 23 [24] all express either ontologically or epistemologically the limited receptivity of the created realm vis-à-vis the infused powers or influentia transmitted by the uncreated deity. The fact that Proposition 1 occupies such a prominent place is not surprising, given that the text in question is a treatise on causality. But the fact that in a short and dense text six further propositions state the other principle, and that the treatise is also monotheistic and creationist suggest that it may have shaped Llull’s thought in excess of any influence he may have received from the Elementatio theologica and the corpus dionysiacum.

Bordoy seems to agree that the fundamental theorem—or first law—of causality as expressed in the Liber de causis, at least, deriving as it does from Proclus’s Propositions 56 and 57, had a profound influence on Llull’s thinking, though concludes that

la metafísica de Llull sembla recollir el rerefons de l’estructura del teorema 57 de Procle, en el sentit que és la potència de la causa més comprehensiva el que permet entendre-la com a superior per necessitat al seu efecte. No obstant, resulta difícil establir si l’origen d’aquest postulat lui lià es troba en el Liber de Causis o procedeix d’una interpretació dels Elements de teologia de Procle, tot i que les semblances de contingut semblen indicar com a més probable la segona de les dues opcions (Bordoy 2006: 426-27).

Bordoy also points to the influence of the Pseudo-Dionysius on Llull over and above that of the Liber de causis, namely, with respect to the idea of the transcendentality of the first cause (ibid.: 428). It should be noted, however, that Bordoy rejects a more wholesale influence of Proclus upon Ramon Llull, finding evidence instead that Llull’s thought developed along Porphyrian-Calcidian-Pseudo-Dionysian lines (ibid.: 416-463, 484-503, 602-11).

My claim, however, rests on the following grounds: The inherent inequality between the two orders—uncreated and created—as expressed by the Liber de causis in particular means that the cyclical Christian-Neoplatonic return is never absolutely assured, even if supplemented by the causally conceived and, in terms of created being, most perfect figure of Jesus Christ. I believe it is this uncertainty that Llull is expressing in the passage from Fèlix quoted in the title. This is because the asymmetry between—or unequal efficacy of—first and second causes seems to find its corollary in the similar asymmetry between the two natures conjoined in the hypostatic union in Christ. I make this claim despite what Richard Cross says about the rejection of causally
conceived theorisations of the hypostatic union by Duns Scotus at the very least (Cross 2002: 136, 166, regarding the unrelatedness of the Word’s special indwelling in the assumed human nature to any sort of efficient causality; and 168, regarding Scotus’ belief that hypostatically sustaining a created nature is in no way a causal kind of state). What medieval theologians in general reject, according to Cross, is that the state of being incarnate places an incarnate being in any sort of causal relationship with anything external to that being (Cross 2002: 152-55; here, 152-53; emphasis added). It should also be mentioned in passing that, in terms of Roman Catholic orthodoxy, I believe, any asymmetry between Christ’s divine and human nature’s is only apparent, given that his human nature is that of the Person of the Son of God and any such asymmetry therein is cancelled out—“theandrically”, so to speak. The reader should consult David B. Burrell on the theandric nature of Christ’s mediation (Burrell 2011: 174).

Although the literature on causality deriving from Procline and Pseudo-Dionysian roots evidently does not specify a conjunction without confusion, alteration, division or natures if we accept the Chalcedonian formula, according to Ruiz Simon it does allow—as the Aristotelian doctrine of causality does not—for the conjoined action between a hypothetical first cause and a second (or immediate) cause, this collaboration between first and second causes deriving via the Liber de causis from Proclus’ Elementatio theologica (Ruiz Simon 2005: 187-88 and n. 32; and esp. 191). It is eminently possible, therefore, that Llull might have seen this literature as a filter through which to view two degrees of causality in Christ as being associated with his two natures and vice versa (Ruiz Simon 2005:183-93, re. the Dionysian-Procline filter operative in Llull’s writings).

Evidence for the fact that divine actions may be attributed to the divine nature (rather than person) can be found in both Aquinas and Henry of Ghent (Cross 2002: 155). Cross also gives detailed discussion concerning the complexities of attributing Christ’s human actions to the causal origin of His human nature, conceived as an individual substance-like thing (Cross 2002: 218-29). Ramon Llull, on the other hand, effectively attributes causality, acting in both directions, to the divine and the human components of the hypostatic union in the context of a discussion of the Trinity as God’s supreme internal and the Incarnation as God’s supreme external operation. He does so by referring to the Dignities or divine attributes as the divine component and the term creatura to indicate the human component, in his Liber principiorum theologiae (hereafter LPT), 4.1.2 [Secunda pars De humanitate Christi]: «quod maius D (Operation) bonitatis et perfectionis ipsius C (Dignities) in creatura, et creaturae in ipso C, sit incarnatio», (Llull 2007: 49). What we are looking at here, in Llull’s case, is a version of the doctrine of dyaoteletism, namely, the Christological view as declared by the Third Council of Constantinople (681) that Christ has two wills or «modes of operation» which correspond to his two natures, the version in this case involving two wills conceived as two forms of causality. What we should consider, however, is whether—if my hypothesis is correct—Llull might be responsible for a form of what Richard Cross calls «causal overdetermination». 
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Cross states that, if we assume that the causal origin of the Son of God’s actions is the Son of God or Word Himself, then

the causal origin of the human actions cannot be the assumed nature (or its causal powers), otherwise we would have two causal origins for one and the same action—and, furthermore, for the sort of action that appears to be sufficiently causally explained by the presence of merely one causal origin (Cross 2002: 218).

A way of avoiding such overdetermination, though not without its own theologically undesirable consequences, he suggests, is to conclude that the human nature and its activities are merely instrumental with respect to the Second Person of the Trinity, the «human nature’s causal powers [being] merely moved by the Word» (idem). A further distinction is made by Cross between causal and predicative aspects of agency (Cross 2002: 219). One such undesirable consequence is that, if the human nature is conceived as a «total instrument», it cannot possess a will; but since orthodoxy stresses two wills in Christ, Christ’s human nature cannot be «a total instrument of the Word» (Cross 2011: 197-98). What we should perhaps note in this regard, however, is John of Damascus’s comments in De fide orthodoxa, III, 14, first, to the effect that Christ’s wills and operations are «natural» rather than «person» (John of Damascus 1864: 1035A); second, to the effect that, as a result of the unicity of Christ’s Personhood, «unus etiam proinde est volens, tam divina quam humana ratione» (ibid.: 1035C); and, further, in III, 15, that «tametsi in Theandrica, seu in Dei simul et hominis actione nequeant disjungi» (ibid.: 1055A). For a brief discussion of «theandric» energy in Christ, a concept forged by the pseudo-Dionysius in his Letter 4, ‘To the same monk Gaius’, the reader should consult Louth (2002 [2004]: 153-54).

Nevertheless, given that in Proclus’ text and the Liber de causis, the human intellective soul fulfils the role of second cause and that Christ’s human spiritual soul is what connects his corporeal human nature to his Divinity (Hughes 2005-06: 13-14 and n. 29; 33), the humanity of Christ, as repository of his soul—that is to say, the man God—could come to represent for Llull the locus of a maximal downward influentia or Neoplatonic procession and, correspondingly, in conjunction with his divinity, of a maximal upward refluentia or return (Ruiz Simon 2005: 189). What this means is that, for Llull, Christ could be seen as the second cause and that, as second cause, he is in his humanity eminently so. By the same token, of course, man would also be considered a second cause, though to a lesser degree, given that his virtut or potency is not so great. What’s more, however, the theory of causality expressed by Proclus and synoptically by the Liber de causis quite possibly led Llull to reconceive his understanding of the hypostatic union and the communicatio idiomatum (or «communication of properties») in Christ, thus enabling him to reconfigure in a more philosophically amenable or satisfactory way the «conjoined action» and «collaboration» of the divine person in Christ with His human nature, the agency and efficacy of His human will (as part of his soul) now being able to be more systematically calibrated against that of His divine will. Here we should attend to Cross’s assertion that «[t]he schoolmen universally understand the communication of properties to be the ascription of divine and human properties to the (divine) person» (Cross 2002: 183; emphasis in original). What such a readjustment may have also enabled
Llull to do was to superimpose a Neoplatonic account of causality, and of Christ’s dual agency in particular, onto a traditional—and for Llull, continuing—account thereof according to the Aristotelian four causes. In so doing and given such Neoplatonising focus, Llull might have been able to arrive at the view, also attributed by Richard Cross—although for different reasons—to John Duns Scotus, namely, that «the relation between human and divine wills [in Christ] is just a standard case of secondary causality» (Cross 2011: 198).

Christ is certainly seen by Llull, in his mature writings at least, to be the secondary efficient, exemplary and final cause of creation: efficient cause with regard to creation and recreation (the latter, loosely speaking, indicating redemption, though conceived in fuller «recreative» Bonaventurian terms); exemplary cause insofar as Christ is both superlative image and exemplar; and final cause insofar as he is the source of God’s hominification and man’s deification. It is worth just mentioning in passing that a good part of the evolution in Llull’s Christology between 1273 and 1315 may be attributable to his general shift in emphasis away from elemental theories and, therefore, the «material cause» of creation, and towards its «final cause», viz. deification and hominification.

Given the orthodoxy of the dyothelite position, the asymmetrical nature of causality, and the asymmetrical nature of the hypostatic union, however, it seems perfectly feasible that Llull would have felt entitled to map the doctrine of causality found in Proclus and beyond onto the hypostatic union and to reinterpret the former in the light of the latter should the opportunity arise. At the very least, they might have been seen to be mutually reinforcing doctrines and reciprocal instantiations of each other. Although Llull’s work Fèlix o Llibre de meravelles is far from being an attempt to axiomatise the medieval science of theology, it is quite possible that what Ruiz Simon has called a «solid doctrinal block» embodying the works of Proclus and the Pseudo-Dionysius, not to mention the Liber de causis, has a diffuse if not entirely systematic role to play in the formulation and expression of theological content within Fèlix (Ruiz Simon 2005: 185).

Given that Duns Scotus, along with other medieval theologians, upheld the Augustinian-derived maxim according to which, «indivisa sunt opera Trinitatis ad extram»—although Augustine’s actual words in his Enchiridion ad Laurentiam, 12. 38 are «neque enim separabilia sunt opera Trinitatis» (Augustine 1841-64a: 252)—, and whereby, as Augustine reiterates in his De Trinitate, 1. 4. 7., «pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sicut inseparabiles sunt, ita inseparabiliter operentur» (Augustine 1841-64b: 824), it is not surprising that the former, at least, should conclude that the relation between the human nature and the Word of God is not one of caused to cause, since that [i.e. causality] is common to the whole Trinity. I would conjecture, however, that Llull might be rejecting this

5 For a consideration of Llull’s views on recreation, see Reboiras (2011: 604-615).

6 Llull treats the four Aristotelian causes in their relation to the Incarnation in Llibre de demostracions (Llull 1930: 500-513); for the Latin text, see Liber mirandarum demonstrationum (Llull 1722a (1965): 203-208 (380-88)).

Robert Desmond Hughes. «[el resclús] se maravellà com podia esser que Déus no exoya la natura humana de Jesucrist, qui pregava per son poble la natura divina», (Fèlix o Llibre de meravelles, Ch. 105, «De la oració»)?

document **avant la lettre** and attempting progressively, through his development of the doctrine of the correlatives and its relation to Deitas and humanitas in the correlatives of deification and hominification, along with a Neoplatonising understanding of primary and secondary causality, to address the question of whether the individual persons of the Trinity might possess distinct causal powers—active, passive and conjunctive—and whether, consequently, it might be possible for Christ’s human nature to be viewed as being genuinely an instrument of the second person of the Trinity alone (Cross 2011: 203). That Ramon Llull attributes difference (as well as equality and concordance), that is to say, three of his relational principles, to the suppositis (or Persons) of the Divinity in terms of their power and operation can be seen at the very least in LPT, III, «De uiginti quaestionibus […]», q. 1, «Quaestio: Si in B ita se habet ipsum D ad essendum (hoc est, ad operandum essentiam) sicut se habet in C D ad bonificandum, magnificandum, possificandum, cognoscendum, amandum, perficiendum?: »idcirco oportet, quamlibet personam fore B (Divine essence) sine distinctione ipsius B in C (Dignities), et quod D (operation) ipsius B sit in qualibet Persona in C, et etiam, quod D cunislibet personae sit in BC» (Llull 2007: 135; emphasis added; cf. also q. 10, in ibid.: 140).

2. The apparent contradiction at the heart of the quotation in question:

On first analysis, the statement from Chapter 105 of *Fèlix o Llibre de meravelles* (Paris, 1287-9) to the effect that

[c]om en açó hac considerat longament, [el resclús] se maravellá com podia esser que Deus no exoya la natura humana de Jesucrist, qui pregava per son poble la natura divina, ni per que no exoya santa Maria et tant angel, archangel, martir et confessor qui ha en parays, qui tots pregun que lo mon fos bo et en bon estament (Llull 1985 [English] / 1989 [Catalan]: 1043-44 / 341; emphasis added)\(^8\)

would seem openly to contradict the statement Llull makes in the *Llibre de contemplació en Déu* (1273-42) that the reciprocal love between Christ’s humanity and divinity is the greatest possible—«car la vostra natura divina ama més la humanitat ab que es unida que totes les altres creatures, e la vostra humana natura ama més la vostra deitat que no fan totes les altres creatures» (Llull 1906-14 / ORL V: 137). In fact, this earlier statement would very much seem to render implausible the position set out in *Fèlix*. The sentiment expressed in *L.C* is echoed, furthermore, and here specifically related to Christ’s great capacity for prayer, in Book IV, Ch. 2, § 4, of the *Llibre de demostracions* (1274-6), where Llull states that if the Son of God is incarnated, He has greater capacity to know and love the Supreme (as well as the lowest) Good, than any other existing power; greater capacity to pray,

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\(^8\) In my view, the word «tots» in the final clause might plausibly be considered to include Christ as well. We should also note Llull’s pessimistic comments which immediately follow this quotation and serve to close the chapter, namely (in the Catalan version), «Estant que lo resclús en esta cogitació estava, e·s maravellava per què Déus tant poc exoïa los sants de glòria, ell se adormí e viu en visió com grans són los falliments que los bòmens fan contra Déu, per los quals defalliments tan grans no és meravella si Déus leixa los bòmens de aquest món perseverar en lur malícia» (Llull 1989: 341; emphasis added).

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Robert Desmond Hughes. «[el resclús] se maravellà com podia esser que Déus no exoya la natura humana de Jesucrist, qui pregava per son poble la natura divina», (Fèlix o Llibre de meravelles, Ch. 105, «De la oració») 

bestow gifts and assist man than any other created power (Llull 1930: 421-22). Llull’s apparent position in Fèlix, therefore, brings to mind the view stated in the opening objections to Book III, q. 21, a. 4 of Aquinas’s Summa theologiae on the question of whether Christ’s prayer was always heeded or answered. The four objections all end with the words—or some variation thereupon—«Ergo videtur quod non omnis eius oratio fuerit exaudita» (Aquinas 1980a: 803), Aquinas, however, going on—in his response (ST III, q. 21, a. 4, co.)—to distinguish between an absolute sense of human will as the voluntas rationis and a conditional sense of will as «velleity» secundum motus sensualitatatis, vel etiam secundum motum voluntatis simplicis, according to which «Christus nihil aliud voluit nisi quod scivit Deum velle. Et ideo omnis absoluta voluntas Christi, etiam humana, fuit impleta, quia fuit Deo conformis, et per consequens, omnis eius oratio fuit exaudita» (idem; emphasis added). Although encyclopaedic (Brown 2012: 132), Fèlix o Llibre de meravelles, is clearly no formal summa, and although religiously minded the «resclús» is no scholastic theologian, which perhaps explains in part the absence of this distinction in Llull’s work and the apparent lack therein of correspondence between human and divine wills in Christ.

Later on in the Llibre de demostracions, in Chapter 43, «De pregar e honrar», however, Llull makes it clear that the act of prayer conveys honour upon not only upon the subject but also the object of prayer, in this case God or the Supreme Good who is honoured—«pus diligentement e pus fervent e pus sovén dues pregar lo subiran be que t fassa gracia con lo pusques honrar e pregar per ta honor e per ton honrament» (Llull 1930: 572 [Catalan]; Llull 1722a (1965): 233 (410) [Latin]). Here also prayer has a degree of self-reflexivity, insofar as one prays in order to be able to pray (to the Supreme Good). What this chapter reveals to us, however, is the exact same metaphysical structure of prayer in Christ as that which is present in the quotation from Fèlix, the difference being that here the underlying assumption is that Christ’s prayers will have automatic efficacy whereas in the Fèlix quotation the opposite holds true. Llull states in the former instance that «es demostrada encarnació e ajustament (i.e. conjunction) de natura divina e humana, per so que la humana pusca mills pregar la divina per l umà linyatge» (Llull 1930: 573 [Catalan]; Llull 1722a (1965): 233 (410) [Latin]), and, appealing to medieval notions of social hierarchy, he goes on to outline a very similar situation to that of Fèlix whereby it is the ontological dignity and degree of honour attributable to Christ and, secondly, to the Virgin Mary that lend weight and honour to the prayers they offer to the Supreme Good—«per so que la humanitat de Jhesu Crist e Nostra Dona Santa Maria son .ij. es creatures mellors e pus honrades que totes les altres, per tal que lo subiran be nefos pus honradament pregat que per totes les altres [the Latin reads here: «honoratius rogaretur ab illis quam ab omnibus aliis creaturis»]» (Llull 1930: 574 [Catalan]; Llull 1722a: 233 (410) [Latin])—even if in the case of Fèlix the outcome of such prayers is not positive. We should note here that Christ’s and Mary’s prayers to God are taken in tandem, a fact which supports my reading of Christ’s inclusion among the «tots» in the Fèlix quotation in question (see previous note). I say this despite what we read in Bernard (1967: 55-59) to the effect that there is a distinction in kind, based on «une communion initiale, celle du Fils avec le Père» (Bernard 1967: 55), between Christ’s prayer and that of any other person. Bernnard, nevertheless, provides an accessible overview of Christ’s prayers and particularly his prayers of petition (Bernard 1967: 55-77).
In order to resolve the above apparent contradiction, it is worth considering that the figure of Christ encapsulates two movements—one directed from God towards humanity and the other directed by humanity towards God, the first bringing salvation through God’s self-communication, the second involving worship through mankind’s grateful response (Dupuis 1994: 125-26). Zachary Hayes in fact states, in reiteration of this point, though here with reference to St Bonaventure’s Commentary on the Gospel of Luke, that Christ «[contains] in Himself both the descent of God’s grace-influences and the ascent of the human response» (Hayes 2000 [1st ed. 1981]: 44). For Llull, from 1287-89 onwards, God’s self-manifestation and love are held to be a superior end of the Incarnation than man’s redemption; they constitute, in fact, the Incarnation’s first intention. Progressively, and as at least a loose correlate of this, God’s hominification takes precedence over man’s deification (Hughes 2001: 111-115; Hughes 2005-06: 3-37). In other words, the divine end of the Incarnation is emphasised over its human counterpart. I support this claim by reference to Llull’s Disputació de cinc savis (November 1294), where in Part II, Fifth Reason, arguing against the Nestorian, the Latin Christian states:

La fi per què és encarnatió és per so que Déus sia home e aquesta és la primera entenció e la pus principal per què Déus és encarnat. E la segona entenció és per so que home sia Déu e aquesta segona entenció és primera segons comparatí de la redemptió del human gendre, la qual redemptió és per la segona entenció (Llull 1986: 75).

Llull goes on to reinforce this point in Part III, Eighth Reason, of the same work, this time when in dispute with the «Jacobite» or Monophysite, again stating that «en la encarnatió és home per so que Déus sia home e no és Déus per so que home sia Déus» (Llull 1986: 92), and describing the former as the «fi pus noble» (idem). Man’s first intention (to remember, know, love, honour, serve and praise God), however, remains constant—and is equally applicable to Christ’s human nature—but it is placed lower in the hierarchy than God’s purpose in Creation and Incarnation. The divine purpose, in the Ternary Phase and beyond, a phase on the cusp of which Félix stands, is seen to bear relation principally to God Himself rather than to man: that is to say, God creates and recreates (via the Incarnation) for Himself rather than for the benefit of man. In all this, Ramon Llull exhibits both similarities to and differences from what the International Theological Commission has characterised as being a tendency of modern Christology, namely, to conceive of «the purpose of the redemption (...) more as a hominization than as the deification of man» (International Theological Commission 1981: I. D. 1).

This latter point is made very explicitly in two works written almost contemporaneously to Félix, namely, the Disputatio fidelis et infidelis (1287-9) (hereafter DFI), where the Catholic in dispute with the «Infidel» or non-believer argues that God is the highest Being with all His «Reasons», and that He created His effect with respect to Himself «ad se ipsum». In other words, uncreated Goodness created created (siú) goodness to love that uncreated Goodness etc., (and so on for greatness and wisdom). And because Divine Greatness is identical with all the other Divine Reasons, it is fitting that the effect is created according to such a disposition that this effect understands greatly, loves greatly, magnifies greatly, glorifies greatly etc., God with all His Reasons. Llull concludes his
reasoning by asserting that none of the above can be achieved more excellently than if Christ’s human nature (Christ being most eminent among all created things, i.e. the greatest created effect) is united with the Deity (Llull 1729a (1965): 23, 31 (400, 408)). Significantly, however, in this passage the foregoing conclusion is based on the following supposition, namely, that God united a man with Himself so that, just as God is the highest Being of beings with respect to Deity, so this man assumed by God is the highest creature among creatures and the end or purpose (finis) of all creatures—«sed si Deus est incarnatus, videlicet, quod Deus sibi univerit hominem ita ut, sicut Deus est summum ens entium quoad Deitatem, sic ille assumptus a Deo sit summa creatura creaturarum et finis omnium creaturarum» (ibid.: 24 (401)).

Beyond the customary points of Lullian Christology (e.g. the supremacy of Christ’s humanity, the theme of Christ as the final cause of creation, etc.), we also notice the presence of certain potentially problematic assertions regarding the hypostatic union as far as the admittedly fluid notion of medieval Christological orthodoxy is concerned. For a start, Llull’s reference to the fact that «Deus sibi univerit hominem» appears to go against a particular powerful strand of the medieval tradition which carefully stated that God united to Himself a human nature alone rather than a man on the grounds that the human nature may be considered an individual substance or «thing» whereas a «man» can only be considered a hypostasis or person, and that to posit two hypostases in Christ is to commit the heresy of Nestorianism.¹ Secondly, to refer to Christ as a «creature»—and even as the «summa creatura creaturarum»—although consonant with certain tones of Franciscan thought, could be considered controversial in the context of scholastic debates insofar as it appears to treat Christ, the man God, as simply a creature (i.e. without respect to his divine nature and Personhood), and medieval thinkers hotly debated whether Christ could be considered to have even been «made» or «created» (Lombard 2010: 44-47 [English]; Lombard 1971-81: 77-78). Peter Lombard was such a thinker, and in the first chapter of his Libri sententiarum, Book III, he determines that Christ was neither made nor is a creature; in Chapter Two he clarifies that to speak thus of Christ is to talk figuratively, but that, more correctly, one should add that he is made or is a creature according to the flesh or according to his humanity. Some of the debates to which Llull may have been responding during this period could have been prompted by the metaphysical implications arising from the writings of Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome, William of Ware, Godfrey of Fontaines and, of course, Thomas Aquinas (cf. Cross 2002: 237-96). What we should probably do, therefore, in considering Llull’s conduct in these cases, is to assume that he is using the term homo and creatura to refer exclusively to Christ’s human nature.

¹Cf. Lombard (2010: 41-42). For the Latin text of Peter Lombard’s work, see Lombard (1971-81: 73). The question of individuation in relation to Christ’s assumed (i.e. non-subsistent) nature and to his suppositum—as medieval writers called his hypostasis—or subsistent nature, is discussed in Cross (2002: 16-17), who also emphasises (ibid.: 20) the medieval tendency to detach the individuation of the former from that of the latter. The medieval claim that Christ’s human nature is a substance is complicated by the fact that «an obvious way of distinguishing a person from a nature is by claiming that a person—and not a nature—is a substance» (ibid.: 2). Cross examines three types of theory which attempt to explain the distinction between a person and an individual nature: esse theories of subsistence; relation theories of subsistence; and negation theories of subsistence (ibid.: 237-309).
The second work which makes reference to and reinforces Llull’s point regarding God’s Creation and Incarnation ad se ipsum is the *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam solubiles* (1289; hereafter *QADS*), in Quaestio XXIX, where Llull poses the question of whether the chief purpose of the Incarnation is divine manifestation and love or the redemption of mankind. In his solution by *Medium*, to follow Llull’s full account, he expressly states that God, on account of the greatness and goodness of Creation, created us principally for His own benefit («ad se ipsum principaliter») rather than for our benefit above all else («non autem principaliter ad nosmet ipsos»), so that our creation should be in majority of goodness, etc. In the same way, God, by assuming flesh, principally created that Man He assumed for Himself («ad se ipsum») «& hoc in tantum principaliter, quod ratione principalitatis finis uniens eum in se ipso univit eum ad se ipsum» (Llull 1729b (1965): 50 (67)). From this we may safely conclude that God was principally incarnated for Himself («propter se»), whence it follows that, if He had become incarnate principally on our account («propter nos») then, by reason of the greater and more principal purpose, he would have created us for ourselves. And so that conjunction or union of deity and humanity is in majority and minority, in minority and majority, which is impossible, and against the condition of *Medium* (or Middle) between God and Man, because also against the Beginning and the End (or purpose) of that *Medium*. From this, in turn, it follows that the main purpose of the Incarnation is divine manifestation and love rather than our redemption (idem). The Bonaventurian flavour of Llull’s considerations here is beyond dispute, given that for Bonaventure himself, in III *Sent.*, d. 32, q. 5 ad 3, «[n]on enim Christus ad nos finaliter ordinatur, sed nos finaliter ordinamur ad ipsum» (Bonaventure 1882-1902: 706).

From the foregoing we can see two hierarchies of ends or at least two aspects of the same hierarchy at work: divine manifestation and love (viz. outward communication) is a superior end to redemption; and the divine end of the Incarnation is superior to the human end. From the period leading up to the beginning of the Ternary Phase onward, we can detect in Llull’s works, however, a desire to «close the circle», as it were, and to ensure that there are no interruptions to the Neoplatonic cyclical movement of *exitus a Deo* and *reditus ad Deum*.

3.1. Prayer: To Whom or What does Christ pray?

A very short answer to this question—and one that would assume Llull’s close familiarity with *DDN*—would be to refer the reader to Chapter III, § 1, 680B, of that work, wherein it is stated clearly that prayer is addressed to the Trinity (Pseudo-Dionysius 1987: 68). However, from the perspective of modern theology, at least, Christ’s «mystery of saving worship» (Schillebeeckx 1966: 18-21, as cited in Dupuis 1994: 125)—a mystery that contains both descending and ascending movements—comprises, among other things, his acts of prayer as divine-human mediator between God and man, but also as mediator between the Son of Man (i.e. the Son of God incarnate) and
God the Father. While Jacques Dupuis clearly states that Christ’s relationship to God in prayer is not in truth the relationship between his humanity and God per se, nor that between his humanity and the entire Trinity (Dupuis 1994: 126), but rather, as just stated, between the Son of Man and God the Father, what we find in Llull’s writings is that the relationship of Christ’s humanity to the divinity is, through the mediation (Medium) of the Son of God, specifically one between Christ as Man (and through him, all men) and the other two members of the Trinity. The standard construal of Christ’s relationship to the divinity derives from the opening words of Christ’s prayer in Mk 14:36: ‘Abba, Father […]’, and holds that it consists in a relation of God the Son to God the Father (Marchel 1967; Marchel 1971; de la Potterie 1990: esp. 81, 84-88, 96, 100, 108).

Llull also speaks of the relationship of mankind via the Man-God to God per se, not least in *Ars ad faciendum et solvendum quaestiones* (*Lectura Artis inventivae et Tabulae generalis*) (1294-5), Dist. III, Part I, q. 2, Quarta Quaestio E: ‘Quare est Incarnatio Dei?’, § 3, Solutio: EFtF:

> Ratio, propter quam est Incarnatio, est ut sapientia Dei possit scire medium inter Deum et creaturam, illo medio existente Homine Deo, nam, in quantum est homo, est medium inter Deum et alios homines; et in quantum est Deus Filius, est medium inter illum hominem et Deum Patrem et Deum Sanctum Spiritum et inter alios homines qui sunt de specie illius hominis (Llull 1729 (1965): 157 (516)).

We could possibly surmise on purely logically grounds that what is true of the general relation between man and God should also hold true of the relationship between ordinary men and God in prayer, the denizens of Paradise referred to in the passage from *Félix and God in prayer*, and even and especially that between the Son of Man and God/the Trinity in prayer, this latter being a very special case of the general relation between Man and God. In fact, in a section specifically devoted to prayer of a relatively late work, the *Medicina de pecat* (July 1300), we find evidence that man’s prayers are indeed addressed to the Trinity: *Medicina de pecat*, Part V, «D’oració» (Llull 1938: 166-204), Ch. 2 «De oració de què», ll. 4865-73 (Llull 1938: 172; also available electronically at [http://www.rialc.unina.it/89.5.htm](http://www.rialc.unina.it/89.5.htm) (page accessible 06/08/14)). Suffice it to say for now, however, that it is the relationship between God-as-man and God-as-God/the Trinity that Llull is referring to when he speaks of «la natura humana» and «la natura divina» of Christ (though it should be noted that he specifically refers only to Christ’s two natures, leaving it to be understood that these are found conjoined without confusion, alteration, division or separation in a single Person). Christ’s human nature is assumed into personal union with the Son of God and therefore is «indirectly
assumed into the intratrinitarian relationships» (Dupuis 1994: 126.). This is why Llull can repeatedly assert that the Incarnation and the Trinity offer reciprocal proofs of each other (Hughes 2005-06: 25-30). It is, however, Christ’s human spiritual soul that acts as the bridge between his corporeal human nature and his Divinity (Hughes 2005-06: 13-14 and n. 29; 33), a point already made by Gregory Nazianzen in his Oratio 38.10 (1856: 321AC) and also alluded to by John of Damascus in De fide orthodoxa, 6 (1864: 1006B).

3.2. Prayer and the will in Bonaventure; intercession in Peter Lombard:

As the above makes clear, although the passage from Félix we are considering seems to deal specifically and exclusively with the efficacy of prayer and in particular with the prayers of those one might expect to be answered most readily by God the Father, that is to say, the prayers of the God-man, Christ, and the most eminent dwellers in Paradise (Mary, the angels, archangels, martyrs and confessors), it also involves complex matters associated directly with the nature of the hypostatic union and the communicatio idiomatum between Christ’s human and divine natures. Both the latter’s ascending aspect (human → divine, through prayer) and its descending counterpart (divine → human, through grace) are present. But, as we have specified and as Llull’s previously cited words from the Ars ad faciendum et solvendum quaestiones (Lectura Artis inventivae et Tabulae generalis) reveal, the mediation of Christ in both directions operates at two levels. We should perhaps note here St Bonaventure’s distinctions of the will as regards Christ’s prayer, a topic he discusses in d. 17, a. 2, q. 1. ad 1 of his Commentary on the Third Book of Sentences (Bonaventure 1882-1902: 371; as cited and discussed in Hayes 2000 [1st ed. 1981]: 121 and note). He distinguishes between three different types of will from which prayer may emerge: the rational will, the will of piety and the will of the flesh, only the first of which will be answered in all cases by God since it conforms to the divine will. The second and third type, however, do not invariably conform thereto as far as their particular objects are concerned and thus are not always answered. (A comprehensive treatment of Christ’s two wills in the context of thirteenth-century scholasticism has been given by Corey Ladd Barnes (Barnes 2006).) Whether Llull was familiar with this commentary tradition is a separate matter, but what this brief glance at Bonaventure’s work—admittedly very distant in genre terms from Llull’s proto-novel, Félix—does show is the vivid contrast between his hierarchised and sophisticated construal of types of will as applied to prayer and the relatively blunt and highly condensed portrayal in terms of inoperative causal mechanisms given by Llull in the fragment in question to prayer itself. For orientation regarding the efficacy of Christian prayer in general and the subjective efficacy of Christ’s prayer, the reader would do well to consult Bernard (1967: 125-64, 67-68, respectively).

Having mentioned the medieval commentary tradition on the Book of Sentences, it might be instructive at this point to compare Llull’s treatment of prayer in this instance with that presented by Peter
Lombard in Book IV, Distinction 45, Chapter 6 of his Book of Sentences.\textsuperscript{12} In his book, Peter Lombard, Philipp W. Rosemann describes Peter's approach to the question of the intercession of the angels and saints to whom we direct our prayers as involving «a reconciliation of religious practice with doctrinal truth» (Rosemann 2004: 184), in the sense that «[i]n the Book of Sentences, theological theory does not simply overrule religious practice; it elucidates and—where necessary—gently corrects it» (Rosemann 2004: 185). We should note, first, that the parallel with the Lullian example is not direct, insofar as in the latter case it is Christ's human nature which, \textit{in conjunction with}—as I argue—the denizens of Paradise, namely, Mary, the angels, archangels, martyrs and confessors, address their prayers to Christ's divine nature, i.e. the divine essence of God. In the Lombardian case, therefore, the angels and saints are apparent addressees of prayer (for intercessory purposes), whereas in the Lullian case they are addressees of prayer. However, in the former case, God is not informed of our supplications by the angels and saints; quite the reverse: it is He who informs them, being, after all, omniscient.\textsuperscript{13}

As Peter, in fact, states in his \textit{Libri sententiarum}, Book 4, Dist. 45, Ch. 6, no. 2: «the angels are even said to offer our prayers and vows to God, not because they inform him of them, but because they seek his will over these matters» / «Unde et dicuntur angelis orationes et vota nostra offerre Deo, non quia eius docent, sed quia eius voluntatem super eis consultunt» (Lombard 2010: 248 [English]; Lombard 1971-81: 527 [Latin]). Quoting Augustine, the Lombard stresses that «“an angel is not said to offer our prayers to God in the sense that God would then know what we wish and what we need,”\textsuperscript{14} since he knows all things before they are done, just as he knows them afterwards» / «“Non ergo dicitur angelus orationes nostras offerre Deo, quasi Deus tunc noverit quid velimus et quo indigemus”, quia omnia antequam fiant, sicut et postea quam facta sunt novit» (Lombard 2010: 249 [English]; Lombard 1971-81: 528 [Latin]). Following Augustine again, the Lombard holds that when the angels are said to «announce» certain things to God, this should be read as their consulting Him as to His will. The saints, in the Lombard's view, replicate the role of the angels in this respect in their relation to God.

Against the commonly held, or «naïve», position according to which the angels and saints simply intercede on our behalf before God, as equally against the rigid theological doctrine of God's omniscience, Peter presents the qualified view that «God is said to grant the prayers of some not only when he grants them their effect, but also when he allows the court of angels and holy souls to know what is or is not going to happen with regard to them» / «Deus dicitur audire preces

\textsuperscript{12}I refer to the edition given in Lombard (1971-81).

\textsuperscript{13}For an interesting discussion of the Classical Latin sense of «intercessio», as well as religious intercession in the Old and New Testaments, in which latter Christ features as «l'intercesseur parfait», see Bernard (1967: 73-75).

\textsuperscript{14}Augustine's text in \textit{Epistola 140 (ad Honoratum)}, Ch. 29, no. 69, in Augustine (1841-64: 568), actually reads: «sed sicut annuntiant angeli, non solum nobis beneficia Dei, verum etiam illi preces nostras [...] non ut tunc Deus noverit quid velimus, vel quo indigemus».
Robert Desmond Hughes. "[el resclús] se maravellà com podia esser que Deus no exoya la natura humana de Jesucrist, qui pregava per son poble la natura divina", (Fèlix o Llibre de meravelles, Ch. 105, «De la oració»)?

What is there to learn from this comparison between Peter Lombard and Ramon Llull? It would seem that the Lullian quotation which we are discussing, namely, that in which

[el resclús] se maravellà com podia esser que Deus no exoya la natura humana de Jesucrist, qui pregava per son poble la natura divina, ni per que no exoya santa Maria et tant angel, archangel, martir et confessor qui ha en parays, qui tots preguen que lo mon fos bo et en bon estament

need not necessarily reflect the opinion of the historical Ramon Llull himself. On one level, these words simply register what the narrator of an exemplaristic fictional narrative peppered with meravelles or «wonders» attributes as thoughts to a character therein, namely, the recluse. However, the recluse’s sense of wonder in this instance strikes the reader as being genuinely felt and in need of some satisfactory response or answer. In fact, this meravella seems to correspond to the kind of dubium which Llull in his Ternary Arts might seek to resolve initially at least by means of the question Utrum?, which, though it is not the case here, would convert this matter into an authentic example of the Scholastic quестіо. What’s more, however, the very content of the recluse’s sense of wonder, or what he is wondering «at», also seems worthy of its being expressed in literary form and, further, of being taken seriously by the reader, as well as the author.

Given that the quotation occurs in a work of fiction with a strong moral and pastoral purpose and a «popular» readership in mind, it should come as no surprise that what Llull presents to us comes closer to what Rosemann’s reading of Peter Lombard would call the «naïve view» of the intercessory role of the angels and saints, with the proviso that it is not just «man» who is praying to God, but Christ’s human nature (along with Mary, the angels and saints etc.) that is praying to its divine counterpart. This in itself presupposes a certain view of the hypostatic union, and one which, in fact, in this particular passage opts to omit reference to the Person of Christ, i.e. the Person in whom these two natures are united, namely, the Son of God, completely. The greatest contrast, perhaps, between the Lombardian view and that expressed here by Llull is that, although Christ and the angels and saints are seen in both as acting in man’s interest, given the right conditions, in the former case this situation is predicated on the presence and activity of prayerful members of the faithful, while in the latter, and far less optimistic, case the prayerful activities of a people whose faith is strongly in doubt are in fact absent. It is the prayers of Christ’s human nature, of the angels and saints, which seem to occupy the void established by human neglect of God.
3.3. Types of prayer: Biblical precedent and Aquinas:

In the rather bleak view proposed by Llull, mankind fails to direct prayers to God, so preoccupied is he with worldly affairs. Neither Christ in his glorified humanity nor the angels and saints in their glory feature as the objects of man’s upwardly-directed prayer, that is to say, as objects who intercede. Quite the opposite: Christ in his humanity, the angels and saints, appeal to the divinity so that «lo mon fos bo et en bon estament», the goodness of the world and of its continuing condition depending here not on the divine attribute of God’s diffusive «Goodness» but on man’s ability and willingness to respond well thereto, namely, in a faithful Christian fashion. (I am assuming here that Christ is included here in those who pray alongside Mary, the angels and saints for this particular purpose.) What is particularly odd, however, about the construal offered by the narrator of the recluse’s thoughts and doubts is that it expresses a complete scission between God’s human nature in Christ and the will associated therewith and the divine nature and its associated will in the Person of the Son of God. In the medieval period in particular, and in spite of Christ’s apparent divided wills as shown in Luke 22:42— «Saying: Father, if thou wilt, remove this chalice from me: but yet not my will, but thine be done», Douai-Rheims Version. Cf. also Mark 14:36—and Matthew 26:39— «And going a little further, he fell upon his face, praying, and saying: My Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from me. Nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt», Douai-Rheims Version; cf. also Mt 26:42—, tradition asserted that the two wills of Christ, divine and human, were—at least with regard to the latter’s rational aspect—in total harmony; or in other words, that Christ as man could not wish for something that as God he would not grant. When considering the question of the appropriateness of prayer in Christ, Aquinas states, in fact, in his *Summa theologiae*, III, q. 21, a. 1 co. that a prerequisite for such consists in the very existence of two wills in Him. He states:

> oratio est quaedam explicatio propriae voluntatis apud Deum, ut eam impleat. Si igitur in Christo esset una tantum voluntas, scilicet divina, nullo modo sibi competeteret orare, quia voluntas divina per seipsam est effectiva eorum quae vult […] Sed quia in Christo est alia voluntas divina et alia humana; et voluntas humana non est per seipsam effica ad impleendum ea quae vult, nisi per virtutem divinam, inde est quod Christo, secundum quod est homo et humanam voluntatem habens, competit orare (Aquinas 1980a: 803).

Aquinas, in fact, goes on to assert that «inter alia quae Christus scivit futura, scivit quaedam esse fienda propter suam orationem. Et huiusmodi non inconveniender a Deo petitio» (Idem), in relation to which Corey Ladd Barnes has commented that here Christ’s prayer «exemplifies the role of secondary causality. The *Scriptum [super libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi]* considers Christ’s instrumental causality wholly in terms of secondary causality (whether dispositive or meritorious)» (Barnes 2006: 332-36, here 333), whereas in the *Summa theologicae* Aquinas attributes efficient instrumental causality to Christ. Barnes concludes, therefore, that in his early writings Aquinas, «following his contemporaries, limited the causality of Christ’s human nature to dispositive and meritorious modes» (Barnes 2006: 343 and n. 757).
4. The Hypostatic union: The soul-body analogy and the Antiochene/Alexandrian divide:

Returning to our theme, however, the nature of the hypostatic union is a topic frequently discussed by Llull, and one frequently discussed at some length, not least in *LC*, Book V, Chapter 337: «Com hom adora e contempla la sancta gloriosa humana natura de nostre Senyor Jhesu Christ», (Llull 1906-14 / ORL VII: 264ff), where it is demonstrated, to use Llull’s term, by analogy with the union of body and soul in created beings (e.g. § 12). This analogy has a long history, and was used in the context of Patristic theology by writers on both sides of the Antiochene/Alexandrian divide, writers including Gregory of Nyssa (c. 330/35-c.395), Gregory Nazianzen (c. 329-389/90), Cyril of Alexandria (c.376-444), Severus of Antioch (465-538 (?)), Leontius of Byzantium (c.485-c.543) and John of Damascus (c.675-749) as well as St Augustine (354-430) himself. Gregory Nazianzen’s forging of this analogy can be found in his Epistle 101, where the author states that «quamvis enim duae naturae sint Deus et homo, quippe qui anima sit et corpus» (Gregory Nazianzen 1862: 180A). The Cyrillian use of this analogy has been treated by Donald Fairbairn (Fairbairn 2006 [1st ed. 2003]: 116-19), and a fuller account is given by Steven A. McKinion (McKinion 2000: 188-96). Sarah Coakley also makes reference to the use of this analogy (Coakley 2002: 143-63, here 147) as does Brian E. Daley (Daley: 164-96, here 176, 184).

Interestingly, in Book 3, Chapter 3 of his *De fide orthodoxa*, John of Damascus specifically warns against treating Christ’s *composita natura* «neque ex aliis aliud» (1864: 990A), the examples he gives being «quemadmodum ex anima et corpore hominem, aut ex quatuor elementis» (idem), namely, as we shall see, the precise terms Ramon Llull uses for his analogy with the hypostatic union. He goes on to reiterate this point later in the same chapter when he states that: «[h]inc sit, in Domino nostro Jesu Christo natura una dicenda non sit, ut eodem modo de Christo qui ex deitate et humanitate compositus est, loquamur, veluti de individuo quod corpora et anima constat» (John of Damascus 1864: 994A), for the reason that Christ cannot be considered an individual, lacking, as he does, the common species of *Christitas* (cf. also John of Damascus 1864: 1066A).

Particular reference is made in *LC*, Book V, Chapter 337 § 15 to the exact nature of the *communicatio idiomatum*, as well as, negatively, to what it cannot be understood to be. Llull, in what continues to be a seemingly Antiochene construal of the hypostatic union and the *communicatio idiomatum*, is keen to emphasise the distinction of nature in Christ, that is to say, between his deity (here, using the embryonic Alphabet, represented as A) and his humanity (here, C), and to stress the specificity of their respective properties to each— «predicant la M (human speech) una cosa de la A (Deity) e altra cosa de la C (humanity of Christ)» (Llull 1906-14 / ORL VIII: 268). By way of an excursus and dramatic summary, Antiochene Christology tended to assert the assumption of full humanity (i.e. body and soul) on the part of the Son of God along with a clear distinction between his natures, the communication of properties between them being restricted, whereas the Alexandrian school supposed the divine Person’s assumption of mere flesh alone and asserted Christ’s fundamental unity and a more open communication of properties. In a highly condensed summary, F. LeRon
Shults has pointed to the relative differences between the Antiochene and Alexandrian positions and the risks, at the extremes of each, of sliding into Nestorianism or Eutychian monophysitism, respectively (F. LeRon Shults 2008: 24-28, 32-33). Further study of Llull's position on the hypostatic union might take the foregoing into account, as also the three theories of the Incarnation (i.e. the *assumptus homo* theory, the subsistence theory and the *habitus* theory) discussed in Peter Lombard's *tertium Librum sententiarum*, Dist. VI, (Lombard 1971-81: 49-59).

That there is evidence of at least one significant similarity between theologians of the Antiochene tradition and Ramon Llull with respect to their conceptions of the hypostatic union, can be seen in the fact that both Theodore of Mopsuestia (c. 350-428) and Theodoret of Cyrus (c.393-c.457) both refer only to the «conjunction» of natures in Christ (Daley 2002: 179, 181, respectively), a term Cyril of Alexandria (c.376-444) strongly rejected on the grounds that it failed sufficiently to indicate the union (ibid.: 179), while Llull himself specifies in his *Liber de Trinitate et Incarnatione* (Sept. 1305) that this union exists as a conjunction rather than a composition of natures (Llull 1984: 118), stating in the slightly later *Ars compendiosa Dei* (May 1308) that Christ's purpose itself is this very conjunction: «Per primam speciem quartae regulae quaeritur: Quare est Christus? Et respondendum est, quod est per hoc, quia natura divina est cum natura humana coniuncta» (Llull 1985a: 228).

We should note, nevertheless, that this late position of Llull's on the question of the «composition» or «conjunction» of natures in Christ differs markedly from his much earlier statements—in *LPT*, III, «De uiginti quaestionibus», q. 5: «Quaestio: Si humanitas Iesu Christi existit in toto D ipsius C et in toto B?»—to the effect that Christ «est M (i.e. the Principle of composition) ipsius A (i.e. God), et creaturae» and that «compositum autem, hoc est, Iesus Christus est unum in persona» (Llull 2007: 137). Such a difference provides strong evidence for a dramatic shift over time in Llull's Christology. Llull's position is rendered more problematic, however, by the fact that a few questions later in the same text from which these last quotations are taken, Llull explicitly refers to the *conjunction* of Christ's human nature with *Deitas* (i.e. the divine nature), even while using as an analogy the manner in which the body's form causes the simple elements to relinquish (amittunt in forma corporis) their simple forms in the process of becoming composite within the body's form, itself thereby being composite. On the one hand, this conceptualisation clearly indicates the relevance of hylomorphic theories to Llull's construal of the hypostatic union, and, on the other, it reveals that Llull, at least in this work, may not be exercising the fullest terminological precision when considering that union in the light of either *conjunctio* or *compositio* or at least may only be using the latter in a broad sense (or one in which the terms are not mutually exclusive). Perhaps we should also bear in mind here the important distinction concerning the hypostatic union made by John of Damascus (1864: 990A) that a thing can be composite in the sense that it consists of different parts which retain their difference rather in that of any such difference being dissolved in the formation of a new or third thing. Whatever the case, we read, again in *LPT*, III, «De uiginti quaestionibus», q. 10, that:
Robert Desmond Hughes. «[el resclús] se maravellà com podia esser que Déus no exoya la natura humana de Jesucrist, qui pregava per son poble la natura divina», (Fèlix o Llibre de maravelles, Ch. 105, «De la oració»)?

natura humana [Christi] potest esse persona per se in conjunctione deitatis [i.e. when conjoined with Deity], sicut elementa simplicia, quae proprias formas simplices amittunt in forma corporis, ubi composita existunt, quae est forma ab ipsis composita, idcirco humanitas Christi, quae naturam habet personae [i.e. which has the nature of a person], potest esse una persona cum Filio ipsius A, qui per se persona existit (Llull 2007: 140).

Here, despite Llull’s emphasis on the singularity of Persons in Christ, there seems to be some room for misinterpretation along Nestorian lines, given his dual assertions to the effect that «natura humana [Christi] potest esse persona per se» and that the Son of God «per se persona existit». Unless we read this passage very carefully, there is also a suggestion that Christ himself might be considered a person or even a Person. The relevance of Llull’s Avicebronian brand of hylomorphism needs to be examined in any comprehensive account of Llull’s Christology which focuses on his use of the soul-body analogy with regard to the hypostatic union, though interestingly Llull himself seems not always to make reference thereto when invoking this analogy. Llull, however, gives his own brief account of the hylomorphism contemporary to the composition of Fèlix in QADS, q. 72, «Quomodo anima sit conjuncta corpori?» (Llull 1729b: 88 (105)). For an extended treatment of Llull’s hylomorphism, see Bordoy (2006: 364-416). Llull’s hylomorphic theories are also discussed at some length by Marta Romano in Lullus (2008: 369-74).

It should be noted, however, that compositionalist accounts of the Incarnation are by no means necessarily or even invariably heterodox and represent a relational-concretist rather than a transformationalist-abstractist approach to the hypostatic union, as can be gathered from Jonathan Hill and, separately, Oliver D. Crisp (Marmodoro & Hill 2011: 1-19; 45-66).

Two questions later in this same text, namely, LPT, III, «De uiginti quaestionibus», q. 12, the analogies—and I call them analogies on account of the sic . . . sicut . . . et sicut . . . construction of the sentence in question—analogies themselves governed by the metaphor presented at the beginning of Question 5, are extended to include the supernatural union of God and man via the Incarnation, the co-presence of God and man in the sacrament of the Eucharist under the form of bread, and the Virtus (H) and Operatio (D) of the human intellective soul under the form of a mobile animated body (Llull 2007: 141).

4.1. The soul-body analogy in a number of Ramon Llull’s writings:

We shall now take a closer look at several of Llull’s works:

4.1.1. Llibre de contemplació en Déu (1273-4?):

As, for the moment, in LC we will be dealing with Ramon Llull’s emerging alphabetical notation, it will help the reader to see the full table of alphabetised concepts germane to this chapter.
Robert Desmond Hughes. «[el resclús] se maravellà com podia esser que Déus no exoya la natura humana de Jesucrist, qui pregava per son poble la natura divina», (Fèlix o Llibre de menavelles, Ch. 105, «De la oració»)?

Table 2: Alphabetised concepts from LC, Book IV, Ch. 337.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Deity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Divine power (virtut)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Humanity of Jesus Christ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Human power (virtut)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Jesus Christ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Peter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Soul of Peter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Nature of soul of Peter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Body of Peter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Nature of body of Peter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Human understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Human speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Prayer and contemplation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analogy used by Llull here (i.e. the comparison between the union of soul and body in man and the hypostatic union in Christ), however, is powerfully mediated by a further analogy: that existing between B (divine power) and D (human power), on the one hand, and that existing between H (the nature of Peter’s soul) and K (the nature of Peter’s body), on the other, the former paralleling a fortiori the latter (i.e. BD > HK). By way of an aside, it should be mentioned that the entire purpose of this chapter, not to mention of LC itself, is to endorse anything which corresponds to—and to facilitate—N (prayer and contemplation). This further analogy is of significance for it is by virtue of H and K, on the one hand, that FG and I (Peter, Peter’s soul and Peter’s body, respectively) enjoy existence, as also of B and D, on the other, that E (Jesus Christ) consists of A (Deity) and C (humanity of Jesus Christ) (Llull 1906-14 / ORL VIII: 269).

It is worth noting in this respect, however, that St Bonaventure specifically rejects the soul-body analogy for the hypostatic union on the grounds that since it expresses «a union between two elements which have a natural ordering to each other for the purpose of constituting a nature which is simply identical with neither of its constitutive elements» or, in other words, since that union is conceived of a constituting «some new third nature», the Apollinarian heresy, a form of monophysitism, would thereby raise its head once again (cf. Hayes 2000 [1st ed. 1981]: 74, 76). Bonaventure’s actual words—in III Sent., d. 6, a. 2, q. 1. resp.—are that «[q]uiaedam vero est unio, in qua non est unitorum transmutatio, sed tertiae naturae constitutio; et hoc est, quia unibilia non habent repugnantiam, habent autem mutuam dependentiam, sicut uniuntur corpus et anima ad constitutionem hominis» (Bonaventure 1882-1902: 158). It is this «third nature» and the sense of essential dependence that Bonaventure seeks to override in his quest for an analogy suited to the hypostatic union.

As the reader will have noticed, there is at least an apparent asymmetry or inequality within the hypostatic union as regards the relative eminence of the two conjoined natures (see pp. 163-164 of the current article, however). And although LC is far from being a work of formal apologetics, it is nonetheless true that to those not convinced of the truth of the Catholic faith, as well as to Ramon Llull himself, the fact of this asymmetry represented a major obstacle to their potential—and by Llull much desired—conversion to Christianity—e.g. DFI, Part IV, §§ 2, 5 co. (Llull 1729a:...
Robert Desmond Hughes. “[el resclús] se maravellà com podia esser que Déus no exoya la natura humana de Jesucrist, qui pregava per son poble la natura divina”, (Fèlix o Llibre de maravelles, Ch. 105, «De la oració»)?

23, 25 (400, 402)). It might also seem to have posed a conundrum to sceptical Catholics whose faith was wavering. Llull, in this work, however, makes it perfectly clear that this is an integral part of the faith in which he believes and which he has no desire to conceal, stating in Book IV, Ch. 337, § 2 that «en axí la L (human understanding) entén que en la E (Jesus Christ) molt major es sens comparacio la B (divine power) que la D (human power), com sia B creador e D creatura» (Llull 1906-14 / ORL VIII: 270). Although at the time of writing LC, Llull may not yet have had access to Burgundio of Pisa’s translation of John of Damascus’s De fide orthodoxa, he may well have had such access during his subsequent stay in Paris (1287-89), although his clear endorsement of the aforementioned asymmetry at this early stage already reveals similarities with the Damascene in this respect. Here, the reader is directed to Andrew Louth’s discussion of John of Damascus’s «asymmetrical» Christology (Louth 2002 [2004]: 162-63; 174-75).

Again here we note the presence of a potential and actual interruption to the circulation to which Llull seeks to attest within the movements of descent/ascent, influentia/refluentia (these latter being terms first introduced by Llull in the Compendium seu commentum Artis demonstrativa (1289)—(Llull 1722: 77-78 (369-70))—, a work almost exactly contemporary with Fèlix), and the divine and human ends or intentions of creation and (through the Incarnation) recreation. The circulation to which I refer is brought out particularly well, in the context of an Aristotelian-inspired definition of God as the unmoved mover («Deus igitur est immobils, et ipse est motor omnium finitorum et principatorum»), in Q-ADS, q. 167, «Quomodo Deus moveat omnia?», (Llull 1729b: 166-67 (183-84)), as is the role played therein by Christ’s Incarnation and Passion: «Pradera est alius modus movendi inter Deum et creaturam, videlicet, quod Deus sit incarnatus et passus secundum earnem propter nos: et iva ipsa movet quod moveamus nos ad multum honorandum et diligendum eum ex toto nostro posse», (ibid.: 167 (184); emphasis added). From the time of Fèlix onward, if not before, however, Llull progressively seeks to counteract and override any such interruption by emphasising in his mature works the superlative nature—or Primacy—of Christ, his human nature included, that nature being conceived maximally in order to achieve this desired goal (i.e. full circulation). At least four primary sources of interruption can be found in: a) the ontological gap between the created and uncreated, the finite and the infinite—which is unavoidable; 2) Original Sin—which is accidental, in the Aristotelian as well as Pseudo-Dionysian sense (cf. DDN, Ch. 4, §§ 31 and esp. 32; 732C-733A); 3) the existence of non-Christians—which is undeniable yet can be remedied by conversion; 4) and the lack of faith found in supposed Christians, which manifests itself as actual sin (i.e. the fact that humanity does not practise virtue and avoid vice), and is subject to Llull’s reforming impulse. What we find, however, in the quotation from Fèlix is that there appears to be an interruption as regards the bestowal by God of His grace upon man. How should we explain this?

Apart from the fact that a distinction should be drawn between God’s general presence in creation and his specific presence in Christ, a further distinction clearly exists between Christ’s salvific role as redeemer or recreator, a role in which he brings about the remission of generalised original sin
and which Llull is consistent in asserting throughout his years of writerly production, and Christ’s ability to remit actual sin in specific individuals or communities through his prayers and active mediation. For if man does not perform good works, but rather commits evil deeds and acts to the disservice of God, that is to say, if he fails to practise the virtues and to avoid vice, if he fails to honour God and worship Christ, if he inverts the two intentions, then, for Llull perhaps, though man is all the more in need of Christ’s prayers, he cannot expect Christ’s agency through prayer as intercessor for mankind to be as efficacious or even forthcoming as if he had in fact carried out all those things in the desired manner—see LC, Ch. 338, § 1 (Llull 1906-14 / ORL VIII: 273ff).

A possible explanation for the Fèlix quotation, therefore, would be that as a result of man’s failure to remember, understand, love, honour and praise God through His Son incarnate, his failures vis-à-vis the virtues and vices, and his failure to affirm the Incarnation and to offer prayers to God (all of which are implied in the behaviour of the people observed by the recluse in the passage from Fèlix), Christ’s human nature is less able to communicate with his divine nature (at least through prayer), his capacity to intercede on our behalf is vitiated and divine grace is, therefore, less forthcoming or not forthcoming at all. God, of course, is not obliged to answer any prayer, from whomever it may come. Man indeed has to collaborate if he wishes to receive divine aid (yet even then it is not guaranteed). He has to act virtuously, avoid vice, affirm the Incarnation and enable this to be signified to his memory, intellect and will, all for the sake of increasing prayer to and contemplation of God. Before quoting a passage, which contains alphabetical notation, where the above is stated explicitly, I present the reader with the full table of correspondences between letters and concepts:

Table 3: Alphabetised concepts from LC, Book IV, Ch. 338.

| A | God’s aid          |
| B | Doing good        |
| C | Doing evil        |
| D | Affirmation of the Incarnation |
| E | Negation of the Incarnation |
| F | Signification of D |
| G | Signification of E |
| H | Memory, understanding, will |
| I | Prayer and contemplation |

The passage, from LC again—Ch. 338, § 10—reads as follows:

e aïtant com la H (memory, understanding and will) reeb de so que la F (signification of D) li mostra de la D (affirmation of the Incarnation), d’aïtant ha la A (divine aid) raó que ajut a la H com fassa la B (doing good) e que no fassa la C (doing evil) per tal que aja en si la I (prayer and contemplation) (Llull 1906-14 / ORL VIII: 276).

We should note here, in passing, the mediating role played by signification with respect to the affirmation of the Incarnation to the human intellective soul (cf. Gayà 1995).
Robert Desmond Hughes. [el resclús] se maravellà com podia esser que Déus no exoya la natura humana de Jesucrist, qui pregava per son poble la natura divina, (Fèlix o Llibre de meravelles, Ch. 105, «De la oració»)?

A later section of the same chapter—LC, Ch. 338, § 24—deals specifically with the assistance offered to humanity to do good and avoid evil by the saints in heaven who enable man all the better to pray to God for mercy. This goal is achieved more effectively on the basis that the affirmation of the Incarnation is signified to the powers of the human soul than that its contrary (the negation of the Incarnation) is so signified. A very similar list of intercessors is given here to the one presented in Fèlix; intercessors whose aid is secured by means of the aforementioned signification:

la F (signification of D) se fa a avant e demostra ab la D (affirmation of the Incarnation) que vostra humana natura e nostra dona Saneta Maria e los apostols e molts sents e martirs e confessors e religiosos ha en Gloria qui tots ajuden a pregar per nosaltres peccadors (Llull 1906-14 / ORL VIII: 280-81).

Again it is to be noted that Mary, the apostles and saints, etc., feature alongside Christ’s human nature in the above list of those conjoined in the activity of prayer for sinful man.

4.1.2. Liber principiorum theologiae (1274-83):

Turning now to LPT, we see that Llull again has recourse to what he now calls the «metaphor» of the human person’s union of body and soul in order to demonstrate the relation between Christ’s humanity and his divinity. In order to show the full functioning of Llull’s arguments, I now reproduce the table showing the alphabetised concepts used within this work, some of which will feature in the text below:

Table 4: Alphabetised concepts from LPT, III, «De uiginti quaestionibus».

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B</th>
<th>Divine essence</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Precepts</th>
<th>K</th>
<th>Love (Dilectio)</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>Supposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Dignities</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>Sacraments</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Simplicity</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Exposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Power (Virtus)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Composition</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>First Intention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Articles</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Cognition</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Order</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>Second Intention</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The hierarchy that subordinates the virtus (or power) of the body to that of the soul illustrates for Llull how, though specifically composite as regards his two natures, the D C B (operation, Dignities, Divine essence) in Christ’s one Person are greater than his humanity, in which humanity, Llull goes on, is all the D of C B, insofar as the Son of A (not included in the table, but here God) is by all D C B one with (his) humanity. Thus there is a hierarchy in Christ, in this particular case not so much between his two natures as between his human nature and his divine Personhood.15 For this

15 In the Llibre de demostracions (1274-76), Book IV, Ch. 1, § 6, though with a different emphasis, Llull had already made use of the analogy between the soul’s superiority over the body, insofar as the soul is the body’s form, as well as the superiority of the body over the elements, insofar as it is composed of matter, form and their conjunction, which elements themselves organise the earliest «prime matter» («la primera ordinal materia»), and the way in which the Son
reason, the Person of the Son can be said to be outside or beyond (extra) humanity through the infinity of D in C B. Interestingly, Llull states that Christ’s human nature consists of the red triangle (from Figure T: Beginning, Middle, End)—or, in other words, that it is subject to normal temporal causality—yet that D C B lie outside that triangle, these being, ad intra at least, eternal and without cause, and mutually convertible, the latter insofar as D is equally present in C and B.¹⁶

What Llull is trying to do here is to account for the union or conjunction of two natures in one Person, that is to say, of the created and the uncreated, the finite and the infinite, while seeming to indicate that infinitude resides ultimately in the divine Person (rather than the divine nature) from whom it radiates dynamically via the operation (D) of the Dignities (C) which characterise and define the Divine essence (B) in its internal and external activities. Llull’s final, subtle answer to the question posed (namely, «Utrum humanitas Jesu Christi sit in toto D ipsius C et in toto B?») is that the Son of God in Christ (a conjunction of creature and Creator) is infinite by all of D C B, though that humanity may not exist throughout the D of CB. The bi-directional movement, therefore, in the figure of Christ is clearly weaker in its ascending aspect. This inequality thus goes some way to explaining the ontological and operational gap between the finite and the infinite which, in the relevant passage from Félix, at least, seems unsusceptible of being bridged (Llull 2007: 137). Elsewhere I have argued that in Llull’s later works his general tendency is to minimize as far as possible in and through Christ, the man God, the existential and metaphysical gap between the finite and the infinite, the uncreated and the created. This tendency can be seen in the Llibre de demostacions, Ch. 23, «De causa formalis», § 3, where Llull states «cor de necessitat se cové que enfre forma infinida e finida, aja major conveniencia que enfre forma i materia qui son coses finides» (Llull 1930: 509 [Catalan]; Llull 1722a (1965): 207 (384) [Latin]). This last quotation is also of of God is the perfection of the humanity He assumed («complement a la humanitat que precis»). According to Llull, «per la participació d aquella persona divina infinita e la participació de la humana natura, es feta unió de amdues les nature». Stressing the supremacy of Christ’s created nature, Llull states that Christ’s being is «major e pus noble, sens tota comparació, en bonea, poder etc., que no es tot l autre be creat. On, axí con lo teu cors es altre qui no es los .iiij. elements e ha més noblea que no han los .iiij. elements, e assò per la participació de la anima, enaxí la humana natura de Jhesu Crist es més a ensús que no es tota la humana especia ni que tot l autre be creat» and proof that God is capable of creating «una pus nobla creatura que totes les altres creatures» and «.j. be major que tots los altres bens» (Llull 1930: 417 [Catalan]; Llull 1722a (1965): 167-68 (344-45) [Latin]).

¹⁶See LPT, III, «De uiginti quaestionibus», q. 5 (Lull 2007: 137), and, in particular, q. 1: «Si D foret in C, et non in B, existeret in C per Q (First Intention), et in C foret B per R (Second Intention). Hoc autem est contra H L in C B» (ibid.: 135). As I mentioned in a previous article (Hughes 2005: 281-296, here p. 282, n. 9), and seems worth repeating, in Ad Thalassium 22, Maximus the Confessor describes Christ as the beginning, middle, and end of all the ages (i.e. of all creation). Cf. Maximus the Confessor, Ad Thalassium 22, in Maximus the Confessor (2003: 117). It is worth noting, in passing, that after he had translated and then revised his translation of the Pseudo-Dionysius’ works under the given title Versio opera sancti Dionysii Areopagit, John Scotus Eriugena also translated Maximus’ Ambigua ad Ioannem (as Versio sancti Maximi Confessoris Ambigua ad Ioannem) as well as his Ambigua ad Thalassium (as Versio sancti Maximi Confessoris Quaestiones ad Thalassium). Eriugena thus provides a possible conduit to Ramon Llull of Maximus—though thought while Llull was in Paris between 1287-89, Ad Thalassium 22 and 60 being particularly important in this regard.
clear relevance to Llull's construal of the hypostatic union, and shows that this construal is causal, formal, and «hylomorphic» in however broad a sense, given that, by definition, there can be no such thing as «materia infinida e finida» and that there is an evident superiority in the relation between «forma infinida e finida»—i.e. between the divine and the human soul in Christ, the soul being the body's form—over that which pertains to «forma e materia», in whatever way the two elements in each dyad may be conjoined.

Despite the above conclusion, Llull goes on to assert in the following question («Utrum humana natura Jesu Christi sit in Filio istius A (God) per Q (first intention) et in Persona Patris et Sancti Spiritus per R (second intention), cum Pater et Sanctus Spiritus non assumpsersint humanam naturam?») that the operation of the Dignities is equally infinitely in Q without R in the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and therefore that it is impossible for the humanity of Christ to be in the Son by Q and in the other Persons by R. Effectively, then, Christ's humanity is equally present to all three members of the Trinity, and this is so «by Q», that is to say, as an end in itself rather than as a means to an end. Clearly this does not mean that all three members of the Trinity are incarnated in Christ, as Llull goes to great lengths on numerous occasions in order to demonstrate the fitnessness of one divine Person's being incarnated and of the fact that this person is the Son of God (Llull 2007: 138). This again reinforces the fact that for Llull—i.e. pace Dupuis 1994 and Marchel 1967 and 1971—Christ's human prayers would be addressed to the Trinity as a whole, not just to God the Father, as occurs in the Biblical witness, not least for the straightforward—and negative—reason that, in the latter, the doctrine of the Trinity had not yet been codified as it later was to be at the First Council of Nicaea in 325.

5. «Reception according to the capacity of the receiver»:

Although earlier on we have quoted from works more or less contemporaneous to Fèlix, namely, DFI (1287-9), Q-ADS (1289) and the Ars ad faciendum et solvendum quaestiones (Lectura Artis inventivae et Tabulae generalis) (1294-5), we have mainly concentrated on some of Llull's earliest works so far—LC (1273-4?), the Llibre de demostracions (1274-6), and LPT (1274-83), for instance. We now return...
briefly to \textit{Q-ADS}, q. 31, «Quare Deus non creavit tantum bonum quantum potest creare?», §§ 6 and 7, where we find two possible clues to the state of affairs described in \textit{Fèlix} (Llull 1729b (1965): 54 (71)) as well as evidence of Llull’s familiarity with the doctrine of «reception according to the capacity of the receiver», which, as noted earlier, derives ultimately from Proclus’s Prop. 173. Section 6 of \textit{Q-ADS} discusses Creation in terms of its end as well as the image of that end («finis et imago ipsius finiss», that image being created goodness, created greatness, etc. Here the human intellect, «tam separatus quam conjunctus», acts as a mirror («specularis») and subject wherein the «finis bonitatis» etc., might see the divine Dignities reflected. However, here Llull stresses the receptive limits of the created world as regards its capacity proportionately to reflect the Dignities («convenit quod divina potestas crearet tantum bonum quantum potuit creare secundum magnitudinem bonitatis etc. praedictarum imaginum, quam habent ipsae imagines in sui proportione ad ipsae Dignitates» (idem: all quotations; emphasis added). \textit{Finis, imago} (though, interestingly not the customary \textit{similitudo}, a term not used here), \textit{speculum} / \textit{mirall} (as in \textit{speculari}), and \textit{proporrio}, it should be noted, are all terms which figure very prominently and are used in a maximal sense in Llull’s Christological discourse (Hughes 2005-06). He goes on to stress, however, in the following section (§ 7), that (despite such limits) Creation must always be conceived of maximally rather than minimally: «quando potestas creavit bonum, creavit illud tantum quantum potuit ratione majoritate non autem ratione minoritate, et per consequens ratione magnitudinis, non autem ratione parvitatis, ut ejus actus creandi quantum posset distaret a parvitate et minoritate» (Llull 1729b (1965): 54 (71)).

In the earlier \textit{Llibre de demostracions}, however, Llull makes reference on a number of occasions to the possibility that the supreme good can make an infinite from a finite good, if only the latter were capable of receiving infinitude—e.g. Book IV, Ch. 1, §§ 1-8; Book IV, Ch. 5, § 4; Book IV, Ch. 46, § 8 (Llull 1930: 166-68, 175, 238 respectively). However, such statements should be set alongside the qualification or inherently limiting factor present in created perfection, namely, in Book IV, Ch. 8, § 2 of the same work and in Llull’s own words, that if the Son of God were to make the Son of Man perfect and infinitely and eternally capable of perfecting, then man would be equal to the Supreme Good, which is impossible (Llull 1930: 180).

Perhaps a further clue to the conundrum posed by the quotation from \textit{Fèlix} lies in Part I, Ch. 9 of that work itself, insofar as we find therein an assertion to the effect that the human nature of Christ is not sufficient by itself of redeeming the human race, although united with the Son of God, that nature is in fact capable of redeeming more than a million worlds (\textit{setgles}) (Llull 1985: 703-05 [English]; Llull 1989: 64-65 [Catalan]). So, if Christ’s human nature on its own is not capable of redeeming humankind, would the prayers of Christ’s human nature (and of Mary and the other denizens in Paradise) addressed to its divine counterpart (and here, rather uncharacteristically, not to the Person of the Son of God or explicitly to the Trinity as a whole) be any more effective in achieving a response or in drawing down God’s grace upon the actual sins of man?
If we give a negative answer to this question how can we explain such a possible conclusion, if we accept that Llull generally shows an entirely favourable attitude towards prayer? Given that Christ is the supreme created being, should not his prayers be supremely effective and therefore eminently susceptible of being heeded by God? If Christ cannot successfully enjoin God to bestow His grace upon man, who can? Are all prayers to go unanswered? Has man so completely alienated himself from God and God's designs that all rescue is impossible?

6. Prayer in the Medicina de peccat (July 1300):

A brief glance at a later text, namely, the Medicina de peccat, a poetic work containing a very lengthy section on prayer—Part V, «D'oració» (Llull 1938: 166-204; ll. 4671-5858)—might shed some light upon the situation described by the Félix quotation(s) and upon the way I myself have tried to elucidate the problematic surrounding it. As the section of the poem proceeds, we note that the poet addresses a prayer to Christ asking that his sins be pardoned in Chapter 2 «De oració de qui», ll. 4921-34 (Llull 1938: 174). Repentance for one's sins, however, is required if they are to be forgiven; consequently, some fifty lines later within the same chapter, Llull casts the poet as penitent sinner at l. 4987 (Llull 1938: 176). Notably, the figures in the passage from Félix are far from being remorseful or even aware of the fact that they are sinning. They are, in fact, recalcitrant, habitual sinners oblivious to their disservice to God and the harm they cause themselves.

The penitence Llull holds up as an example (in prayer) is of paramount importance if one wishes to secure God's grace, this being the correct manner of praying to God, one he cannot refuse—«e vuyl plorar e sospirar / per penedir e per amar; car per ests .ij. pot peccador / aver gracia del Senyor», Part V, Ch. 7 «De oració de loc» (Llull 1938: 196-97), and deal with God's justice and forgiveness, also give instruction as to how to «fer / a Deu veray oracio» (Llull 1938: 201; ll. 5760-61), as Llull later expresses matters in Part V, Ch. 9 «oració ab qui», ll. 5741-5858 (Llull 1938: 201-204). This last chapter, along with the preceding one, namely, Ch. 8 «manera d'oració», ll. 5622-5740 (Llull 1938: 197-201) provide full guidelines as to how to conduct oneself in matters of prayer (Clot 2014: personal communication). Again in Chapter 8, ll. 5689-90, Llull cautions the reader to have the correct aim when praying, that is to say, not to pray for oneself but rather for God, «car Deus no vol hom exoir / qui vula mays esser salvat, / que Deu servit entes amat e onrat» (Llull 1938: 199; ll. 5698-701). For prayers, even and especially, should be guided by man's first intention. A further warning is then given by Llull some hundred lines later (Part V, Ch. 9, ll. 5815-16) regarding the degree to which one invests oneself in prayer and the negative consequences of failing sufficiently to do so, «car se / qui prega ab petit / totes vetz no es exoit» (Llull 1938: 203).

The various desiderata for proper prayer given by Llull as well as his explanations of the circumstances in which prayer will not be heeded by God are of relevance to the problematic quotation from Félix.
on which we are commenting. However, one very obvious difference is that the prayer of Christ’s human nature which in *Fèlix* appears to be unsuccessful in drawing down God’s grace, and which seems to be fully counteracted by the gravity of mankind’s persistent wickedness—we should not forget the recluse’s final dream in which «viu en visió com grans són los falliments que los hòmens fan contra Déu, per los quals defalliments tan grans no és meravella si Déu leixa los hòmens de aquest món perseverar en lur malícia»—is a very different matter from the prayers of a penitent sinner-poet correctly addressing God in order to secure His pardon and His grace. For a start, Christ—and indeed, for Llull, Mary too—was born without sin. And Christ’s impeccability is a Christian article of faith, and one to which Llull refers often, not least in Part Four («De Incarnatione»), § 20, of his *Disputatio fidelis et infidelis* (1287-89) (Llull 1729a (1965): 34 (411)). The Council of Chalcedon in fact determined that Christ is «like us in all respects except for sin» (*κατά πάντα ὅμοιον ἡμῖν χωρίς ἁμαρτίας*—*per omnia nobis simile absque peccato*) (Tanner 1990: 86). He can, therefore, by definition, never occupy the role of penitent sinner. What he can offer in its place, however, is a maximally formulated petition to God in prayer, lesser gradations of which are also offered by his co-intercessors mentioned at the end of *Fèlix*, Chapter 105, a petition which stands a better chance of being heeded by God than any other. We should finally note, at least in passing, the lurking presence of a bitter irony in the last quotation insofar as, within a work specifically devoted to revealing a multiplicity of *meravelles* or wonders, there is at least one such whose implications are far from pleasant; namely, the thought that God might after all leave man to persist in his wickedness.

7. Conclusion:

I began this article by detailing certain possible influences from the common medieval Neoplatonic heritage (Plotinus, Proclus, the Pseudo-Dionysius, the *Liber de causis*) from which scholastic writers and Llull himself drew. This enabled me to focus attention upon several features therein of relevance to Llull’s conception of Christ’s human agency, to the efficacy of Christ’s prayer, to the structural asymmetry underlying Llull’s version of procession and return, to his adoption of the principle of ‘reception according to the capacity of the receiver’, and his at times ‘metaphorical’ construal of the hypostatic union (i.e. the soul-body analogy).

I then continued by outlining a possible contradiction within and between Llull’s texts concerning the efficacy of Christ’s prayers—that is to say, of Christ in his humanity viewed as secondary efficient cause and also as supreme created effect—in the light of man’s recalcitrant wickedness and the exceptional reciprocal love that the divine and human natures in Christ have for the humanity and the deity with which they are respectively conjoined. I then showed how the two movements (of descent and ascent) in Christ find themselves reflected in Llull’s writings by a hierarchy of intentions regarding the purpose of the Incarnation, a purpose that must be referred predominantly to God Himself. I went on to describe how in several works more or less contemporary to *Fèlix* Llull reaffirms this point by stating that God both creates and recreates principally for his own ends,
yet that despite the evident hierarchy of ends in Creation and in Christ, he is keen to maximise the possibility of a full circulation of the two aforementioned movements, as well as to minimise the possibility of any interruptions thereto.

I then set out Llull’s position with respect to the issue of whether prayer in Christ expresses either the relationship a) between the Son of Man and God the Father or b) between the Son of Man and God per se or the Trinity as a whole. Following this, I sought to delineate Llull’s possibly Antiochene interpretation of the hypostatic union and the *communicatio idiomatum*, with a view to presenting Llull’s analogy between the conjunction of soul and body in man and the union of divine and human natures in Christ as being one mediated by a certain «nature of soul» and «nature of body» in the former case and «Divine power (virtut)» and «human power (virtut)» in the latter. This led me to point to a basic asymmetry within the hypostatic union, itself a reiteration of the abovementioned theme of a hierarchy of ends, an asymmetry that can usefully be considered in the light of the inferiority of second to first causes, as expressed in both Proclus’ *Elementatio theologica* and the *Liber de causis*. I then paused to reflect upon the existence of an interruption in or disturbance to the circulation between uncreated and created reality and back, described from the time of Félix onwards by Llull using the Neoplatonic terminology of *influentia/refluentia*, terminology itself deriving from the *corpus dionysiacum* and the *Liber de causis*. I identified four possible sources of such interruption, leaving myself the task of still having to explain the possibility a) that God (i.e. the First Cause) might withdraw His grace from man (in a downward direction) and b) that even Christ’s intercession on man’s behalf (in the form of His humanity and as second cause) through prayer (in an upward direction) might prove insufficient to mollify God. That second causes are less potent and less effective than the First Cause is a point central to the doctrine of causality expounded in the *Liber de causis*.

I use the word «mollify» here, because in the passage from Félix under consideration, there is a strong sense not only that man’s wrongdoings might be too terrible to be forgiven or that his lack of mindfulness towards and neglect of God might deserve some weighty rebuke, but also that the reader is in the presence of, if not the wrathful God of the Old Testament, then at least a God who might prove unresponsive to the petitions even of Christ, Mary and the saints, and capable of withdrawing the fullness of His Providence (or efficient causality) from man. We should bear in mind in this respect, however, that man, as created effect, is held by Llull to be considerably inferior to Christ the man, who in his humanity is the supreme created effect, and thus far less potent as an efficient cause, i.e. in terms of pure causality his wrongdoings might be presumed to have little effect upon God as First Cause. We should remember here, therefore, that God enjoys final causality, though His end be in Himself, and that God in Christ is the final cause of creation. God might be able, then, to withhold his efficient causality *ad extra*, but His final causality is as intrinsic to Him as Himself.
The reader should nevertheless note at this point that Proposition 70 of Proclus’ *Elementatio theologica* states (in the English translation) that

where the [secondary cause] has withdrawn the [higher cause] is still present (for the gift of the more powerful principle [i.e. of the higher cause] is slower to abandon the participant, being more efficacious, and also inasmuch as through the gift of its consequent [i.e. of the secondary cause] it has made its own irradiation stronger) (Proclus 2004 [2nd ed. 1963]: 67).

This thought is echoed in Proposition 1.15 of the *Liber de causis*, which states (again in English): «And when the second cause removes itself from its effect, the prime cause does not remove itself from it, because the prime cause has a greater and more intense adherence to the thing than its proximate cause» (Anon. 1984: 20). The notion, therefore, that the higher cause might withdraw its *influentia* is as good as foreclosed by both texts. Evidence to the contrary from the realm of scholasticism, however, in both a natural and a Christological context, can be found in William of Ware’s *In Sententias* 161 (MS 1438, fo. 108vb, Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek), where God is seen to withhold his primary causation in the biblical story of Daniel and his companions (Dan 3) who, though cast into a fiery furnace, remain unscathed; as cited in Cross (2002: 141 and n. 20).

I went on to distinguish Christ’s role with respect to Original Sin and actual sin, highlighting the effect man’s various failures and misdeeds, though inferior causes, might have on the communication between Christ’s two natures, which according to an Antiochene understanding, has never been too strong in any case. Such considerations point to the need for man actively to contribute to his destiny and to collaborate therewith by embracing virtue, avoiding vice and keeping the Incarnation at the forefront of his mind. Indeed, I showed how, in Llull’s writings, God’s aid is fostered by the signification of the Incarnation to the powers of the human soul. The aid given by the first (or prime) cause to the second cause in its operation is a thesis expressed clearly in Proposition 1 of the *Liber de causis* (Anon. 1984: 20; Aquinas 1996: 6, 8), while the doctrine of the limited receptivity of the created world used by Llull echoes the remaining propositions from the *Liber de causis* cited in the Introduction to this article.

I then re-examined Llull’s use of what he, by this stage, calls the «metaphor» between the soul-body relation in man and the human-divine union in Christ in terms of its being a suggestive analogy capable of evoking the way in which the relative weakness of Christ’s human nature in that union encapsulates and dramatises the essential weakness of the created with respect to the uncreated and the finite with respect to the infinite. Such thoughts lead one to consider that this ontological and operational deficiency in creation and in Christ can only be adequately supplemented on two conditions: 1) that Christ’s human nature is conceived maximally, his human agency in prayer being directed upwards towards God as Trinity but also God as Divine essence, this agency as intercessor also being conceived maximally; and 2) that God is willing (and wills) to bestow His grace downwards upon man in full. If only one of these conditions is satisfied, we are left in the position suggested by the *Fèlix* passage, namely, that despite Christ’s (and Mary’s, etc.) best efforts...
in prayer, no response is forthcoming from God. A third condition should also be written into this «contract», namely, that as previously mentioned, if man is not penitent and fails actively to pursue his first intention in life as in prayer, the contract could or should be terminated or annulled forthwith. In the passage from Fèlix we find that the second and third of these conditions do not obtain, and thereby Christ's and the other intercessors' prayers seem not to be answered.

Since God's will, however, cannot be said to be dependent upon or conditioned by anything, particularly by an effect that can also be considered a second cause—man's collaboration or otherwise in his salvation included—it is probably safer simply to say, as Llull himself concludes, that despite Christ's, Mary's and the saints' prayers on man's behalf, it should come as no surprise if God were to withhold His grace and deny man his ultimate destiny—«si Déus leixa los hòmens de aquest món perseverar en lur malícia»—, given that we find not only the absence of a maximally positive response on his part towards God but also the presence of one in which God is minimally respected and actively repudiated—«grans són los falliments que los hòmens fan contra Déu» (Llull 1989: 341).

A few final words perhaps should be said to the effect that although these latter sentiments are in fact voiced by Llull in the indicative rather than the subjunctive mood, this fact is attributable to the author's desire to lend immediacy in the form of the present tense to the recluse's vision while at the same time making a general statement about man's condition and his relation to God. It should also be remembered that salvation is God's gift to man and is made at His discretion and that worship is man's response to God. Prayer, of course, is a form of such worship, and Christ's prayers as man form part of this response. Lastly, one should bear in mind that what might be seen as man's collaboration in his own salvation could more profitably be considered his participation in the worship of God.

8. Appendix:

At the risk of undermining my entire line of argument, I feel I should alert the reader to at least one of a series of points raised by Ruiz Simon (Ruiz Simon 2014: personal communication) after he had read a late draft of this article. Unfortunately, his comments came too late for me to make all but a few adjustments and would have required a wholesale reconceptualisation of the matter at hand, given that he delivers some very serious challenges to the interpretation I have been giving. He takes issue, in fact, with a number of the basic points I have tried to put across, as well as contributing helpful suggestions towards the enrichment of our understanding of Llull's Christology via reflection on the influence of the Pseudo-Dionysius' DDN thereupon. It is my provisional opinion, however, that Llull's sometimes complex positions regarding Christology are only partly explained by recourse to the writings of the Pseudo-Dionysius in their role as the chief conduit through which Neoplatonic ideas of causality became subject to «Christianisation». I hope to explore some of these questions at a later date.
Ruiz Simon, then, points out that, in the full quotation from Félix in question, there is an asymmetry in content between the prayer of Christ’s human nature and that of Mary, the archangels, etc., a fact which I had otherwise overlooked. Christ’s prayer is simply «per son poble», he states, whereas that of Mary, etc., is so that «lo mon fos bo et en bon estament» (see above § 2, p. 168). Christ’s prayer, therefore, is «selective»—here Ruiz Simon refers to Romans 8:34 (cf. Romans 8:27) and to John 17:9ff. as Biblical precedents, and the «poble de Déu» referred to are those predestined for salvation, an end which will be brought about by the divine rather than human efficacy present in Christ. Christ’s prayer thus also corresponds to the will of God, whose power is capable of bringing about whatever He wills. Christ’s prayer is one in which «Christus nihil aliud voluit nisi quod scivit Deum velle» (as cited above, § 2, p. 168), and thus there can be no divided will in Christ, unlike what appears to be the case in Luke 22:42 or Matthew 26:39 (as cited above, § 3.3., p. 178).

Ruiz Simon goes on to suggest that the recluse plays a similar role to Félix in Book I, Chapters 1-6 of the work of the same name, who «marvels» or «wonders» at the fact that God did not protect the «shepherdess», who placed all her trust in Him, from the wolf (Llull 1985: 661-662; 1989: 19). Here, neither the recluse nor Félix are responding as theologians. Furthermore, he states that Llull’s distinction between the two aforementioned kinds of prayer show that he had a very clear understanding of theological orthodoxy, as does the fact that Christ’s prayer is attributed to his human nature, in keeping with St Thomas Aquinas’ statements in ST, III, q. 21, a. 1 co. (Aquinas 1980a: 803; as also cited above, § 3.3, p. 179). Ruiz Simon’s solution, therefore, successfully reconciles Llull’s thought in this respect with orthodoxy and effectively dissolves the dilemma I have been discussing in this article, although it seems to me that there is some negative excess present in Llull’s treatment of the issue which is not entirely accounted for or removed by the solution Ruiz Simon proposes.

What I think the difference of opinion between Ruiz Simon and myself boils down to is this: namely, that I consider the quotations from Félix discussed above to reveal a genuine disjunction expressed by Llull between the relative capacities of Christ’s two natures, a disjunction which embodies a form of causal insufficiency or weakness in his humanity, and which poses a constant threat to the possibility of man’s return to God. I have also suggested that such a state of affairs is reinforced by Llull’s oscillating views regarding the nature of the hypostatic union in Christ, views which at times seem to reflect a crypto-Monophysite understanding thereof (as seen in his use of the soul-body analogy; cf. John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, III, 3 (John of Damascus 1864: 990A)) and at times a neo-Antiochene position. I also contend that the figure of the recluse, though not a professional theologian, is giving voice to bona fide theological reflections.

Ruiz Simon’s elegant formulation, on the other hand, holds that any disjunction or dilemma in Llull’s treatment of the matters at hand is, at best, a false one, and that reading Llull’s utterances through the filter of Pseudo-Dionysian Christology, best seen in DDN, Chapters 1-3, and Letter 4, ‘To the same monk Gaius’, themselves filtered through John of Damascus’ subsequent De fide
orthodoxa, III, 19 and 24, in particular, helps us properly to reconcile his statements with orthodoxy. On this reading, the very question of the efficacy of Christ’s prayer as an operation of his human nature does not arise, since no causal power attaches to that nature which is not (equally) that of its divine counterpart. In other words, no disjunction exists between Christ’s two wills (cf. John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, III, 15, who states that «tametsi in Theandrica, seu in Dei simul et hominis actione nequeant disjungi» (1864: 1055A)). Also on this reading, the recluse’s statements constitute strictly personal, if literary, reflections standing well outside the bounds of scholastic theological discourse.

I leave the reader to deliberate on such matters, though add that perhaps the result of this deliberation will rest on whether we judge Classical theatrical traditions regarding the interplay of irony and its opposite to have any bearing at all on the comments Llull places in the mouth of the recluse. Consequently, we might want to consider what position the latter could possibly occupy along the spectrum between the braggadocio generally exhibited by the alazôn (ἀλαζῶν) and the understatement characteristic of the eirôn (ἐιρών), or whether we cast him as a simple «wonderer». If we reject such a reading in terms of Classical models, and I only invoke them on the grounds of Ramon Llull’s evident dramatization of the recluse’s words, we might equally wish to reject Richard Rorty’s post-analytic definition of irony as «inherently a private matter» (1989: 87) and its opposite as nothing other than «common sense» (Rorty 1989: 74), for it seems that Ramon Llull’s construal of the opposition between actual and apparent meaning, viz. irony, in the Fèlix quotation(s) I have discussed, is contrasted with its own opposite, namely, Christian orthodoxy conceived in terms of sincerity and literalness. The differences between Ruiz Simon’s interpretation and my own hinge upon this dialectic, though it is indeed a further irony that my own more «literal» reading—albeit one that finds room for Llull’s «metaphorical» treatment of the hypostatic union—has failed to eliminate every suggestion of possible heterodoxy among some of the complex positions to which Llull gives voice in his treatment of Christological matters relating to the hypostatic union, causality and prayer.
Robert Desmond Hughes. «[el resclús] se maravellà com podia esser que Déus no exoya la natura humana de Jesucrist, qui pregava per son poble la natura divina», (Fèlix o Llibre de meravelles, Ch. 105, «De la oració»)?

Abbreviations:


DFI = Disputatio fidei et intellectus (see below).

DDN = De divinis nominibus in Pseudo-Dionysius (1987) and PG III (1857).

LC = Llibre de contemplació (see below).

LPT = Liber principiorum theologiae (see below).


PL = Patrologia Latina. Cursus Completus (1841-64), [Augustine Epistola 140 (ad Honoratum) XXXIII; Enchiridion ad Laurentiam XL; De Trinitate XLI; Eriugena, Versio operum sancti Dionysii Areopagitae CXXII], Jacques-Paul Migne (ed.), Paris.

QADS = Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam solubiles (see below).


Robert Desmond Hughes. «El resclús se maravellà com podia esser que Déus no exoya la natura humana de Jesucrist, qui pregava per son poble la natura divina», (Fèlix o Llibre de maravelles, Ch. 105, «De la oració»).

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